Attorney General Opinion No.

Kansas Attorney General Reports·Decided July 24, 2003·Published

Opinion

Linden G. Appel Chief Legal Counsel Kansas Department of Corrections 900 S.W. Jackson, 4th Floor Topeka, Kansas 66612

Dear Mr. Appel:

As Chief Legal Counsel for the Kansas Department of Corrections, you pose a primary question concerning K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567, as amended by L. 2003, ch. 100, § 1, the Kansas driving under the influence statute. If our response to this question is affirmative, you pose five follow-up questions. All of these concerns relate to 2002 amendments to subsection (g) of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567 that appear inconsistent with other language in that statute.

"On the fourth or subsequent conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be guilty of a nonperson felony and sentenced to not less than 90 days nor more than one year's imprisonment and fined $2,500. The person convicted shall not be eligible for release on probation, suspension or reduction of sentence or parole until the person has served at least 90 days' imprisonment. The 90 days' imprisonment mandated by this subsection may be served in a work release program only after such person has served 72 consecutive hours' imprisonment, provided such work release program requires such person to return to confinement at the end of each day in the work release program. At the time of the filing of the judgment form or journal entry as required by K.S.A. 21-4620 or 22-3426, and amendments thereto, the court shall cause a certified copy to be sent to the officer having the offender in charge. The law enforcement agency maintaining custody and control of a defendant for imprisonment shall cause a certified copy of the judgment form or journal entry to be sent to the secretary of corrections within three business days of receipt of the judgment form or journal entry from the court and notify the secretary of corrections when the term of imprisonment expires and upon expiration of the term of imprisonment shall deliver the defendant to a location designated by the secretary.After the term of imprisonment imposed by the court, the person shall be placed in the custody of the secretary of correctionsfora mandatory one-year period of postrelease supervision, which such period of postrelease supervision shall not be reduced. During such postrelease supervision, the person shall be required to participate in an inpatient or outpatient program for alcohol and drug abuse, including, but not limited to, an approved aftercare plan or mental health counseling, as determined by the secretary and satisfy conditions imposed by the Kansas parole board as provided by K.S.A. 22-3717, and amendments thereto. Any violation of the conditions of such postrelease supervision may subject such person to revocation of postrelease supervision pursuant to K.S.A. 75-5217 et seq., and amendments thereto and as otherwise provided by law."1

Your primary question is whether, in view of the requirement that postrelease supervision commence upon expiration of imprisonment, a court may legally sentence a fourth or subsequent DUI offender to serve a period of imprisonment to be immediately followed by a period of probation which in turn is followed by a one-year period of postrelease supervision.

Currently, according to one provision of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(g), a person convicted of a fourth or subsequent DUI is not "eligible for release on probation" until serving 90 days imprisonment. This language implies that a court is authorized to place such person on probation following 90 days imprisonment. However, according to another provision in that section, probation after serving 90 days imprisonment is not an option:

"The law enforcement agency maintaining custody and control of a defendant for imprisonment shall . . . notify the secretary of corrections when the term of imprisonment expires and upon expiration of the term of imprisonment shall deliver the defendant to a location designated by the secretary. After the term of imprisonment imposed by the court, the person shall be placed in the custody of the secretary of corrections for a mandatory one-year period of postrelease supervision. . . ."

Thus, as it stands, subsection (g) of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-15672 is at best ambiguous, and at worst contains conflicting language, and so we turn to rules of statutory construction regarding ambiguous and conflicting statutory language.

Rules of Statutory Construction
A statute is ambiguous when two or more interpretations can fairly be made.3 If a statute is ambiguous, a determination of legislative intent is in order and effect must be given to that intent.4 A determination of legislative intent is not limited to a mere consideration of the language used, but the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions should be considered.5 Further, in construing an ambiguous statute reason should be used as well as consideration of the practicalities of the matter addressed; and a statute should never be interpreted to lead to uncertainty, injustice or confusion.6

When two statutes, or two provisions within one statute, conflict, then the more specific, more recent statute controls. Older statutes are subordinate to new enactments, as the newer statute is the later expression of legislative intent and so will control if there is an unavoidable conflict between the two.7

Legislative History
Although legislative history is sparse, testimony provided by Charles Simmons, then Secretary of Corrections, provides rationale for proposed amendments to the version of K.S.A. 8-1567(g) in effect at the time. He initially explained that 2002 Senate Bill No. 433 would amend K.S.A.8-1567(g) by "incorporating the intermediate period of supervision of substance abuse treatment into the post release supervision period."8 He then explained problems that had arisen under K.S.A. 8-1567(g) as it then existed and how 2002 Senate Bill No. 433 would solve those problems. Because his was the only relevant testimony concerning this issue, we quote from his testimony at length:

"[The current version of] K.S.A. 8-1567

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