Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Keith Anthony Parris, Misc. Docket AG No. 22, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Eaves, J.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTION — DISBARMENT Keith Anthony Parris, Respondent, violated several provisions of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) when he failed to file opposition motions on behalf of his client; failed to respond to discovery requests; failed to comply with court orders compelling him to complete discovery; failed to communicate with his client; repeatedly failed to respond to his client’s requests for information; misrepresented the status of the case to his client; made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the trial court; collected unreasonable fees from his client for services he did not perform; and failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information. Respondent’s conduct violated the following MARPC: 1.1 (Competence); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal); 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); and 8.4 (Misconduct). These violations warrant Respondent’s disbarment. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAE21-10972 Submitted on Brief: November 4, 2022 IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF MARYLAND*
Misc. Docket AG No. 22
September Term, 2021
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v.
KEITH ANTHONY PARRIS
Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Eaves, J.
Filed: February 1, 2023 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this * At the November 8, 2022, general election, the document is authentic. voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 2023-02-01 11:50-05:00 amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on Gregory Hilton, Clerk December 14, 2022. This attorney discipline case involves the misconduct of Keith Anthony Parris
(“Parris”), a member of the Bar of this Court. During his representation of a client, Parris’s
conduct evidenced a multitude of wrongdoing warranting his disbarment. Parris failed to
respond to motions, to respond to discovery requests, to comply with court orders
compelling him to complete discovery, and to advise his client of the pending motions and
discovery. Parris neglected to respond to his client’s requests for information, and, to
conceal his deficiencies, he misrepresented the status of the case to his client and made
knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the trial court. Parris’s inaction ultimately
caused the court to impose sanctions and enter a default judgment against his client.
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), acting
through Bar Counsel, filed in this Court its Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action
(the “Petition”) against Parris. The Commission alleged that Parris violated the following
nine Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”):
1. 19-301.1 (Competence) (1.1); 2. 19-301.3 (Diligence) (1.3); 3. 19-301.4 (Communication) (1.4); 4. 19-301.5 (Fees) (1.5); 5. 19-303.2 (Expediting Litigation) (3.2); 6. 19-303.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) (3.3); 7. 19-303.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney) (3.4); 8. 19-308.1 (Bar Admissions and disciplinary Matters) (8.1); and 9. 19-308.4 (Misconduct) (8.4).
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-722(a), this Court entered an order referring the
matter to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. In the Order, this Court designated
the Honorable Wytonja L. Curry (the “hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and provide findings of fact and conclusions of law. During the proceedings before the
hearing judge, Parris did not file any responsive pleadings or respond to Bar Counsel’s
requests for information. As a result, the Commission filed a Motion for Order of Default.
The hearing judge entered an Order of Default against Parris “for failure to respond to [the
Petition] within the time permitted by the Order of the [Supreme Court of Maryland] and
the Writ of Summons issued by the Clerk of [the circuit court].” The circuit court held a
hearing, at which Parris did not appear. The hearing judge considered the evidence that
the Commission submitted at the hearing and then filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law with this Court.
Parris did not file any exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Because (1) Parris did not file an answer to the Petition and the
hearing judge entered an Order of Default against him; (2) the Order of Default was not
vacated; (3) Parris did not appear at the hearing before the hearing judge; and (4) Parris did
not file any exceptions or recommendation for sanction with this Court, he is deemed to
have waived oral argument pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-740(a). Accordingly, this Court
considered the matter without oral argument based on the record before the hearing judge.
For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions of
law for each of Parris’s violations of the professional conduct rules and disbar Parris.
I. THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT Where, as here, neither party filed any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of
fact, this Court “may treat the [hearing judge’s] findings of fact as established.” Md. Rule
19-740(b)(2)(A). We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact below.
2 A. Background
This Court admitted Parris to the Bar of this Court on June 18, 1987.1 At all times
relevant to this proceeding, Parris maintained an office for the practice of law in Prince
George’s County, Maryland. Parris’s misconduct in this case arises out of his
representation of the Chaddsford Community Association, Inc. (“Chaddsford”).
B. Chaddsford Community Association, Inc.
Chaddsford is a homeowner’s association for a housing community in Brandywine,
Maryland. In August 2010, Chaddsford retained the Law Offices of Gregory A.
Alexandires (the “Firm”) as general counsel to Chaddsford’s board of directors (the
“Board”).2 Among its duties, the Firm collected past due assessments from property
owners subject to Chaddsford’s authority. In June 2017, Chaddsford terminated the Firm
and requested from the Firm an invoice for outstanding attorneys’ fees and collection costs.
The Firm subsequently sent Chaddsford an itemized invoice in the amount of $77,727.43,
accounting for the Firm’s services from August 2010 to June 2017. Chaddsford did not
pay the invoice, which prompted the Firm to file a lawsuit against Chaddsford in the
District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County. The Firm’s action against
Chaddsford sought to collect a portion ($29,673.30) of the attorneys’ fees and collection
costs detailed in the June 2017 invoice.
1 At the time of his admission, it was the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. As noted earlier, the name is now the Bar of the Supreme Court of Maryland. 2 For simplicity, we will refer to Chaddsford’s actions through the Board as “Chaddsford” since the Board is authorized to make decisions on behalf of Chaddsford pursuant to Chaddsford’s articles of incorporation and bylaws.
3 C. Parris’s Representation of Chaddsford in the Firm’s Lawsuit
On August 13, 2018, Chaddsford retained Parris to serve as its new general counsel.
With respect to the Firm’s District Court action against Chaddsford, Parris advised
Chaddsford that it “was not liable for approximately 40% of the attorneys’ fees and costs
claimed . . . because the Firm failed to collect those amounts before the statute of limitations
expired.” Parris further advised Chaddsford that “some of the legal services included on
the [June 2017] invoice were inconsistent with prior accountings” the Firm provided to
Chaddsford. Based on his advice, Chaddsford authorized Parris to represent it in the
District Court action. Parris billed Chaddsford $2,415 for legal services he provided in the
District Court case from August 7–31, 2018, which Chaddsford paid in full.
On November 29, 2018, the Firm filed a separate complaint against Chaddsford in
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and sought to recover $75,000—nearly the
full amount of the June 2017 invoice. The Firm thereafter filed a motion to stay the
proceedings in the District Court pending the outcome of the circuit court action. Parris
did not file a response to the motion, and the District Court granted the motion. Parris
invoiced Chaddsford $2,460 for legal representation he provided in the District Court case
from September 1, 2018, through December 14, 2018, which Chaddsford paid in full.
Parris filed an answer to the circuit court complaint on March 15, 2019, in which he
argued that Chaddsford did not owe the claimed fees and asserted several affirmative
defenses to the Firm’s claims. Parris then served Chaddsford’s first set of interrogatories
on the Firm. Among its written discovery requests, the Firm served request for admissions
on Parris, to which Chaddsford’s responses were due on April 29, 2019. Parris “failed to
4 timely forward the discovery requests to Chaddsford or advise [Chaddsford] of the deadline
to respond” and “failed to timely respond to the requests.”
As a result, the Firm filed a partial summary judgment motion contending that the
circuit court should deem as admitted the alleged facts in the complaint due to
Chaddsford’s failure to respond to the request for admissions. Parris neither advised
Chaddsford of the summary judgment motion nor filed a response to the motion. The
circuit court denied the summary judgment motion for nonconformance with Maryland
Rule 2-501(a).3 The Firm subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of its summary
judgment motion in conformance with Rule 2-501(a), which the court again denied.
On June 28, 2019, Parris filed an answer to the Firm’s summary judgment motion
stating in part,
[a]s indicated in the Answer to Complaint, a large part of the [Firm’s] complaint is barred by the [s]tatute of [l]imitations.
[Chaddsford] is still in the process of gathering discovery to establish the violation of the [s]tatute of limitations, in that the information is in the custody of the [Firm].
[Chaddsford] has been hindered in this process in not receiving documents and pleadings supposedly filed by the [Firm].
This matter should be litigated on the merits. [Chaddsford’s] discovery will be fully complied with on or before July 12, 2019.
3 When a party files a motion for summary judgment with the court, “[t]he motion shall be supported by affidavit if it is (1) filed before the day on which the adverse party’s initial pleading or motion is filed or (2) based on facts not contained in the record.” Md. Rule 2-501(a). The Firm’s motion lacked this supporting affidavit.
5 The Firm, however, served Parris its answers to Chaddsford’s interrogatories and copies of
each of its motions throughout the proceedings. The hearing judge found that “[Parris’s]
statements to the [trial] court that he was in the process of gathering information from the
Firm and that he had been hindered by not receiving documents and pleadings filed by the
Firm were knowingly and intentionally false.”
Thereafter, the court held a pretrial conference, which Parris attended on behalf of
Chaddsford. At the conference, the court ordered that Chaddsford provide all outstanding
discovery responses to the Firm by August 5, 2019. On August 5, Parris sent his discovery
responses to the Firm via email attachment, but the responses were incomplete and one of
the attachments could not be opened. The Firm sent Parris via email two requests to resend
complete discovery responses that could be opened. Parris did not respond to either email.
Consequently, the Firm filed a motion for sanctions against Chaddsford for failure to
provide outstanding discovery by the court’s deadline. The Firm requested the court to
award it $800 in attorney’s fees for the time it spent on additional efforts to obtain the
outstanding discovery. Parris did not file a response to the sanctions motion. Parris
proceeded to bill Chaddsford $3,955 in legal services that he claimed for the period of
March 14, 2019, through August 14, 2019. Chaddsford paid the invoice in full.
The court denied the motion for sanctions and entered an order “compelling
Chaddsford to provide electronic and hard copies of all discovery to the Firm within seven
days” of August 30, 2019. When Parris failed to comply with the court’s discovery order,
the Firm filed a renewed motion for sanctions for failure to comply with second court order
for discovery responses. The Firm requested that the court enter an order of default against
6 Chaddsford and award the Firm attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,225. Parris did not file
a response to the Firm’s motion and did not provide the outstanding discovery to the Firm.
On October 14, 2019, Parris met with Chaddsford to provide an update on the circuit
court litigation. According to the Board’s meeting minutes, Parris discussed the settlement
value of the case and his anticipated attorneys’ fees. The hearing judge found that Parris
omitted material facts in an effort to conceal his misconduct from Chaddsford. In
particular, Parris did not inform Chaddsford of the outstanding discovery requests or of his
failure to comply with court orders compelling Chaddsford to provide outstanding
discovery. Parris also did not advise Chaddsford of the Firm’s recent pending motion, in
which the Firm asked the court to impose discovery sanctions and enter a default judgment
against Chaddsford.
On October 21, 2019, the court entered an order granting the Firm’s renewed motion
for sanctions. The court awarded, with post-judgment interest, $1,225 in attorneys’ fees to
the Firm and entered a default judgment against Chaddsford in the amount of $75,000. The
court’s order stated that Chaddsford “shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this order
to move to vacate this entry of default.” Parris neither advised Chaddsford of the default
judgment nor moved to vacate the default judgment.4
After the court’s entry of default, Parris did not respond to Chaddsford’s
communications to him about the status of the case. In January 2020, Chaddsford’s
managing agent sent three emails to Parris requesting an update. Parris did not respond to
4 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 3-507, the District Court dismissed the Firm’s District Court claim on January 17, 2020.
7 these emails. Between January 2020 and March 11, 2020, the Board president made
several phone calls and sent 17 text messages to Parris requesting information about the
case. Parris did not answer any phone calls but responded to some text messages, although
his responses appeared to lack both substance and thought.
Unbeknownst to Chaddsford, the Firm obtained and served a writ of garnishment
on Chaddsford’s bank to collect the $75,000 default judgment. On February 19, 2020,
Chaddsford’s bank sent a letter to Chaddsford notifying it of the writ of garnishment with
a copy of the writ attached—this was Chaddsford’s first notification of the default
judgment. Parris did not notify Chaddsford of the default judgment until March 11, 2020,
via email. Parris stated that the circuit court recently entered the October 21, 2019, default
judgment against Chaddsford. The hearing judge found that Parris’s statement that the
default judgment was recent was “knowingly false and intentionally misleading” because
almost five months had passed. Parris “omitted material facts concerning his failure to
respond to discovery and failure to comply with the court’s orders to conceal his
misconduct.” Parris also notified Chaddsford that he would attend a March 9, 2020, Board
meeting to discuss the outcome of the circuit court case. Parris did not appear at the
scheduled meeting.
Parris billed Chaddsford periodically throughout the litigation, and Chaddsford
promptly paid each invoice in full. Between August 31, 2018, and August 26, 2019, Parris
collected $8,830 in fees from Chaddsford, at a rate of $300 per hour. Parris created false
time entries and billed Chaddsford for services he did not perform. The hearing judge cited
examples including an entry dated August 13, 2019, which reflected that Parris
8 “purportedly spent 4.4 hours reviewing and analyzing discovery” and an entry dated
August 14, 2019, the work for which Parris “billed 2.3 hours to review and input data.”
The hearing judge found that “the billing entries were knowingly false and intended to
conceal [Parris’s] failure to defend Chaddsford in the litigation.”
D. Bar Counsel’s Investigation On May 20, 2020, Chaddsford filed a complaint against Parris with the Commission.
Between July 2020 and November 2020, Bar Counsel wrote to Parris on four separate
occasions requesting a response to the complaint against him. Parris did not respond to
Bar Counsel’s inquiries. On December 3, 2020, a Bar Counsel investigator went to Parris’s
home and spoke with him. Parris denied receiving any of Bar Counsel’s letters. The
investigator gave Parris copies of all four letters, and Parris said he would reach out to Bar
Counsel that day. Parris did not contact Bar Counsel and never responded to any of Bar
Counsel’s requests for information.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW As discussed, when neither the respondent nor the Commission files exceptions to
any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact, this Court may accept those findings of fact as
established. Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). This Court reviews de novo the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law, Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1), and “determines whether clear and convincing
evidence establishes that an attorney violated the MARPC[,]” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Silbiger, 478 Md. 607, 617 (2022).
9 III. DISCUSSION
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Parris violated
professional conduct Rules 1.1; 1.3; 1.4; 1.5(a), 3.2; 3.3(a); 3.4; 8.1(b); and 8.4(a), (c)–(d).
Neither Parris nor the Commission filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of
law. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the hearing judge that clear and
convincing evidence establishes each of the MARPC violations in this case and conclude
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Parris.
A. Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports the Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law.
Because the same conduct of Parris supports his violation of several rules of
professional conduct, we first address concurrently Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 3.4. We
then address in turn Rules 1.5, 3.3, 8.1, and 8.4.
Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.3 (Diligence); Rule 1.4 (Communication); Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney).
Under Rule 1.1, “[a]n attorney shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness[,] and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Generally, this Court will find
that an attorney violated Rule 1.1 when he or she “fails to act or acts in an untimely manner,
resulting in harm to his or her client.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642,
694 (2019) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 319 (2012)). An
attorney has violated Rule 1.1 when he or she failed to “file opposition motions,” failed to
“answer discovery requests,” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bellamy, 453 Md. 377, 393
10 (2017), and failed to comply with court orders, Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 461
Md. 189, 217 (2018). An attorney has demonstrated incompetent representation by his or
her failure to respond to discovery that results in sanctions against and pecuniary damage
to the client. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 180 (2015).
Rule 1.3 states that “[a]n attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” Due to the evident overlap between competence and
diligence, an attorney’s “[c]onduct which violates Rule 1.1 will often also violate Rule
1.3.” Powell, 461 Md. at 216 (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388,
398 (2008)). An attorney can violate Rule 1.3 when he or she fails to file responsive
motions, to respond to discovery requests, to comply with court orders to complete
discovery, and to respond to the client’s communications about the case. Att’y Grievance
Comm’n v. Williams, 446 Md. 355, 374 (2016). E.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Leatherman, 475 Md. 80, 105 (2021). An attorney has failed to act with reasonable
diligence when his or her failure to respond to discovery requests causes a court to impose
discovery sanctions against the client. Hamilton, 444 Md. at 183 (citing Brown, 426 Md.
at 320).
Rule 1.4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that an attorney shall “keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information[.]” Rule 1.4(b) requires that “[a]n attorney shall explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” This Court has sustained violations of Rule 1.4 for an
attorney’s failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the case, to
11 promptly respond to the client’s reasonable requests for information about the case,
Leatherman, 475 Md. at 105, and to apprise the client of pending motions and discovery
requests, including the significance of sanctions, Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 469
Md. 134, 147 (2020); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349–50 (2020).
Rule 1.4 “is violated also when an attorney ‘fails to communicate crucial information about
the status of the case,’ such as when a case is dismissed.” Planta, 467 Md. at 349 (quoting
Hamilton, 444 Md. at 185). An attorney’s “failure to communicate the status of a case
prevents the client from making informed decisions.” Edwards, 462 Md. at 699 (citing
Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367, 385 (2015)). Additionally, an attorney’s
misrepresentation of the status of the case to the client can violate Rule 1.4. Id.
Pursuant to Rule 3.2, “[a]n attorney shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” An attorney violates Rule 3.2 by
neglecting a client’s case and failing to comply with discovery requests resulting in the
court’s imposition of sanctions and a default judgment against the client. Brown, 426 Md.
at 323. E.g., Planta, 467 Md. at 354; Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Trye, 444 Md. 201, 216
(2015). See also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 365 (2006)
(concluding that an attorney violated Rule 3.2, in part, as a result of his lack of
communication with the client during litigation).
Under Rule 3.3(c), an attorney shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists[.]” Rule 3.4(d) provides, in applicable part, that “an attorney shall not . . . fail to
make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an
12 opposing party[.]” We have held that an attorney’s failure to respond to discovery requests
and adequately comply with court orders to complete discovery resulting in monetary
sanctions violates Rule 3.4. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kane, 465 Md. 667, 719–20
(2019).
Applying the above principles here, Parris’s derelict representation of Chaddsford
concurrently violated professional conduct rules of competence, diligence,
communication, expediting litigation, and fairness to opposing party and attorney. Parris
repeatedly failed to respond to discovery requests, failed to adequately comply with the
circuit court’s orders compelling discovery, and failed to file any opposition to the Firm’s
motions for sanctions and motion for default. Parris neglected to apprise Chaddsford of
the Firm’s discovery requests or of the deadlines to respond to the discovery requests, to
advise Chaddsford of the court orders compelling discovery and the possibility of
sanctions, and to inform Chaddsford of the summary judgment, sanctions, and default
motions. Parris failed to substantively answer Chaddsford’s numerous and reasonable
requests for information, and when he did communicate with Chaddsford, he intentionally
omitted his shortcomings that resulted in harm to Chaddsford. When Parris did provide
discovery, he produced untimely and incomplete discovery responses on behalf of
Chaddsford despite court orders compelling complete responses. Parris’s continuous
inaction at each stage of the litigation resulted in significant harm to Chaddsford in the
form of a $75,000 default judgment and court-imposed sanctions of $1,225 in attorneys’
fees with post judgment interest. Parris took no action to vacate the default judgment
against Chaddsford and did not notify Chaddsford of the default judgment until
13 approximately five months later. For these reasons, Parris violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2,
3.3(c), and 3.3(d).
Rule 1.5 (Fees).
Under Rule 1.5(a), an attorney “shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” A court considers the
following factors in determining the reasonableness of a fee:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment of the attorney; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Md. Rule 19-301.5(a). An attorney’s fee arrangement with a client is reasonable if it is
“commensurate with the legal services provided.” Leatherman, 475 Md. at 106 (quoting
Edwards, 462 Md. at 701). Accordingly, “a reasonable fee at the outset of a representation
‘can become unreasonable if the lawyer fails to earn it.’” Id. (quoting Edwards, 462 Md.
at 701). An attorney’s fee arrangement with a client “is unreasonable if the attorney fails
to perform any meaningful work on behalf of the client in exchange for the fee.” Att’y
Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 457 Md. 159, 218 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 275 (2013)).
14 Here, Parris deserted Chaddsford, after which he did not “perform any meaningful
work on behalf of [Chaddsford] in exchange for the fee” that he charged. Throughout the
litigation, Parris periodically billed Chaddsford for legal services he did not provide. For
example, Parris billed Chaddsford $3,955 for legal services he claimed for the period of
March 14, 2019, through August 14, 2019. During this time, Parris filed an answer to the
Firm’s complaint, but he neglected to respond to or inform Chaddsford of the Firm’s
discovery requests, to sufficiently comply with a court order compelling him to complete
discovery, and to respond to the Firm’s motions for summary judgment. Thereafter, Parris
failed to respond to the Firm’s sanctions motions and default judgment motion. As the
hearing judge found, Parris’s “billing entries were knowingly false and intended to conceal
[his] failure to defend Chaddsford[.]” Although Parris’s fee arrangement with Chaddsford
may have been reasonable at the outset of the litigation, those fees became unreasonable
when Parris ceased to provide any services of value. Thus, we agree with the hearing judge
that Parris collected from Chaddsford unreasonable fees totaling $8,830.
Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal).
Pursuant to Rule 3.3(a)(1), an attorney “shall not knowingly . . . make a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or
law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney[.]” See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Collins, 477 Md. 482, 504–06 (2022) (concluding that an attorney violated Rule 3.3 where
she claimed she had not received email messages notifying her of a complaint but it could
be reasonably inferred from the record that she received such messages). “What matters
for purposes of finding [a] [Rule]3.3(a)(1) violation is whether an attorney knows that the
15 information he or she presents to the tribunal is incorrect.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Steinhorn, 462 Md. 184, 197 (2018) (citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1,
32 (2006)).
Here, pursuant to Rule 19-740, we treat as established the hearing judge’s finding
that Parris made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the circuit court in his June
28, 2019, answer to the motion for summary judgment. Parris stated that he was “still in
the process of gathering discovery” and “had been hindered in this process in not receiving
documents and pleadings” from the Firm. The circuit court record reflects that the Firm
served a copy of answers to interrogatories on April 15, 2019. We therefore agree with the
hearing judge’s conclusion that Parris’s conduct violated Rule 3.3(a)(1).
Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters).
“An attorney . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary
authority[.]” Md. Rule 19-308.1(b). An attorney violates Rule 8.1(b) when “he or she fails
to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful request for information.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Hoerauf, 469 Md. 179, 213 (2020) (citing Edwards, 462 Md. at 705).
Here, Parris failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s correspondence in 2020 dated July
2, July 29, November 10, and November 16. Even after receiving hand delivered copies
of Bar Counsel’s letters at his residence and stating that he would respond, Parris still failed
to respond in any manner. Thus, Parris violated Rule 8.1(b).
16 Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).
Rule 8.4 states, pertinent part, that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct; *** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [and] (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]
An attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) when “he or she violates any other Rule under the
MARPC.” Hoerauf, 469 Md. at 214 (citing Edwards, 462 Md. at 706). We have sustained
an attorney’s violation of Rule 8.4(c) when he or she makes a knowing and intentional
misrepresentation to a court to conceal his or her shortcomings, id. at 215, and
misrepresents the status of the case to his or her client, Brown, 426 Md. at 323–24. An
attorney’s conduct that violates Rule 8.4(c) may also violate Rule 8.4(d). Hoerauf, 469
Md. at 215. Generally, an attorney violates Rule 8.4(d) when his or her conduct “impacts
negatively the public’s perception or efficacy of the courts or legal profession.” Id. at 214–
15 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 696 (2013)).
Because we conclude that Parris violated multiple rules of professional conduct, we
conclude that Parris also violated Rule 8.4(a). With respect to Rule 8.4(c) and 8.4(d), Parris
made knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the circuit court in his June 28
Answer; misrepresented the status of the case to Chaddsford in his March 2020 email to
Chaddsford; and billed Chaddsford for services he never provided, all in an attempt to
conceal his misconduct. Further, as to Rule 8.4(d), Parris engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice. Parris’s pattern of inaction and neglect caused substantial
17 harm to Chaddsford and brings the legal profession into disrepute. Parris’s failure to
respond to Bar counsel further brings the legal profession into disrepute.
B. The Appropriate Sanction is Disbarment.
The primary purpose of a sanction in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is to
“protect[] the public and deter[] future misconduct rather than to punish the attorney.”
Silbiger, 478 Md. at 635; see Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. White, 480 Md. 319, 390 (2022)
(citing Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 607 (2022)) (“[We] must promote
both general and specific deterrence and safeguard the public and its confidence in the legal
profession.”). In determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney, “we consider the
facts and circumstances of each case and order a sanction that is ‘commensurate with the
nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed.’”
Edwards, 462 Md. at 712 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 441 Md. 352, 359
(2015)).
Our review of the facts and circumstances includes evaluating any mitigating and
aggravating factors. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Frank, 470 Md. 699, 741 (2020); see
Silbiger, 478 Md. at 635 (“[W]e typically consult the list of aggravating and mitigating
factors developed by the American Bar Association.” (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Ibebuchi, 471 Md. 286, 309 (2020))). The respondent attorney in a disciplinary proceeding
must prove any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, Hoerauf, 469 Md.
at 216, and the Commission must prove any aggravating factors by clear and convincing
evidence, id.
18 Finally, we underscore that “in cases involving intentional dishonesty, disbarment
is ordinarily warranted.” Silbiger, 478 Md. at 638; e.g., Hoerauf, 469 Md. at 218
(concluding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for the attorney’s “numerous and
severe violations” of the MARPC which included dishonest conduct on multiple
occasions); Edwards, 469 Md. at 712 (determining that the attorney’s “pattern of
dishonesty in and of itself warrant[ed] disbarment”). An attorney’s “lack of prior discipline
does not preclude disbarment.” Edwards, 469 Md. at 712.
Here, the Commission recommends that we disbar Parris. Considering the facts and
circumstances of Parris’s pattern of misconduct, in conjunction with the applicable
mitigating and aggravating factors, we agree that the appropriate sanction for Parris’s
misconduct is disbarment.
Parris did not offer any mitigating factors5 in his defense, as he did not file any
responsive pleadings with this Court. The Commission, however, identified that Parris has
5 The list of mitigating factors we typically consult includes: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to the Commission or a cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability, (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct, (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation, and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse;
19 an absence of a disciplinary record, which the hearing judge found was a present mitigating
factor. On the other hand, the hearing judge found the existence of seven aggravating
factors:6
(1) Dishonest or Selfish Motive; (2) A Pattern of Misconduct; (3) Multiple Offenses; (4) Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Agency; (5) Refusal to Acknowledge the Wrongful Nature of the Conduct; (6) Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law; and (7) Indifference to Making Restitution.
We agree with the hearing judge that clear and convincing evidence supports each
of the above aggravating factors. Parris exhibited a dishonest or selfish motive when he
made knowing and intentional representations about the case to conceal his derelict
performance from the court and Chaddsford. Parris’s representation of Chaddsford and
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the [MARPC]; and (14) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct. Silbiger, 478 Md. at 636 n.13. 6 The list of aggravating factors we typically consult includes: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the [MARPC]; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. Silbiger, 478 Md. at 635 n.11.
20 conduct in these disciplinary proceedings exhibited a clear pattern of misconduct. Parris
committed multiple violations of the MARPC, as detailed above. Parris engaged in bad
faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding when he intentionally failed to comply with
the rules and orders of the Commission and the hearing judge. Parris’s refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct is apparent from his failure to refund
Chaddsford’s fee payments. Parris has substantial experience in the practice of law as he
has been a member of the bar of this Court since 1987. Finally, Parris’s indifference to
making restitution is evident from the fact that he made no attempt at restitution and has
not refunded Chaddsford.
Therefore, “[t]o safeguard the public from future harm and to protect its perception
of the legal community at large,” White, 480 Md. at 393 (citing Bonner, 477 Md. at 607
and Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Karambelas, 473 Md. 134, 177 (2021)), we conclude that
disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Parris’s “flagrant and persistent MARPC
violations,” id.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST KEITH ANTHONY PARRIS.