Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.

544 F. Supp. 2d 933, 2008 WL 1733656
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedApril 1, 2008
DocketCV 01-162 TUC FRZ
StatusPublished

This text of 544 F. Supp. 2d 933 (Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 933, 2008 WL 1733656 (D. Ariz. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER

FRANK R. ZAPATA, District Judge.

I.

PlaintiffiCounterDefendant Au-Tomo-tive Gold, Inc. (“Auto Gold”) filed the Complaint in this action on April 19, 2001 against Defendants/Counterclaimants Volkswagen AG and Volkswagen of America, Inc. (collectively “VW”) and Audi AG and Audi of America, Inc. (collectively “Audi”) seeking a declaratory judgment that its production and sales of automobile accessories did not constitute trademark infringement or trademark counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), or trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).

VW and Audi filed counterclaims for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a); false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); consumer fraud under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act; tortious interference with contract; tortious interference with business expectancy; trademark counterfeiting under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act; and a request for declaratory judgment as to all claims.

Then, as explained by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, “[f]rom this point, the case became a maze of counterclaims, stipulated dismissals, and new complaints. This procedural morass was made all the more complicated when some of Volkswagen and Audi’s complaints migrated from the original counterclaim to a separate complaint that was later consolidated with the original action.” Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1839, 167 L.Ed.2d 323 (2007).

*935 In its opinion, filed August 11, 2006, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, finding in favor of VW and Audi on the issue of infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) and remanded “for consideration of the ‘first sale’ defense and any other related claims or defenses.” Id.

This case was reassigned to the undersigned on November 13, 2006.

Before the Court for consideration is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants/Counterclaimants Volkswagen and Audi, filed May 21, 2007, seeking a permanent judgment as a matter of law on VW and Audi’s claims of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.

A hearing was held in this matter on October 22, 2007 and the matter was taken under advisement.

II.

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that the only liability issue remaining, on which the Ninth Circuit remanded this case, is whether Auto Gold can assert a “first sale” defense. Defendants argue that under the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which conclusively determined that the products at issue are likely to confuse customers, and thus, VW and Audi have established a prima facie case with respect to infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, that the material facts are undisputed and Defendants are entitled to judgment on the question of the viability of Auto Gold’s first sale defense.

Defendants cite Sebastian International, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.1995), explaining that a trademark holder has no right to object when a third party displays and resells genuine merchandise under the producers’ trademark. Defendants use the example that “once a genuine Volkswagen brake caliper is sold to a customer, the customer may resell that caliper and VW has no right to object” under the first sale doctrine. To illustrate the exception to the first sale defense, Defendants use the example, that if the purchaser of the Volkswagen brake caliper uses the caliper to build its own anti-lock brake system, it can no longer be sold under the VW brand because it is not a genuine VW brake system, and thus, a recognized limitation to the first sale defense is that the mere sale of a trademarked product does not give the purchaser the right to alter the product and resell it as if it were genuine. See Karl Storz Endoscopy v. Surgical Technologies, Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir.2002); Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir.1999).

Defendants first argue that Auto Gold has asserted its first sale defense to only one of its products, the “VW” medallion license plates, and that it should be noted that Auto Gold has no defense whatsoever for the rest of its counterfeit key chains, license plates, and license plate frames, for which the Ninth Circuit’s conclusive finding of prima facie infringement stands entirely unrebutted, and therefore, VW and Audi are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1074-78.

Defendants next argue that it is undisputed that Auto Gold uses the VW medallions in manufacturing an entirely new product by using its own materials and its own specification, in some instances simply by gold-plating the medallions.

Defendants further argue that the VW medallion license plates are not protected under the first sale doctrine, an important — but limited — restriction on trademark rights because Auto Gold “has done much more than ‘merely stocking and reselling’ genuine VW® medallions.” See Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1076. Defendants provide a thorough analysis of the Ninth *936 Circuit decisions addressing the restrictions of the first sale doctrine in cases where the reseller uses genuine trademarked items as a component in the manufacturing of a new product in Rolex Watch, Karl Storz, and Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. General Circuit Breaker & Electric Supply Inc. 106 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir.1997). 1

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law, and that “irreparable injury may be presumed” from a showing of a likelihood of confusion in a trademark case. GoTo.Com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 n. 4 (9th Cir.2000) (citation omitted).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
544 F. Supp. 2d 933, 2008 WL 1733656, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/au-tomotive-gold-inc-v-volkswagen-of-america-inc-azd-2008.