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SJC-13769
ATTORNEY GENERAL vs. MYSTIC VALLEY REGIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL.
Suffolk. November 3, 2025. - March 11, 2026.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ.
Education, Charter school. Public Records. Supervisor of Public Records. Attorney General. Statute, Construction. Practice, Civil, Judgment on the pleadings.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 31, 2023.
The case was heard by Michael P. Doolin, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Charles M. Waters (Matthew Campbell also present) for the defendant. KerryAnne Kilcoyne, Assistant Attorney General, for the plaintiff. James Leon Smith & Joseph N. Schneiderman, for Citizens for Juvenile Justice, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Jessie J. Rossman & Suzanne Schlossberg, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 2
GEORGES, J. This case requires us to decide whether a
"[C]ommonwealth charter school," as defined by G. L. c. 71,
§ 89 (c), is subject to the Massachusetts public records law,
G. L. c. 66, § 10. Mystic Valley Regional Charter School
(Mystic Valley) contends that it is not and, on that basis,
refused to comply with multiple public records requests. After
the Attorney General commenced this enforcement action, a
Superior Court judge (motion judge) granted judgment on the
pleadings in the Attorney General's favor, concluding that
Mystic Valley is a governmental entity obligated to respond to
the requests.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that
Commonwealth charter schools, including Mystic Valley, are
"agencies" subject to the public records law. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, a Commonwealth charter school
qualifies as an "authority established by the general court to
serve a public purpose," G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, and
therefore falls squarely within the class of governmental
entities expressly covered by the public records law.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.1
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of the Attorney General by Citizens for Juvenile Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc. 3
Background. Mystic Valley is a Commonwealth charter school
within the meaning of G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c). Commonwealth
charter schools are tuition-free public schools that operate
pursuant to a charter approved by the Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education (BESE) and are subject to ongoing oversight
by the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE).
See generally G. L. c. 71, § 89; 603 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.00
(2021).
Between January and November 2022, Mystic Valley received
several public records requests. Taking the position that it is
not a public entity subject to the public records law, Mystic
Valley declined to respond to the requests. Several requestors
appealed to the supervisor of public records (supervisor), who
ordered Mystic Valley to comply. Mystic Valley nevertheless
reaffirmed its refusal, asserting in a written response that it
"does not fall under the categories of entities handling public
documents." Mystic Valley also cited its limited financial
resources and noted that much of the requested information could
be found in materials it already submits to DESE.
Because Mystic Valley continued to disregard the
supervisor's orders, the supervisor referred the matter to the
Attorney General. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (b) (authorizing
supervisor to notify Attorney General when agency refuses or
fails to comply). The Attorney General directed Mystic Valley 4
to comply. When the school failed to respond to a follow-up
letter, the Attorney General's office contacted Mystic Valley's
legal counsel by telephone and was informed that the school
would not comply absent a court order. The Attorney General
then commenced this declaratory judgment action in the Superior
Court.
The Attorney General sought declarations that Mystic Valley
is a custodian of public records and that it is not exempt from
the disclosure obligations imposed by G. L. c. 66, § 10. The
Attorney General subsequently moved for judgment on the
pleadings. After a hearing, the motion judge allowed the motion
and declared that Mystic Valley is a custodian of public records
and must respond to public records requests pursuant to G. L.
c. 66, § 10. Mystic Valley timely appealed, and we transferred
the case to this court on our own motion.
Discussion. Mystic Valley renews its argument that a
Commonwealth charter school does not fall within the statutory
categories of governmental entities that create or maintain
public records and therefore has no obligation to respond to
public records requests.
1. Standard of review. We review de novo the allowance of
a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Miele v. Foundation
Med., Inc., 496 Mass. 171, 175 (2025). In doing so, we accept
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the nonmoving 5
party -- here, Mystic Valley -- and draw all reasonable
inferences in its favor to determine whether those factual
allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id.
Whether Commonwealth charter schools are subject to the public
records law presents a question of statutory interpretation,
which we likewise review de novo. Id.
2. The statutory schemes. We begin by summarizing the
relevant statutory schemes.
a. The public records law. General Laws c. 66 governs the
creation, maintenance, destruction, and, as relevant here,
disclosure of public records. The statute reflects the
Legislature's recognition that "[t]he public has an interest in
knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in
an efficient and law-abiding manner" and that broad access to
governmental information is "an essential ingredient of public
confidence in government" (citations omitted). Attorney Gen. v.
District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 484 Mass. 260, 262-263
(2020). Consistent with that purpose, the public records law is
designed "to give the public broad access to governmental
records." Id. at 262, quoting Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v.
Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 382-383 (2002).
To qualify as a public record subject to disclosure, a
document must, among other things, have been created or received
by an "officer or employee of any Massachusetts governmental 6
entity" (quotation and citation omitted). Attorney Gen., 484
Mass. at 263. The relevant portions of the statute do not
expressly use the term "governmental entity,"2 but rather use the
term "agency," which is defined as "any entity, other than a
municipality, that is identified in [G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth,] as possessing public records" (quotation omitted).3
G. L. c. 66, § 6A (a). That provision sweeps broadly,
encompassing "any agency, executive office, department, board,
commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth,
or . . . any political subdivision thereof, or . . . any
authority established by the general court to serve a public
purpose."4 G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.
b. Commonwealth charter schools. The Legislature
authorized charter schools in the Education Reform Act of 1993,
St. 1993, c. 71. See Doe No. 1 v. Secretary of Educ., 479 Mass.
2 The term "governmental entity" appears once in G. L. c. 66 as part of a relatively recent addition to the statute. See G. L. c. 66, § 10B, third par., inserted by St. 2019, c. 73, § 1.
3 While municipalities are, like agencies, subject to the public records law, see G. L. c. 66, § 10, neither party contends that a Commonwealth charter school is a municipality.
4 This quoted language was added to G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty- sixth, as part of an amendment to the definition of "[p]ublic records." See St. 1973, c. 1050, § 1. The amendment brought "a great many more documents to public view." Hastings & Sons Publ. Co. v. City Treas. of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812, 815 (1978). 7
375, 376–377 (2018). A Commonwealth charter school is "operated
under a charter granted by [BESE], which operates independently
of a school committee and is managed by a board of trustees."
G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c), first par. Each charter is subject to
renewal by BESE every five years. See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (dd).
The statute expressly sets forth the public character of
Commonwealth charter schools. Indeed, the Legislature has
unambiguously designated a Commonwealth charter school as a
"public school." G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c), first par. Further,
the board of trustees "shall be deemed to be public agents
authorized by the commonwealth to supervise and control the
charter school." Id. Additionally, students are not charged
tuition, see G. L. c. 71, § 89 (m); instead, Commonwealth
charter schools are funded through public tuition payments
calculated by DESE under a "statutory formula" designed to
approximate per pupil spending in district schools. Doe No. 1,
479 Mass. at 379. See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (ff). The State
Treasurer pays those amounts directly to the Commonwealth
charter schools and reduces State aid to the sending districts
accordingly. Id.
3. Application. We begin, as we must, with the words of
the statute. Where the statute's language "is clear and
unambiguous, we must give effect to its plain and ordinary
meaning and . . . need not look beyond the words" (quotation and 8
citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Fleury, 489 Mass. 421, 424
(2022). And in the absence of statutory definitions, we may
"derive the words' usual and accepted meanings from sources
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" (citation
omitted). Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc., 487 Mass. 655,
658 (2021). "We do not construe terms in isolation; instead, we
consider the specific language of a provision in the context of
the statute as a whole." Garcia v. Steele, 492 Mass. 322, 326
(2023).
Mystic Valley principally contends that it is not subject
to the public records law because it is not among the entities
enumerated in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. We disagree
because we conclude that Commonwealth charter schools fall
within the category of "any authority established by the general
court to serve a public purpose." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth.
The statutory list of entities to which the public records
law applies uses the word "authority" twice, first in reference
to an "authority of the commonwealth," and later in reference to
the broader category of "any authority established by the
general court to serve a public purpose."5 G. L. c. 4, § 7,
5 "'Public records' shall mean all books, papers, maps, photographs, recorded tapes, financial statements, statistical 9
Twenty-sixth. Although the statute does not define the term
"authority" in either context, the Legislature's use of the word
"any" in the latter clause, together with its repetition of the
word "authority" signals an intent to reach entities beyond
governmental bodies traditionally referred to as authorities.
We construe the term "authority" in the latter phrase
according to its usual and accepted meaning at the time of
enactment. See Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490
Mass. 684, 695 (2022) (applying dictionary definitions from time
of bylaw's adoption when interpreting "frontage"). At the time
the Legislature adopted the modern enumeration of covered
entities, see note 4, above, an "authority" was understood to
mean "a body having jurisdiction in certain matters of a public
nature." Black's Law Dictionary 169 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Commonwealth charter schools satisfy that definition. That
is, Commonwealth charter schools constitute "a body having
jurisdiction in certain matters of a public nature." They
exercise substantial authority over public education matters,
including student admissions, curriculum and educational program
design, personnel decisions, and school governance. See G. L.
tabulations, or other documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any . . . authority of the commonwealth, . . . or of any authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose . . . ." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. 10
c. 71, § 89 (b), (e), (f), (w). These legislatively granted
powers, exercised to fulfill public educational obligations,
establish Commonwealth charter schools as bodies with
jurisdiction over matters of public concern.
Additionally, Commonwealth charter schools were
incontrovertibly "established by the general court to serve a
public purpose." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. The charter
school statute expressly situates that purpose within the public
education system by requiring charter schools to "stimulate the
development of innovative programs within public education" and
to "provide parents and students with greater options in
selecting schools." G. L. c. 71, § 89 (b). Promoting education
is "undoubtedly a public purpose." Department of Community
Affairs v. Massachusetts State College Bldg. Auth., 378 Mass.
418, 425 (1979). More fundamentally, the provision of tuition-
free public education is a constitutional obligation of the
Commonwealth. See Part II, c. 5, § 2, of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth. See also McDuffy v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 606 (1993) ("the
Commonwealth has a duty to provide an education for all its
children, rich and poor, in every city and town of the
Commonwealth at the public school level").
We therefore conclude that Commonwealth charter schools are
"authorit[ies] established by the general court to serve a 11
public purpose" and are subject to the public records law.6 This
interpretation accords with the statute's remedial purpose of
promoting governmental transparency and accountability.
Mystic Valley advances two statutory arguments and one
public policy argument against this conclusion. We address each
in turn.
a. Independence and corporate features. Mystic Valley
first contends that Commonwealth charter schools are more akin
to private entities than to traditional governmental bodies
because they enjoy "significant operational independence" and
possess certain corporate features. More specifically, they
each operate independently of a school committee and are
governed by a board of trustees authorized to determine, among
other things, curriculum, budget, and educational focus. See
G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c), (m), (w). See also 603 Code Mass. Regs.
6 Regulations promulgated by the supervisor of public records provide an alternative basis for concluding that Commonwealth charter schools are subject to the public records law. See G. L. c. 66, § 1. See also McCauley v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 491 Mass. 571, 585 (2023) (consulting regulations to interpret undefined statutory phrases). The supervisor's comprehensive regulations define public records broadly as materials "made or received by a governmental entity." 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 32.02 (2021). Critically, "governmental entity" expressly "includes any quasi- governmental agency that is considered a body politic and corporate or public instrumentality." Id. Commonwealth charter schools fit squarely within this definition: the statute identifies them as "bod[ies] politic and corporate." G. L. c. 71, § 89 (k). 12
§ 1.10(2)(d). They are also granted certain "powers available
to a business corporation formed under [G. L. c. 156B] that are
not inconsistent with [the charter school statute]." G. L.
c. 71, § 89 (k) (8).
Those attributes, however, do not render Commonwealth
charter schools private. Rather, they mirror features of
entities we have long recognized as governmental authorities for
other purposes. See Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 390 Mass. 604,
607–608 (1983) (housing authority is governmental entity despite
corporate characteristics and independence from Commonwealth);
Department of Community Affairs, 378 Mass. at 425-426 (building
authority is public agency, even as "a hybrid entity" possessing
attributes "both of a private corporation and of an executive
agency of the Commonwealth"); Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass.
721, 734-735 (1956) (Massachusetts Port Authority is "a purely
public corporation," notwithstanding its corporate form).
Like those entities, Commonwealth charter schools are
statutorily designated as "bod[ies] politic and corporate."
G. L. c. 71, § 89 (k). See Spence, 390 Mass. at 607, citing
G. L. c. 121B, § 3; Department of Community Affairs, 378 Mass.
at 419, citing St. 1963, c. 703, § 2; Opinion of the Justices,
334 Mass. at 734. See also St. 1956, c. 465, § 2 (establishing
Port Authority and describing it as "a body politic and
corporate"). The Legislature commonly employs this designation 13
when creating entities -- often combining attributes of private
corporations and governmental agencies -- to perform essential
public functions. Kargman v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 18
Mass. App. Ct. 51, 55 (1984), superseded on other grounds by St.
1992, c. 343, § 5. Whether a particular "body politic and
corporate" should be treated as "more public than private"
depends on the context and statutory purpose at issue. Id.,
quoting Department of Community Affairs, supra at 425.
Here, the charter school statute makes Commonwealth charter
schools' public nature manifest. Charter schools are expressly
"public schools," G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c); their trustees are
"public agents," id.; they receive public funding that directly
affects State aid to municipalities, G. L. c. 71, § 89 (ff); and
their employees are public employees for purposes of tort
liability, G. L. c. 71, § 89 (y).
Commonwealth charter schools are also subject to extensive
State oversight. BESE -- a State agency whose members the
Governor appoints -- grants charters, imposes conditions,
evaluates renewal applications, and may revoke a charter for
noncompliance. See G. L. c. 15, § 1E; G. L. c. 71, § 89 (e),
(j), (dd), (ee). See also 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(3), (7).
Commonwealth charter schools must submit annual reports, adhere
to State academic standards, and obtain State approval for
significant changes to, among other things, governance, 14
enrollment, curriculum, or location. See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (v),
(jj); 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.10(1)-(2). The oversight is
continuous and substantial, notwithstanding the schools'
operational independence from local school committees.
Finally, the operational independence and corporate powers
on which Mystic Valley relies do not undermine this conclusion.
Those powers are tools the Legislature deliberately provided to
advance Commonwealth charter schools' public educational goals.
See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (b). Their independence allows
Commonwealth charter schools to operate "as laboratories of
change, allowing for experimentation to encourage creative ways
of addressing the needs of the children of the Commonwealth"
(citation omitted). Doe No. 1, 479 Mass. at 377. And because
their corporate powers are limited to what is "necessary [and]
desirable" to carry out a charter program and may not be
exercised "inconsistent[ly]" with the statute's public purposes,
G. L. c. 71 § 89 (k), those powers reinforce -- rather than
diminish -- Commonwealth charter schools' public character.
Indeed, their corporate form does not alter the fundamentally
public character of their mission and function.
b. Absence of express designation as governmental entity.
Mystic Valley next argues that the Legislature has expressly
designated charter schools as governmental entities only for
limited purposes, such as conflicts of interest, tort liability, 15
and collective bargaining, and that the absence of comparable
language for purposes of the public records law is dispositive.
See G. L. c. 71, § 89 (u) (deeming charter schools "state
agenc[ies]" for conflict of interest purposes under G. L.
c. 268A); G. L. c. 71, § 89 (y) (deeming charter school
employees "public employees" and trustee boards "public
employer[s]" for tort liability under G. L. c. 258 and
collective bargaining under G. L. c. 150E). That argument
invokes the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius": the
express inclusion "of one thing in a statute is an implied
exclusion of other things not included in the statute." Bank of
Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 619 (2013). We decline to
apply the maxim here because doing so would defeat evident
legislative purpose. See id. at 619-620.
The public records law is designed "to give the public
broad access to governmental records" (citation omitted).
Attorney Gen., 484 Mass. at 262. Excluding Commonwealth charter
schools -- public schools funded with public money and charged
with performing a quintessential public function -- would
frustrate this core transparency mandate. It would also
undermine the Legislature's express objective of "hold[ing]
teachers and school administrators accountable for students'
educational outcomes." G. L. c. 71, § 89 (b). We therefore
decline to adopt Mystic Valley's argument. 16
c. Burden. Finally, Mystic Valley asserts that compliance
with the public records law would impose significant financial
burdens and interfere with its educational mission. These
considerations do not change the result.
Cost concerns cannot override clear statutory language.
See Sisk v. Assessors of Essex, 426 Mass. 651, 655–656 (1998)
(implied public policy goals cannot overcome clear statutory
text); Rosenbloom v. Kokofsky, 373 Mass. 778, 781 (1977) ("We
cannot interpret a statute so as to avoid injustice or hardship
if its language is clear and unambiguous and requires a
different construction"). Nor does the public records law
require production regardless of burden or impact on core public
responsibilities. See Friedman v. Division of Admin. Law
Appeals, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 807 (2024). To the contrary,
the statute expressly provides mechanisms to mitigate undue
burden, including extensions of time and authorization to
recover reasonable reproduction costs. See G. L. c. 66,
§ 10 (b) (v), (c), (d).7
7 The Attorney General does not contend that Commonwealth charter schools fall within the public records law by virtue of an explicit statutory designation. Instead, she relies on the five-factor test articulated in Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd. v. State Ethics Comm'n, 414 Mass. 582, 587-594 (1993), and applied in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 416 Mass. 1007, 1007 (1993). Given our analysis above, however, Commonwealth charter schools fit comfortably within the statutory category of an "authority 17
Conclusion. A Commonwealth charter school is an "authority
established by the general court to serve a public purpose"
within the meaning of G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, and is
therefore subject to the public records law. The motion judge
correctly entered judgment on the pleadings for the Attorney
General.
Judgment affirmed.
established by the general court to serve a public purpose," and we need not reach that test.
We note, however, that the five-factor test originates outside the public records context. It derives from a jurisdictional test the State Ethics Commission developed to determine coverage under the conflict of interest law, G. L. c. 268A, and from a test the Internal Revenue Service employed to assess whether an entity qualifies as an "instrumentality" under the Federal tax code. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 414 Mass. at 588. We applied that framework to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Retirement Board, concluding it was not an "independent [S]tate . . . instrumentality" for conflict of interest purposes. Id. at 587- 592, quoting G. L. c. 268A, § 1 (p). In a subsequent rescript opinion, without guiding analysis, we invoked the same test to determine whether the MBTA Retirement Board was a "board" of the MBTA -- an authority of the Commonwealth -- for public records purposes. Globe Newspaper Co., 416 Mass. at 1007. Since Globe Newspaper Co., we have not meaningfully relied on that test to resolve other entities' public status under the public records law.