Attorney General Opinion No.

Kansas Attorney General Reports·Decided January 29, 1998·Published

Opinion

The Honorable Douglas Johnston State Representative, 92nd District State Capitol, Room 284-W Topeka, Kansas 66612

Dear Representative Johnston:

You have requested our opinion concerning several issues relating to the environmental aspects of animal production facilities. You state that your questions have arisen as a result of the construction of animal production facilities throughout the State of Kansas.

You initially ask whether the provisions of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit are enforceable separately from a state's requirements for a water pollution control permit. The State of Kansas administers the NPDES permit program under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act,33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. The Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters without a permit authorizing such discharge under the Act's provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a). "Navigable waters" is defined as "the waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (7). While the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has transferred the NPDES permit-issuing function to the State of Kansas pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b), the EPA is authorized to enforce the provisions of the Clean Water Act, and can therefore enforce provisions of a state-issued NPDES permit that are consistent with federal law.33 U.S.C. § 1319. However the EPA is not authorized to enforce a permit provision regulating discharges to groundwater because the Clean Water Act does not extend to subsurface waters. The Courts have clearly established that Congress did not intend the Clean Water Act to extend federal regulatory and enforcement authority over groundwater contamination. Kelley, ex rel. Michigan v. United States,618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D.Mich. 1985), Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310,1322 (5th Cir. 1977).

Therefore, a permit which authorizes discharges of sewage to groundwater is issued pursuant to State requirements, rather than federal law, and would only be enforceable by the State of Kansas. See K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 65-165. While the authority of the EPA is limited to enforcing federal law, the State of Kansas is authorized to enforce both federal and state requirements of a discharge permit. K.S.A. 65-170e;33 U.S.C. § 1319, 1342.

You next ask what the word "prevent" means as it is used in NPDES permits issued to the operators of confined animal feeding operations. The Kansas Agricultural and Related Waste Control Permit and National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit issued by KDHE require that "the water pollution control facilities shall be operated and maintained to prevent the discharge of water pollutants into the waters of the State," and "that practices and procedures employed to apply livestock or related agricultural wastes, waste waters, and runoff upon agricultural land shall be prudently conducted to prevent water pollution." The permits also provide that "[l]ivestock wastes (both liquid and solid) shall be applied to land using rates and methods that prevent surface runoff of pollutants and leaching of pollutants to groundwater."

We could find no definition of "prevent" in any of the applicable state or federal laws or regulations. In determining the meaning of words used in a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature intended to use words in their ordinary and common sense. Chavez v. Markham, 256 Kan. 859, Syl. ¶ 2 (1995). "Prevent" is generally defined as "to meet or satisfy in advance" and "to keep from happening or existing." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 924 (1996). Unless expressly defined otherwise in a permit, it is our opinion that the word "prevent" would have the ordinary, common meaning as defined above.

Your next two questions are whether the Kansas Legislature could require KDHE to perform testing on the wastewater lagoons of privately-owned confined animal feeding operations and to study the cumulative environmental impacts resulting from confined animal feeding operations. These questions may raise Constitutional issues concerning separation of powers granted to the Legislature and to the executive branch of government, and issues concerning entry by the government onto private property. While there is no express provision in the Kansas Constitution mandating a separation of powers, the Kansas Supreme Court has found the doctrine to be implied in the organization of the state government into the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Parcell v. State of Kansas, 468 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (D.Kan. 1979). The separation of powers doctrine is intended to avoid a dangerous concentration of power in the hands of a single group and to allow the respective powers of government to be carried out by the department most fitted to exercise them. State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 287 (1976).

One of the issues raised by your questions is whether, in requiring KDHE to perform certain tasks, the Legislature would be exerting power over the agency to the extent the Legislature usurps the agency's constitutional power to enforce the laws of the State. Kan. Const., Art. 1, § 3. In Bennett, the Court explained that "[a] usurpation of powers exists where there is a significant interference by one department with operations of another department." 219 Kan. at Syl. ¶ 4. It seems clear that the Legislature's enactment of a statute requiring KDHE to perform wastewater lagoon testing or to study the impact of confined animal feeding operations would not constitute undue interference by the Legislature with KDHE's powers because, in doing so, the Legislature would merely be exercising it's legislative powers. However, if the Legislature informally directs such testing and study without passing a statute, it may be acting outside it's legislative power, giving rise to a potential violation of the separation of powers. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 64 (1984).

Another potential issue raised by these questions is whether KDHE would need to enter onto private property to conduct the testing and study you reference and, if so, whether they have authority to do so. A statute which requires KDHE to conduct testing should authorize KDHE officials to enter onto private property, if necessary, to conduct the testing. Such authorization should meet the constitutional requirements for governmental entry onto privately-owned property. See City of Overland Park v. Niewald, 258 Kan. 679, 687 (1995); Camara v. Municipal Court,387 U.S. 523, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 1727 (1967).

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Related

City of Overland Park v. Niewald
907 P.2d 885 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1995)
State Ex Rel. Schneider v. Bennett
547 P.2d 786 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1976)
State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives
687 P.2d 622 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1984)
Chavez v. Markham
889 P.2d 122 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1995)
Parcell v. State of Kan.
468 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Kansas, 1979)
State of California v. Department of Navy
631 F. Supp. 584 (N.D. California, 1986)
United States v. Vineland Chemical Co., Inc.
692 F. Supp. 415 (D. New Jersey, 1988)
Kelley ex rel. Michigan v. United States
618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Michigan, 1985)
Shell Oil Co. v. Train
585 F.2d 408 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)