Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 11, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0174 Lower Tribunal No. F21-19386 ________________
Atoya Holmes, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William Altfield, Judge.
Rier Jordan, P.A., and Jonathan E. Jordan, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Katryna Santa Cruz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J. This case stems from a deadly shooting on November 7, 2021.
Appellant Atoya Holmes appeals her conviction and sentence. Holmes
raises multiple issues. We write to address one issue concerning opening
the door to prior bad act evidence. Because we find harmful error occurred,
we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I.
Atoya Holmes and Verdell Goins met when they were sixteen and
twenty years old. They dated for several years. After they broke up, each
went on to marry other people. Almost twenty years later, the couple
reconnected. They rekindled their romance and began having an affair.
Tragically, the relationship was marred with domestic violence.
On November 7, 2021, Holmes and Goins went to a tailgate party at a
Miami Dolphins game. Both were drinking. After the game ended, Holmes
wanted to go to a bar. When Goins declined, Holmes angrily said it was
because his other girlfriend would be there. Holmes and Goins left together,
with Goins driving Holmes’ vehicle.
The couple then went to a friend’s home. While still in the car, Goins
told the friend that Holmes was “just tripping because I know she’ll never
leave her husband for me. I’ve been divorced. She’s been dragging me for
2 six or seven years. And I got a woman, anyway.” In response, Holmes hit
Goins two or three times. The couple drove off.
Eventually, Goins pulled over and stopped the vehicle. Goins reached
over the console, grabbing Holmes’ hand. Twisting it, he pulled off several
fingernails. Holmes shifted her body to alleviate the pain. She tried to exit
the vehicle, but Goins pulled her back by her hair. To no avail, Holmes tried
to kick and push him away. Goins put his hands around Holmes’ neck and
choked her to the point that she passed out.
When Holmes came to, Goins attacked her again. Holmes then
grabbed a gun from the passenger door and shot Goins twice in his right
shoulder. Holmes claimed that his body fell onto her and was unresponsive.
She slid from underneath his limp body that was still secured by his seatbelt.
She then exited the vehicle, placed the gun on top of the car, and asked a
passerby to call 911. She did not attempt to hide the gun.
When police arrived, Holmes stood near a light pole. Holmes’ lip was
swollen and there was dried blood around her mouth. She was missing
fingernails and had abrasions and bruises on her body. She also smelled of
alcohol. But Holmes did not have any of Goins’ blood on her. Holmes told
the police that she shot Goins in self-defense as he was beating her.
3 The State charged Holmes with second-degree murder. Holmes
claimed self-defense. The case proceeded to trial.
In her case in chief, Holmes testified. During direct examination, the
following exchange occurred:
Q: Now as you called 911 and you were leaning on that pole, what were you feeling in that moment?
A: I can’t even explain it. I have never experienced anything like that before to have killed somebody or hurt somebody that you love and know that it is at your hands. I can’t even explain it.
Before cross-exanimation, the State asserted that this testimony was
misleading, and opened the door for the State to introduce that Holmes shot
her son in 2017. Holmes was not arrested or charged for the incident. The
State noted that, while introducing herself to the jury, Holmes discussed her
children in a positive light. Among other arguments, Holmes responded that
the sentence was taken out of context and violative of section 90.403,
Florida Statutes.
Over objection, the trial court allowed the State to extensively question
Holmes about the 2017 shooting. The questioning went into details such as
how many shots were fired, what part of her son’s body was shot, where the
shooting occurred, why she shot her son, and whether she claimed self-
defense. The State then—as the very next question—explicitly tied that
4 event to the current case. Throughout the exchange, the State framed
Holmes as a liar.
During closing, the State pointed to the 2017 shooting and emphasized
that Holmes was not truthful:
Number two. She intentionally misled you.
She sat here, and at the same time looked you straight in the eye and told you that she had never experienced something like this before. Where she killed, or hurt, someone she loved.
But it turns out that that’s not true either. Because she shot her own son in 2017. Flesh and blood. Shot her son.
Now you’re not here to judge the circumstances of what happened back then. It was a family affair. But what is important is that she was, and has, used deadly force against a loved one, and knew exactly what it was like to be in that situation. But she wanted you to believe something else. To believe something that wasn’t true.
The jury found Holmes guilty of the lesser-included manslaughter. She
was sentenced to thirteen years. This appeal followed.
II.
“We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. That discretion, however, is limited by the rules of
evidence.” Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008) (citations
omitted).
III.
5 Evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is inadmissible when
it is solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2), Fla. Stat.
(2023). At the same time, a criminal defendant may open the door to such
evidence. “As an evidentiary principle, the concept of opening the door
allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony to qualify, explain,
or limit testimony or evidence previously admitted. The concept of opening
the door is based on considerations of fairness and the truth-seeking
function of a trial.” Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 42 (Fla. 2000)
(quotations and citations omitted).
“To open the door to evidence of prior bad acts, the defense must first
offer misleading testimony or make a specific factual assertion which the
state has the right to correct so that the jury will not be misled.” Bozeman
v. State, 698 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). See also Robertson v.
State, 829 So. 2d 901, 911 (Fla. 2002) (“Thus, even if the prior crime
evidence is not relevant under section 90.404(2)(a), a testifying defendant
may nonetheless open the door to the prior crime evidence by (1) offering a
trait of the defendant’s good character, see § 90.404(1)(a) (character of
accused), or (2) inaccurately testifying to material facts, see § 90.404(1)(c)
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 11, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0174 Lower Tribunal No. F21-19386 ________________
Atoya Holmes, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William Altfield, Judge.
Rier Jordan, P.A., and Jonathan E. Jordan, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Katryna Santa Cruz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J. This case stems from a deadly shooting on November 7, 2021.
Appellant Atoya Holmes appeals her conviction and sentence. Holmes
raises multiple issues. We write to address one issue concerning opening
the door to prior bad act evidence. Because we find harmful error occurred,
we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I.
Atoya Holmes and Verdell Goins met when they were sixteen and
twenty years old. They dated for several years. After they broke up, each
went on to marry other people. Almost twenty years later, the couple
reconnected. They rekindled their romance and began having an affair.
Tragically, the relationship was marred with domestic violence.
On November 7, 2021, Holmes and Goins went to a tailgate party at a
Miami Dolphins game. Both were drinking. After the game ended, Holmes
wanted to go to a bar. When Goins declined, Holmes angrily said it was
because his other girlfriend would be there. Holmes and Goins left together,
with Goins driving Holmes’ vehicle.
The couple then went to a friend’s home. While still in the car, Goins
told the friend that Holmes was “just tripping because I know she’ll never
leave her husband for me. I’ve been divorced. She’s been dragging me for
2 six or seven years. And I got a woman, anyway.” In response, Holmes hit
Goins two or three times. The couple drove off.
Eventually, Goins pulled over and stopped the vehicle. Goins reached
over the console, grabbing Holmes’ hand. Twisting it, he pulled off several
fingernails. Holmes shifted her body to alleviate the pain. She tried to exit
the vehicle, but Goins pulled her back by her hair. To no avail, Holmes tried
to kick and push him away. Goins put his hands around Holmes’ neck and
choked her to the point that she passed out.
When Holmes came to, Goins attacked her again. Holmes then
grabbed a gun from the passenger door and shot Goins twice in his right
shoulder. Holmes claimed that his body fell onto her and was unresponsive.
She slid from underneath his limp body that was still secured by his seatbelt.
She then exited the vehicle, placed the gun on top of the car, and asked a
passerby to call 911. She did not attempt to hide the gun.
When police arrived, Holmes stood near a light pole. Holmes’ lip was
swollen and there was dried blood around her mouth. She was missing
fingernails and had abrasions and bruises on her body. She also smelled of
alcohol. But Holmes did not have any of Goins’ blood on her. Holmes told
the police that she shot Goins in self-defense as he was beating her.
3 The State charged Holmes with second-degree murder. Holmes
claimed self-defense. The case proceeded to trial.
In her case in chief, Holmes testified. During direct examination, the
following exchange occurred:
Q: Now as you called 911 and you were leaning on that pole, what were you feeling in that moment?
A: I can’t even explain it. I have never experienced anything like that before to have killed somebody or hurt somebody that you love and know that it is at your hands. I can’t even explain it.
Before cross-exanimation, the State asserted that this testimony was
misleading, and opened the door for the State to introduce that Holmes shot
her son in 2017. Holmes was not arrested or charged for the incident. The
State noted that, while introducing herself to the jury, Holmes discussed her
children in a positive light. Among other arguments, Holmes responded that
the sentence was taken out of context and violative of section 90.403,
Florida Statutes.
Over objection, the trial court allowed the State to extensively question
Holmes about the 2017 shooting. The questioning went into details such as
how many shots were fired, what part of her son’s body was shot, where the
shooting occurred, why she shot her son, and whether she claimed self-
defense. The State then—as the very next question—explicitly tied that
4 event to the current case. Throughout the exchange, the State framed
Holmes as a liar.
During closing, the State pointed to the 2017 shooting and emphasized
that Holmes was not truthful:
Number two. She intentionally misled you.
She sat here, and at the same time looked you straight in the eye and told you that she had never experienced something like this before. Where she killed, or hurt, someone she loved.
But it turns out that that’s not true either. Because she shot her own son in 2017. Flesh and blood. Shot her son.
Now you’re not here to judge the circumstances of what happened back then. It was a family affair. But what is important is that she was, and has, used deadly force against a loved one, and knew exactly what it was like to be in that situation. But she wanted you to believe something else. To believe something that wasn’t true.
The jury found Holmes guilty of the lesser-included manslaughter. She
was sentenced to thirteen years. This appeal followed.
II.
“We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. That discretion, however, is limited by the rules of
evidence.” Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008) (citations
omitted).
III.
5 Evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is inadmissible when
it is solely to prove bad character or propensity. § 90.404(2), Fla. Stat.
(2023). At the same time, a criminal defendant may open the door to such
evidence. “As an evidentiary principle, the concept of opening the door
allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony to qualify, explain,
or limit testimony or evidence previously admitted. The concept of opening
the door is based on considerations of fairness and the truth-seeking
function of a trial.” Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 42 (Fla. 2000)
(quotations and citations omitted).
“To open the door to evidence of prior bad acts, the defense must first
offer misleading testimony or make a specific factual assertion which the
state has the right to correct so that the jury will not be misled.” Bozeman
v. State, 698 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). See also Robertson v.
State, 829 So. 2d 901, 911 (Fla. 2002) (“Thus, even if the prior crime
evidence is not relevant under section 90.404(2)(a), a testifying defendant
may nonetheless open the door to the prior crime evidence by (1) offering a
trait of the defendant’s good character, see § 90.404(1)(a) (character of
accused), or (2) inaccurately testifying to material facts, see § 90.404(1)(c)
(character of witness), § 90.608(5) (contradiction on relevant facts).”).
Yet the State is not entitled to offer such evidence merely because
6 testimony was misleading. “Rather, the State must demonstrate a legitimate
need to resort to such evidence to correct a false impression.” Redd v.
State, 49 So. 3d 329, 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “A suggestion or insinuation
made in the defense case cannot be used as a pretext to inform the jury that
he [or she] has been convicted of a crime before. Many false impressions
could be cleared up with far less.” Hill v. State, 933 So. 2d 667, 670 (Fla.
1st DCA 2006).
Once it is determined that the door has been opened, the inquiry has
not ended. Indeed, “[t]he issue is not always whether the door has been
opened, but rather how wide it has been opened.” Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d
at 42. The questioning should be narrowly tailored to just fit through that
door. See Calloway v. State, 210 So. 3d 1160, 1186 (Fla. 2017) (“However,
the court narrowly tailored the admission of evidence of prior criminal
conduct to Calloway’s familiarity with guns, which was a matter that he
himself introduced, and excluded further evidence of his arrest record, which
included more than a dozen arrests in the six years prior to the arrest in this
case . . . . The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted this
narrow inquiry into his prior criminal activities.”). “Otherwise, the ‘opening
the door’ rule threatens to become a pretext for the illegitimate use of
inadmissible evidence, and the fairness-promoting purpose of the rule is
7 lost.” Redd, 49 So. 3d at 333. The probative value of such evidence would
be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. § 90.403,
Fla. Stat. (2023).
While the trial court was correct in its assessment that the door was
opened, the State’s cross-examination of Holmes went well beyond simply
clarifying whether Holmes had harmed someone she loved before. See
Pacheco v. State, 698 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The State
explored the specific details of the 2017 incident—how many shots, where
she was located, where on his body he was shot, why she shot her son, and
whether she claimed self-defense. The extensive details of the 2017
incident were not legitimately necessary to qualify or explain Holmes’
testimony. What is more, the State expressly linked Holmes shooting her
son to her shooting Goins. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. The State went too far
and flung the door wide-open. Melendez v. State, 135 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla.
5th DCA 2014). See generally Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla.
1984) (“[T]he prosecution should not go too far in introducing evidence of
other crimes. The state should not be allowed to go so far as to make the
collateral crime a feature instead of an incident.”). This was an abuse of
discretion.
Given the highly inflammatory nature of the details of the prior
8 shooting, the State cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that this
admission constituted harmless error. See generally Czubak v. State, 570
So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990) (“Erroneous admission of collateral crimes
evidence is presumptively harmful.”); Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 908
(Fla. 1981) (explaining admission is “presumed harmful error because of the
danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus
demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.”). Therefore, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.
“Evidence that suggests a defendant has committed other crimes or
bad acts can have a powerful effect on the results at trial.” Bozeman, 698
So. 2d at 631. “[W]e caution trial courts to exercise extreme caution in
admitting evidence of prior collateral crimes, even when faced with an
argument by the State that the door has been opened.” Rodriguez, 753 So.
2d at 42. See also Calloway, 210 So. 3d at 1186 (“However, such evidence
should be cautiously admitted, due to concerns that it may unfairly prejudice
the defendant.”). Such questioning should be narrowly tailored to simply
address the misleading testimony.
Reversed and remanded.