Atlas Ry. Supply Co. v. Lake & River Ry. Co.

134 F. 503, 14 Ohio F. Dec. 460, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 5064
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio
DecidedJanuary 27, 1905
DocketNo. 6,567
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 134 F. 503 (Atlas Ry. Supply Co. v. Lake & River Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atlas Ry. Supply Co. v. Lake & River Ry. Co., 134 F. 503, 14 Ohio F. Dec. 460, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 5064 (circtndoh 1905).

Opinion

WING, District Judge.

On the 5th day of August, 1903, a bill was filed in behalf of the complainant, alleging that a materialmen’s lien existed in favor of the complainant, and that the defendant was insolvent, and with other allegations sufficiently broad to make it a creditors’ bill for the administration of the assets of the defendant railway company. A receiver was appointed for all of the property and assets of the company. Injunction was issued against the officers and agents of the railway company from in any wise interfering with the management of the property by the receivers. On August 17, 1903, the court made an order requiring all creditors to file their claims on or before the 1st day of October following, on penalty of being forever barred from participating in the distribution of the assets of the company. Notice was given of this order. Later the claims filed were referred to a master, and the master made his report, which was confirmed. On March 20, 1904, the Cleveland Trust Company intervened by petition and cross-bill, setting up a mortgage upon a portion of the premises. Issue was made, and solved in' favor of the intervener, and the prop - erty covered by the mortgage was sold under a decree of foreclosure. About the time of the sale, or perhaps a little after, it was discovered by the receivers that property of the defendant corporation existed in Summit county, of 'which they had theretofore had no knowledge. [504]*504New receivers were appointed, who went into possession of this property by order of the court, and it is now in the possession of the receivers in this cause. One of the interveners — N. M. Berk — became a creditor during the pendency of this suit. He commenced a suit to foreclose his mortgage in the court of common pleas of Summit county, Ohio. Another of the interveners — Z. T. Herndon — and also the Columbus Savings & Trust Company, intervened in this suit. At the instance of the receivers, who filed their petition in this court, these proceedings in the state court were stayed by injunction, after a rule had been entered requiring the intervening petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be so enjoined. Hearing was had on this rule on July 2Í, 1904, at which hearing the court held that it had jurisdiction on the bill as presented to appoint a receiver for all the property and assets of the Take & River Railway Company, including that acquired from the Richland & Mahoning, and that it had done so. The property acquired from the Richland & Mahoning is the property situated in Summit county, and with respect to which suit was brought in the state court by the interveners. The intervening petitioners were enjoined from prosecuting their suit in the state court, and given leave to intervene in this suit within 60 days. The answer and cross-bill of N. M. Berk was filed after the expiration of the 60 days, but with leave of court. With respect to the answer and cross-bill of Berk, motion is filed to strike it from the files, and also a demurrer.

The answer and cross-bill shows that the claim of Berk originated pending this suit, a considerable time after its commencement, and after the appointment and qualification of the receivers; that C. W. French, president of the Take & River Railway Company, applied to Berk for a loan; that Berk agreed to lend to the Take & River Railway Company the sum of money, provided the proper corporate steps were taken by the directors authorizing the loan and providing for the execution and delivery of the mortgage, and provided further that the property was free and clear of all incumbrances; that action was taken by the stockholders and directors authorizing the company to borrow a sum not to exceed $17,000, to be evidenced by a promissory note. Further answering, Berk shows that an abstract of title covering the property was prepared for him by a reliable abstracter, and all of the records of Summit county, Ohio, in which said property was located, were searched for the purpose of ascertaining the title to the property contemplated to be mortgaged under the provisions of the resolution above referred to; that he was advised by said abstracter, and now states the fact to be, that upon the 5th day of November, 1903, the record title to said property was in the Take & River Railway Company, free and clear of all incumbrances, in so far as might appear from the records of Summit county; that, relying upon the action of the stockholders and directors, and without any knowledge of the pendency of this suit, he took from the Take & River Railway Company a note and mortgage deed dated November 5, 1903, by the terms of which the Take & River Railway Company sold and conveyed to Berk, his heirs and assigns, the property, which is fully described in the bill, and which is the property situated in Summit county. There are further allegations in the answer and cross-bill of Berk adapted to be the basis of attack upon [505]*505the decree of this court upon the mortgage issued to the Cleveland Trust Company. The prayer of the answer and cross-bill of Berk is for judgment against the Lake & River Railway Company in the sum of $17,000, with interest; ’ that the Cleveland Trust Company, Calvary Morris, and the Columbus Savings & Trust Company be made parties defendant, and be required by a day certain to answer to the matters alleged; that a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the said the Cleveland Trust Company and Calvary Morris from disposing of the property of the Ashland & Wooster Railway Company sold under the'proceedings heretofore had in this cause; that the decree of foreclosure and sale entered on March 30, 1904, in this cause, and the proceedings had thereunder, including the sale of the property, be set aside, and held for naught; that Calvary Morris and the Cleveland Trust Company be required to redeliver to the receivers heretofore appointed in this cause all of the property obtained by them at the sale under such foreclosure proceedings, which the receivers were ordered to turn over to the purchaser; that the $500,000 of the first mortgage bonds referred to in the bill of complaint filed by the Cleveland Trust Company, August 20, 1903, and the alleged mortgage deed of the Ashland & Wooster Railway Company referred to therein as security for the payment of said first mortgage bonds, be declared illegal and void, and judgment be entered against the Cleveland Trust Company on its cross-bill’ of complaint; that the Lake & River Railway Company be required within a time certain to pay the claims of Berk and those persons or corporations whose claims have been allowed by the special master, and that, in default thereof, an order of sale issue, appointing a special master, and directing him to sell all of the property of the Lake & River Railway Company, and out of the proceeds thereof pay to the claimants herein their claims in the order of their priority.

The theory upon which relief is given under a so-called creditors’ bill, or a bill brought by one creditor in behalf of all for the administration of the assets of an insolvent corporation, is that such assets form a trust fund, of which the then creditors are the cestuis que trustent. In order to administer this trust, receivers are appointed to preserve the property pending the ascertainment of the rights of creditors as to priority and as to amount. It is of course, true that neither the pendency of such a suit nor the decree of sale affects the corporate existence of the defendant, nor in any way prevents it from acting as a corporation; and particularly such suit does not in any wise prevent the corporation from incurring indebtedness.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
134 F. 503, 14 Ohio F. Dec. 460, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 5064, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atlas-ry-supply-co-v-lake-river-ry-co-circtndoh-1905.