Atlanta Lighting Fixture Company, Inc. v. Peachtree-Sheridan Corporation

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Atlanta Lighting Fixture Company, Inc. v. Peachtree-Sheridan Corporation

147 S.E.2d 847, 113 Ga. App. 313, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1048

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 23, 1966

Docket41718

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 147 S.E.2d 847 (Atlanta Lighting Fixture Company, Inc. v. Peachtree-Sheridan Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Atlanta Lighting Fixture Company, Inc. v. Peachtree-Sheridan Corporation, 147 S.E.2d 847, 113 Ga. App. 313, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1048 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).

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Opinion

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

1. A judgment denying a summary judgment is not reviewable. Ga. L. 1959, pp. 234, 236 (Code Ann. § 110-1208). Therefore, the enumeration of error assigning as error the judgment of the trial court overruling the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is not reviewable.

2. “When a materialman is furnishing at the same time material to one contractor for the improvement of property belonging to different persons, and has full knowledge of the separate contracts, and money is paid to the materialman by the contractor from time to time on account of the material so furnished, it is incumbent upon the materialman to keep separate accounts and to find out from the contractor on what contract the money is paid, and to what account it should be applied. If he does not do so, but applies the money as a credit on a general account against the contractor, he thereby waives his right to a lien on the owner’s property, and must look alone to the contractor.” Williams v. Willingham-Tift Lumber Co., 5 Ga. App. 533, 535 (63 SE 584). See also Grigsby v. Fleming, 96 Ga. App. 664, 666 (101 SE2d 217).

3. Where, as in the present case, the seller of building materials furnished materials to a contractor for the improvement of various properties owned by different persons during the same period of time and kept one account (ledger) for such contractor, rather than separate accounts, and gave credit for payments on the total balance due on the one account rather than on the specific account specified by the contractor, he *314 waives his right to a lien on the owner’s property and must look alone to the contractor.

Argued January 6, 1966 Decided February 23, 1966 Rehearing denied March 14, 1966. George S. Stern, Sidney I. Bose, for appellant. Parker & Parker, Melvin Pazol, A. Mims Wilkinson, Jr., Bichard L. Parker, for appellee.

(a) In this case as in Grigsby v. Fleming, 96 Ga. App. 664, supra, the contractor gave instructions as to which “job” credit should be given for payments made but such credit was not specified on the materialman’s general account until after the contractor had financial difficulties. The judgment for the defendant was authorized by the evidence and the trial court did not err in overruling the plaintiff’s motion for new trial based on the usual general grounds only.

Judgment affirmed.

Hall and Deen, JJ., concur.

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Nichols, Presiding Judge.

1. A judgment denying a summary judgment is not reviewable. Ga. L. 1959, pp. 234, 236 (Code Ann. § 110-1208). Therefore, the enumeration of error assigning as error the judgment of the trial court overruling the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is not reviewable.

2. “When a materialman is furnishing at the same time material to one contractor for the improvement of property belonging to different persons, and has full knowledge of the separate contracts, and money is paid to the materialman by the contractor from time to time on account of the material so furnished, it is incumbent upon the materialman to keep separate accounts and to find out from the contractor on what contract the money is paid, and to what account it should be applied. If he does not do so, but applies the money as a credit on a general account against the contractor, he thereby waives his right to a lien on the owner’s property, and must look alone to the contractor.” Williams v. Willingham-Tift Lumber Co., 5 Ga. App. 533, 535 (63 SE 584). See also Grigsby v. Fleming, 96 Ga. App. 664, 666 (101 SE2d 217).

3. Where, as in the present case, the seller of building materials furnished materials to a contractor for the improvement of various properties owned by different persons during the same period of time and kept one account (ledger) for such contractor, rather than separate accounts, and gave credit for payments on the total balance due on the one account rather than on the specific account specified by the contractor, he *314 waives his right to a lien on the owner’s property and must look alone to the contractor.

Argued January 6, 1966 Decided February 23, 1966 Rehearing denied March 14, 1966. George S. Stern, Sidney I. Bose, for appellant. Parker & Parker, Melvin Pazol, A. Mims Wilkinson, Jr., Bichard L. Parker, for appellee.

(a) In this case as in Grigsby v. Fleming, 96 Ga. App. 664, supra, the contractor gave instructions as to which “job” credit should be given for payments made but such credit was not specified on the materialman’s general account until after the contractor had financial difficulties. The judgment for the defendant was authorized by the evidence and the trial court did not err in overruling the plaintiff’s motion for new trial based on the usual general grounds only.

Judgment affirmed.

Hall and Deen, JJ., concur.

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147 S.E.2d 847, 113 Ga. App. 313, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1048, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atlanta-lighting-fixture-company-inc-v-peachtree-sheridan-corporation-gactapp-1966.

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