Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States

181 F. Supp. 3d 898, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175802, 2016 WL 3574149
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedFebruary 9, 2016
DocketNo. 1:15-cv-56-JAP/KK
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 181 F. Supp. 3d 898 (Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 3d 898, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175802, 2016 WL 3574149 (D.N.M. 2016).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES A. PARKER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This lawsuit involves a dispute over who must pay for environmental cleanup and remediation at the Jackpile Paguate uranium mine, located in Cibola County, New Mexico within the boundaries of the Pueblo of Laguna. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently listed the mine on the National Priorities List (NPL), 40 C.F.R. § 300, App. B (2015). Plaintiff Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO or Plaintiff) subsequently filed a COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 1) (Complaint) maintaining that it was not responsible for “funding or performing any environmental reclamation or remediation work at the ... Mine.” Id. ¶ 1. ARCO seeks cost recovery, contribution, and declaratory relief under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 from Defendants United States of America, the Pueblo of Laguna, and Laguna Construction Company,Inc.

On May 26, 2015, the United States moved to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(1). See MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (MTD) (Doc. No. 32). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the United States’ MTD.1

BACKGROUND

The following is a summary of the facts alleged in ARCO’s Complaint.

1. The Atomic Energy Act creates a government monopsony in the market for uranium, but the United States outsources mining and milling of uranium to private operators, in order to lower costs, and maximize production of uranium yellowcake. . .

Congress created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as part of a postwar “program for Government control of the production, ownership, and use of fissionable material to assure the common defense [902]*902and security and to insure the broadest possible exploitation of the fields.” (Complaint ¶ 33) (quoting the. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755, 756 (1946)). Shortly thereafter, the AEC “began a nationwide program to discover and acquire uranium ore and concentrate.” (Id. ¶ 34). Because the AEC did not itself have the expertise necessary to efficiently exploit the United States^ uranium reserves, it “devised and implemented a plan to incen-tivize and to assist private industry to mine and mill uranium ore and then sell uranium to the United States Government.” (Id. ¶ 35).

The plan worked as follows. After conducting its own prospecting and constructing pilot uranium mines and milling facilities, the AEC estimated how much it would cost private parties to mine and process uranium ore. (Id. ¶ 38). The AEC then developed a set of “Circulars” that advertised “guaranteed ore prices, haulage and mine development allowances, production bonuses, and grade premiums” in order to encourage private entities to mine uranium for sale to the government or other licensed purchasers. (Id. ¶ 37-38).2 The AEC also conducted aerial surveys of radiometric anomalies and published the surveys in designated public areas throughout the Western United States. (Id. ¶ 38).

The government withdrew hundreds of thousands of acres of land from the public trust, building roads and constructing uranium ore-buying stations. (Id. ¶ 39-40). It “implemented a comprehensive drilling program,.. designed to find high-grade uranium ore as rapidly as possible for mining and delivery to existing mills, to supply reserves for proposed mills, to show miners where additional reserves were located near existing mines, and to develop reserves in areas where private companies would not normally make the attempt.” (Id. ¶ 40). The government’s clear aim was to maintain its monopsony in the market for uranium while driving down the cost of uranium by outsourcing mining and milling to private- entities. (Id. ¶ 39).

2. The AEC refuses to purchase ore with less than 0.1% uranium content, leading to environmental contamination at uranium mines.

Because the government enjoyed mon-opsony power over the market for uranium, it could dictate the terms of purchase in furtherance of its “main objective”— “the acquisition of uranium concentrate or ‘yellow cake.’ ” (Id. ¶ 44). The AEC published a Circular stating that miners would be paid for ore with uranium content of 0.10% or more, that “the transport of uranium ore below 0.10% uranium was discouraged, and any sub-grade uranium ore brought to an ore buying station could be confiscated as liquidated damages[.]” (Id. ¶ 42). The AEC also refused to negotiate the price of uranium ore and “unilaterally set ore prices on a sliding scale,” with higher prices paid for ore with a higher uranium content. (Id. ¶ 43).

Between 1947 and 1960, the AEC entered into approximately 32 procurement contracts with private companies for the purchase of uranium concentrate. (Id. ¶45). Each agreement varied, but “most provided for the construction of a uranium mill to be operated by the private contractor, specified the particular uranium mines that could provide the raw materials for the mill, and contained a fixed price for the uranium ore that the mill owner or operator would pay to the miners.” (Id.)

“The production of waste at uranium mine sites was a known and intended re-[903]*903suit” of the AEC’s purchasing regime. (Id. at 48). Miners were barred from selling uranium ore to anyone except the AEC or its authorized procurers, and the AEC set the price of uranium. But the AEC “did not include the cost of managing waste or the cost of waste disposal or mine reclamation in the price it paid miners for uranium ore.” (Id.) Because the AEC refused to purchase uranium ore with less than 0.10% uranium content and did not compensate miners for the cost of extracting and properly disposing of unwanted ore, unwanted ore was invariably dumped at or nearby the place of extraction. (Id.).

3. The Anaconda Copper Mining Company, predecessor in interest to ARCO, leases the Jackpile Paguate Site from the Department of. the Interior for uranium extraction.

By the early 1950s, AEC geologists had begun exploring the Laguna Reservation for uranium deposits. (Id. ¶ 56).3 The AEC intended to exploit any uranium found on the Laguna Reservation for its uranium development program. (Id. ¶ 56). The AEC “recommended to the Laguna [Pueblo] that [it] obtain the assistance of a legitimate mining company to develop uranium deposits on the Laguna Reservation so that the Laguna could receive royalties and the uranium ore could be mined and sold to the AEC.” (Id. ¶ 57).

In 1951, Defendant Laguna Pueblo, with the approval of the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), entered into a prospecting agreement with the Anaconda Copper Mining Company (“Anaconda”). (Id. ¶¶ 58-59).

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181 F. Supp. 3d 898, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175802, 2016 WL 3574149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atlantic-richfield-co-v-united-states-nmd-2016.