Atwood-Hood PRD

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedMarch 18, 2010
Docket116-6-09 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Atwood-Hood PRD (Atwood-Hood PRD) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atwood-Hood PRD, (Vt. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} In re: Atwood-Hood PRD (DP 09-07) } Docket No. 116-6-09 Vtec (Appeal of Atwood and Hood) } }

} In re: Atwood 2-Lot Subdivision (DP 09-05) } Docket No. 117-6-09 Vtec (Appeal of Atwood) } }

Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

These two consolidated appeals involve a twelve-unit residential development

proposed to be constructed on property in the Town of Williston, which was granted

“Discretionary Permit” approval by the Development Review Board (DRB) of the Town

of Williston in two separate decisions.1 The proposed twelve-unit development

involves three existing parcels of land: one owned by Appellant-Applicants Dana and

Brenda Hood and two owned by Appellant-Applicant Jeff Atwood.2 In Docket No. 116-

6-09 Vtec, Appellant-Applicants Atwood and Hood (Applicants) appeal certain

1 The Interim Unified Development Bylaw for the Town of Williston, adopted on July 22, 2008 (2008 Development Bylaw), uses the term “Discretionary Permit” to refer to all the types of approvals within the jurisdiction of the DRB, as contrasted with the “Administrative Permits” issued directly by the zoning administrator. See 2008 Development Bylaw, ch. 5 (discussing “Administrative Permit Procedures”), ch. 6 (discussing “Discretionary Permit Procedures”). Thus, the term “Discretionary Permit” encompasses DRB decisions on conditional use applications, subdivision applications, site plan applications, and applications for planned residential developments (PRDs). 2 The parties have not provided the applications or any map, plan, or diagram of the

proposed developments. 1 conditions imposed in a decision of the DRB, in which the DRB granted Discretionary

Permit approval to Applicants for a nine-unit Planned Residential Development (PRD),

with conditions. In Docket No. 117-6-09, Applicant Atwood appeals certain conditions

imposed in a decision of the DRB, in which the DRB granted him Discretionary Permit

approval, with conditions, for the remaining three residential units proposed for the

twelve-unit development. Both of the DRB’s Discretionary Permit decisions on appeal

are contained in the minutes of the DRB’s April 28, 2009 meeting.3 Appellant-

Applicants are represented by L. Randolph Amis, Esq.; the Town is represented by Paul

Gilles, Esq.

The parties have each moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the

DRB had legal authority to impose several conditions included in the two Discretionary

Permit approvals.4 It is important to note that the Statement of Questions raises no

issues regarding whether the Court in this de novo appeal should approve either the

three-unit or the nine-unit portion of the development, with or without the contested

conditions. Rather, as written, all of the questions in the Statement of Questions

3 The parties have not provided a separate written decision on the two applications. However, the minutes of a DRB meeting at which a decision is made may serve as the written decision required by statute. See 24 V.S.A. § 4464(b)(1) (stating that municipal panel “[d]ecisions shall be issued in writing,” and that the “minutes of the meeting [at which the decision is made] may suffice”). For ease of reference, the Court will refer to the April 29, 2009 meeting minutes as the “2009 DRB Discretionary Permit Decision.” 4 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montgomery v. Devoid, 2006 VT 127, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 154 (quoting V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3); State v. Therrien, 2003 VT 44, ¶ 8, 175 Vt. 342). When presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court is “directed to consider each motion in turn and to afford the party opposing the motion under consideration the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences.” In re Delano Variance Application, No. 161-8-07 Vtec, slip op. at 4 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Aug. 28, 2008) (Durkin, J.) (citing DeBartolo v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 2007 VT 31, ¶ 8, 181 Vt. 609). 2 address only the authority of the DRB—and hence, the authority of this Court in this de

novo appeal—to impose the contested conditions.

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Applicants propose to develop a twelve-unit residential development on an

approximately 7.2-acre project parcel, which is composed of three existing parcels of

property: two owned by Applicant Atwood and one currently owned by Applicants

Hood.5 All three parcels of property are bounded on the west by North Williston Road

and are bounded on the east by an unrelated residential development known as

Allenbrook. A small roadway known as Lefebvre Lane serves the Allenbrook

residential development; Lefebvre Lane cuts through the 7.2-acre project parcel and

makes a T-intersection with North Williston Road.

The most southerly of the three existing parcels involved in these appeals (the

South Atwood Parcel) is 3.01 acres in area and is undeveloped; its northerly boundary is

Lefebvre Lane. The adjoining parcel to the north of Lefebvre Lane is the Hood Parcel,

which is 1.17 acres in area and contains an existing single-family dwelling and a paved

driveway.6 Adjoining the Hood parcel to its north is the second Atwood parcel (the

North Atwood Parcel). The North Atwood Parcel is 3.02 acres in area and contains an

5 The project property was located in a Medium Density Residential zoning district under the previous zoning ordinance (the 1990 Zoning Ordinance). Although the area was also defined as a Medium Density Residential zoning district in the 2008 Development Bylaw, the 2008 Development Bylaw did not yet include provisions regulating the uses and dimensional requirements for the Medium Density Residential zoning district (as well as for several other zoning districts) as of the date on which that bylaw was adopted. Due to this omission, in reviewing the applications on appeal the DRB applied the use and dimensional provisions for the Medium Density Residential zoning district from the 1990 Zoning Ordinance. See 2009 DRB Discretionary Permit Decision, at 12. However, the Statement of Questions does not raise any issue as to the lack of these provisions in the 2008 Development Bylaw or the applicability of the 1990 Zoning Ordinance. 6 The house on the Hood parcel has the address of 146 North Williston Road.

3 existing two-unit residential duplex building and an existing carriage barn.7

Class II wetlands and a fifty-foot wetland buffer are located on the northern

portion of the existing North Atwood Parcel, as well as “on the southern and western

border[s] of the existing Hood Parcel.” 2009 DRB Discretionary Permit Decision, at 21.

The South Atwood Parcel is comprised entirely of Class II wetlands, the Allen Brook,

and associated wetland buffers.

Applicant Atwood intends to purchase the Hood Parcel, which will result in a

7.2-acre project parcel. Through the two Discretionary Permit applications on appeal—

Application # DP 09-07 and Application # DP 09-05—Applicants propose to develop a

twelve-unit residential development on the resulting 7.2-acre parcel.8

Application # DP 09-07 (the 9-Unit Application) proposes a subdivision of the

overall 7.2-acre project property and proposes a nine-unit residential development on

the resulting southerly portion of the subdivided property. Application # DP 09-05 (the

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Related

Montgomery v. Devoid
2006 VT 127 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2006)
Smith v. Winhall Planning Commission
436 A.2d 760 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1981)
State v. Therrien
2003 VT 44 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2003)
In Re Keystone Development Corp.
2009 VT 13 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2009)
Robes v. Town of Hartford
636 A.2d 342 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1993)
Brennan Woods Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Williston
782 A.2d 1230 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
Atwood-Hood PRD, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atwood-hood-prd-vtsuperct-2010.