Attorney General Opinion No.

Kansas Attorney General Reports·Decided August 28, 1996·Published

Opinion

The Honorable Gary A. Merritt State Representative, 20th District 10301 Granada Overland Park, Kansas 66207

Dear Representative Merritt:

You request our opinion concerning the Kansas and Missouri metropolitan culture district compact (compact) which allows public monies from both states to be pooled and used for cultural activities in the Missouri and Kansas counties which are part of the district. Before we respond to your numerous queries, we note that some of your questions require factual determinations. Because the purpose of our opinions is to provide advice on questions of law, we are unable to address your questions of fact as part of this opinion.

The Kansas and Missouri metropolitan culture district compact (K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2536 et seq.) was approved by congress on October 22, 1994 (P.L. 103-390) and provides a mechanism for certain counties in Kansas and Missouri to cooperate in improving their cultural facilities, coordinating the services of their cultural organizations, enhancing the cultural activities of their citizens and achieving financial support for those activities.

K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2536, Article II. (The Missouri counterpart is found at RsMo § 70.500.) In order to create the metropolitan culture district (district) the board of county commissioners of both Johnson county, Kansas and Jackson county, Missouri must adopt a resolution authorizing a county-wide retailers' sales tax. The resolution is then submitted to the electorate. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2536, Article IV (b)(1); K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2539. Additional counties in Kansas and Missouri may join the district if such counties are contiguous to one or more of the counties which comprise the district and are located within 60 miles of Johnson and Jackson counties. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2536, Article IV; RsMo § 70.500, Articles IV and X. If the electorate approves the resolution, the tax is levied by the county and collected by the state director of taxation who credits the funds to the metropolitan culture district retailers' tax fund in the state treasury. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2539; RsMo § 70.500, Article X. The funds are then remitted to the respective county treasurer and appropriated by the county to the metropolitan culture commission (commission). K.S.A. 1995 Supp.12-2539(a)(b); RsMo § 70.500, Article X(a)(b). The district is governed by the commission which is a body corporate and politic composed of resident electors of both states. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2536, Article V; RsMo § 70.500, Article V. (The commission's powers are listed in article VI at K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2536 and RsMo § 70.500.) The compact continues until either state repeals its statute, notifies the other state and pays the obligations of the commission. K.S.A. 1995 Supp.12-2536, Article IX; RsMo § 70.500, Article IX.

With this background we respond to your questions:

"1. Does a valid essential public purpose and service result from the creation of the Commission, the implementation of the Act and the establishment of the District, and the financing of the projects described therein as well as the levying of Kansas sales tax in furtherance thereof.

"2. Is the transfer of Kansas sales tax to the Commission and the usage of Kansas sales tax revenues in Missouri by the Commission a valid appropriation or otherwise transfer of Kansas sales tax funds."

"11. Is the transfer of Kansas sales tax to the Commission and thereafter the payment of such sales tax revenues to the Union Station Assistance Corporation, a private corporation and the usage of Kansas sales tax revenues in Missouri by the Union Station Assistance Corporation, a private corporation, a valid appropriation or otherwise transfer of Kansas sales tax funds."

These questions address whether the use of public funds to finance the district comports with the public purpose doctrine. The seminal case on the public purpose doctrine is Ullrich v. Board of Thomas County Commissioners, 234 Kan. 782 (1984) where the Supreme Court concluded that a state or local governing body may appropriate public monies for private individuals if the public welfare is promoted.

"If the purpose of the expenditure is legitimate because it is for a public purpose, it will not be defeated because the execution of it involves payment to individuals, or private corporations.

"What is for the public good or what are public purposes for which appropriations may be made are questions which the legislature must in the first instance decide. In determining those questions, a state legislature is vested with a broad discretion, which cannot be controlled by the courts, except when its action is clearly evasive or violative of a constitutional provision. It has been said that a strict formula to determine public purposes for all times cannot be formulated, since the concept expands with the population, economy, scientific knowledge, and changing conditions. As people are brought closer together in congested areas, the public welfare requires governmental operation of facilities which were once considered exclusively private enterprises, and necessitates the expenditure of tax funds for purposes which were not classified as public. What is a public purpose for which public funds may be expended is not a matter of exact definition, and the line of demarcation is not immutable or incapable of adjustment to changing social and economic conditions that are properly of public and governmental concern." 234 Kan. at 789.

In Duckworth v. City of Kansas City, 243 Kan. 387 (1988), the Supreme Court concluded that courts should defer to the judgment of a governing body in making the determination of whether the public welfare is served by appropriating public funds for private individuals.

The stated purpose of the compact is to create a district which will contribute to or enhance aesthetic, artistic, historical, intellectual or social development of the general public. K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 12-2536, Article II.

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Related

Unified School District No. 259 v. Hedrick
454 P.2d 536 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1969)
Kimsey v. Board of Education, Unified School District 273
507 P.2d 180 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1973)
Ullrich v. Board of Thomas County Comm'rs
676 P.2d 127 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1984)
Wycoff v. Board of County Commissioners
370 P.2d 138 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1962)
Duckworth v. City of Kansas City
758 P.2d 201 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1988)
Board of Education v. Powers
51 P.2d 421 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1935)