Atlantic Civil, Inc. v. Swift

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Atlantic Civil, Inc. v. Swift

118 So. 3d 271, 2013 WL 3815621, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 11618

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 24, 2013

DocketNo. 3D12-1189

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 118 So. 3d 271 (Atlantic Civil, Inc. v. Swift) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Atlantic Civil, Inc. v. Swift, 118 So. 3d 271, 2013 WL 3815621, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 11618 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013).

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Opinion

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

As a matter of law, the defendants’ unjustified and deliberate denial of access to what all agreed was the plaintiff appellant’s property, a large quantity of “fill” used in road construction, which had been stored on the appellee’s land by mutual agreement, constituted a conversion of that material which required the entry of a judgment in the appellant’s favor for its established value. See Thomas v. Hertz Corp., 890 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Warshall v. Price, 629 So.2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Seymour v. Adams, 638 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 223 (1965); § 221 (“A dispossession may be committed by intentionally ... barring the possessor’s access to a chattel.”); § 221 cmt. e (“[Ojne who is under a duty to admit to his land a possessor of a chattel who is seeking to obtain it has effectively dispossessed the other of his chattel if he refuses him access to it.”); § 222 cmt. a. (“Normally any dispossession is so clearly a serious interference with the right of control that it amounts to a conversion; and it is frequently said that any dispossession is a conversion.”)

Accordingly, the judgment in the defendants’ favor rendered after a non-jury trial below is to that extent reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment for the plaintiff upon computing the amount of material converted at $25.75 per ton.

There is no other error.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

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SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

As a matter of law, the defendants’ unjustified and deliberate denial of access to what all agreed was the plaintiff appellant’s property, a large quantity of “fill” used in road construction, which had been stored on the appellee’s land by mutual agreement, constituted a conversion of that material which required the entry of a judgment in the appellant’s favor for its established value. See Thomas v. Hertz Corp., 890 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Warshall v. Price, 629 So.2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Seymour v. Adams, 638 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 223 (1965); § 221 (“A dispossession may be committed by intentionally ... barring the possessor’s access to a chattel.”); § 221 cmt. e (“[Ojne who is under a duty to admit to his land a possessor of a chattel who is seeking to obtain it has effectively dispossessed the other of his chattel if he refuses him access to it.”); § 222 cmt. a. (“Normally any dispossession is so clearly a serious interference with the right of control that it amounts to a conversion; and it is frequently said that any dispossession is a conversion.”)

Accordingly, the judgment in the defendants’ favor rendered after a non-jury trial below is to that extent reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment for the plaintiff upon computing the amount of material converted at $25.75 per ton.

There is no other error.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

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Bluebook (online)

118 So. 3d 271, 2013 WL 3815621, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 11618, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atlantic-civil-inc-v-swift-fladistctapp-2013.

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