Attorney General v. Preferred Mercantile Co.

73 N.E. 669, 187 Mass. 516, 1905 Mass. LEXIS 1040
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court·Decided March 3, 1905·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Knowlton, C. J.

This is an information in the nature of a quo warranto, brought against the defendant corporation, to require it to show by what authority it is conducting the business in which it is engaged. It is a proceeding at law, and not in equity; but the defendant’s answer is not necessarily to be taken as true, like the answer of a judicial tribunal to a petition for [517] a writ of certiorari. See Haven v. County Commissioners, 155 Mass. 467. The reservation is informal, but we treat it as made under the R. L. c. 156, § 7, to report to this court the questions of law which arise upon the record. Such a report may be made by a justice of this court, without deciding the questions. See Pub. Sts. c. 150, § 8; Campbell v. Justices of the Superior Court, ante, 509. No question of pleading is raised, and the material facts of the case are not in dispute.

The defendant was organized under the St. 1903, c. 437, for the purpose of “ conducting the business of dealing in diamonds, buying, leasing and selling the same,” etc. The allegation on which the informant relies is that the defendant “ has grossly abused and misused its corporate authority, franchises, and privileges, and has assumed franchises and privileges not granted to it, by issuing, selling, and redeeming, as its sole business, a certain form of obligation called ‘ diamond lease,’ ” a copy of which is annexed. Another allegation, made in reference to the St. 1904, c. 427, is waived by the attorney general.

The business of the defendant is the issuing of obligations called leases, to persons who apply for them, the contract in each case being that the applicant shall pay $1 on delivery of the lease, and $1 per week thereafter, until the sum of $110 is paid in all, by which the lease becomes fully paid ; that if there is a default in his payments, he shall forfeit twenty-five cents per week for each week that he is in default, and if he continues in default for five consecutive weeks, the lease shall be void and he shall forfeit all the sums paid, which will be retained by the corporation as liquidated damages. Of each dollar paid the corporation is to use seventy cents, together with the moneys received from lapses, fines and transfer fees, for the purchase and delivery of the diamonds called for by the leases, ten cents for a contingent fund, which is to be used in redeeming weekly the oldest unredeemed leases in their order whenever the amount on hand is sufficient for that purpose, and twenty cents, together with the difference between the wholesale price and the retail price of the diamonds, to defray the expenses of managing the business. The corporation agrees to call in and redeem as many of the oldest outstanding, unredeemed leases as the funds will permit, each week, by the delivery of a commercial, white, clear [518] and flawless diamond, of the proper weight and value for the week in which the redemption occurs. A lease calling for a payment of $110 in all by the holder, entitles him to receive a diamond two carats in weight, worth $200. It appears, also, that the company has represented to its customers that it will furnish purchasers for the diamonds to which lessees are entitled, who will pay $160 for each one of the value of $200, and that, whenever requested, it has either taken them or procured others to take them at that price.

There is no source from which to obtain money to supply diamonds, or the money to be paid instead- of them, to leaseholders, except the payments of the leaseholders themselves. The company promises to every leaseholder a diamond worth $200, or cash to the amount of $160, for a payment of $110. But these diamonds and moneys can only be delivered to the leaseholders when the funds appropriated to that purpose enable it to be done. Twenty per cent of the receipts from regular payments are taken at once by the corporation for conducting the business. The amount received from forfeitures on lapsed contracts goes to meet obligations, and it is manifest that, without a large number of lapses or of takers of new obligations or both, the business would quickly come to an end, leaving the late comers with no returns for their payments. Although a few may make gains, the certainty of great loss to the deluded investors as a class is obvious at a glance. A scheme more injurious and misleading, in its effect upon that part of the public who are easily entrapped by a plausible offer to give much for little, hardly can be conceived. But the question now before us is whether the business is forbidden by law.

It is contended by the attorney general that the corporation is conducting a lottery, and that its managers are punishable criminally under the R. L. c. 214, § 7. To come within this section, the money or property must be disposed of “ with intent to make the disposal thereof dependent upon or connected with chance by lot, dice, numbers, game, hazard or other gambling device.” The element of chance, entering into the payments in this case, arises from the uncertainty as to the number of persons who will allow their contracts to lapse, and as to the number who will take new contracts from the company [519] and make payments to it after the issuing of the contract in question.

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Attorney General v. Preferred Mercantile Co., 73 N.E. 669, 187 Mass. 516, 1905 Mass. LEXIS 1040 (Mass. 1905).

73 N.E. 669 (Attorney General v. Preferred Mercantile Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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