ATLANTA IMPOUND, INC v. YARON ATTIA

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: March 11, 2025
• Docket: A24A1394
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MERCIER, C. J., MCFADDEN, P. J., and RICKMAN, P. J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 11, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A1394. ATLANTA IMPOUND, INC. v. ATTIA et al.

RICKMAN, Presiding Judge.

This case arises from the grant of a class certification. Yaron Attia sued Atlanta

Impound, Inc.1 for allegedly engaging in the unlawful practice of disabling vehicles

without legal authority and charging putative fees to have those vehicles released. He

successfully sought to have the action certified on behalf of a proposed class of

similarly situated persons. Atlanta Impound appeals from the trial court’s grant of

class certification, arguing that Attia failed to meet the necessary statutory

requirements, primarily because Attia is the only member of the prospective class

1 Attia also named as a defendants Clay-Devco, Inc. and Hamilton Realty Management, LLC, both of which he alleged owned, occupied, or controlled property on which Atlanta Impound operated, and allegedly hired, authorized, or otherwise provided material support to Atlanta Impound. Neither is party to this appeal. whose name is presently known. For the reasons that follow, we find no error and

affirm.

Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to decide whether to certify a class,

and we will not disturb a trial court’s certification decision absent an abuse of that

discretion. See Endochoice Holdings v. Raczewski, 351 Ga. App. 212, 214 (830 SE2d 597)

(2019). “Implicit in this deferential standard of review is a recognition of the

fact-intensive basis of the certification inquiry and of the trial court’s inherent power

to manage and control pending litigation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. We

will, therefore, affirm the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. See id.

The underlying facts of this case are as follows. In December 2017, Attia parked

his tractor-trailer across several parking spots in the private parking lot of a strip mall

located at 4734 Memorial Drive, Decatur, DeKalb County, Georgia. The property

owner had hired Atlanta Impound to install immobilization devices, commonly known

as boots, on trucks, such as Attia’s, driven by non-paying customers that were

occupying the parking spaces intended for paying customers. Atlanta Impound placed

a boot on Attia’s tractor-trailer and required that he pay $500.00 to remove it, which

2 he did. At that time, DeKalb County did not have a vehicle immobilization ordinance

authorizing the booting of motor vehicles.

Attia filed a class action complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated

persons asserting claims of negligence, negligence per se, premises liability, false

imprisonment, conversion, and money had and received, and seeking both

compensatory and punitive damages. He alleged that in the absence of a local

ordinance or other source of legislative authority granting the use of vehicle

immobilization, Atlanta Impound’s booting of vehicles was strictly unlawful.2 In

support of the proposed class action lawsuit, Attia submitted over 1,000 invoices

produced by Atlanta Impound during discovery3 that evince Atlanta Impound’s

allegedly unlawful vehicle bootings in numerous locations throughout Georgia from

2013 through 2018.

Attia’s proposed class for the class action litigation included:

2 The Supreme Court of Georgia recently confirmed that there is no common- law right allowing private property owners to immobilize unauthorized vehicles parked on their property. See RCC Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC v. Allen, 313 Ga. 69, 74 (2) (867 SE2d 108) (2021). 3 The invoices were produced in a related action involving Atlanta Impound filed in a different county. 3 a. All persons who have been booted by, or at the request of, Defendants at any location within the State of Georgia where there are no vehicle immobilization ordinances, and who have paid fines for the removal of said device, from December 6, 2012, through present; and

b. A subclass of all persons who have been booted by, or at the request of, Defendants at 4734 Memorial Drive, Decatur, GA 30032, and have paid a fine for removal of said device from December 6, 2012, through December 4, 2018 (the Attia subclass).

Atlanta Impound filed a brief in opposition of class certification. Following a

hearing, the trial court issued an order granting class certification and accepting

Attia’s class definitions. This appeal followed.

A named plaintiff seeking class certification must satisfy a series of

requirements. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “[the] proposed class is

adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” Cherry v. Dometic Corporation, 986 F.3d

1296, 1302 (III) (B) (11th Cir., 2021) (“Ascertainability is an implied prerequisite of

4 [OCGA § 9-11-23].”)4 Then, the plaintiff must obtain a finding by the trial court that

the following requirements are met:

(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [numerosity]; (2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class [commonality]; (3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [typicality]; and (4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class [adequacy].5

OCGA § 9-11-23 (a); see City of Roswell v. Bible, 351 Ga. App. 828, 830 (1) (833 SE2d

537) (2019) (“[I]n determining the propriety of a class action, the first issue to be

resolved is not whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or may ultimately

4 “[B]ecause OCGA § 9-11-23 is based on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate that we look to federal cases interpreting that rule for guidance.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Atlanta Postal Credit Union v. Cosby, A24A1694, ___ Ga. App. ___, at *4, n.5 (2025). 5 In addition, the class must satisfy at least one ground under OCGA § 9–11–23 (b), which provides, in summary, that (1) the prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications or would impair other parties’ ability to protect their interests; (2) the defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or declaratory relief with respect to the whole class; or (3) questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. See OCGA § 9-11-23 (b).

5 prevail on the merits, but whether the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) have been

met.”) (citation and punctuation omitted.). The proponents of the class action

litigation have the burden of proving that class certification is appropriate, and must

“come forward with evidence to prove their satisfaction of the statutory

requirements.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

Although Atlanta Impound challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to

each of the above criteria, the crux of its argument is that Attia has failed to establish

that the proposed class and subclass are ascertainable because none of the invoices

upon which Attia relies to establish class membership contain the names or addresses

of the people to whom they were issued. Thus, according to Atlanta Impound, there

is only one known litigant, resulting in insufficient information on which to base a

finding of the factors set forth in OCGA § 9-11-23 (a). We will address each factor in

turn.

a. Ascertainability

Atlanta Impound argues, in essence, that because the invoices do not contain

the names associated with the booted vehicles, there is no administratively feasible

6 method that would allow the trial court to determine membership in the proposed

classes.

As our cases regarding class action litigation make clear, “there is no

requirement that every class member, other than the named plaintiff[], be identified

at the outset of the litigation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bible, 351 Ga. App.

at 834 (3). The trial court must simply establish that the class is clearly ascertainable,

i.e., capable of being determined. See id. (“[A] class definition is necessary only to

establish that the class does, in fact, exist and that its members will be identifiable.”)

(citation and punctuation omitted.) Significantly, “[a]dministrative feasibility is not

an inherent aspect of,” nor is it a prerequisite to, establishing ascertainability.6 Cherry,

986 F.3d at 1303 (III) (B). Instead, “a proposed class is ascertainable if it is adequately

defined such that its membership is capable of determination.” Id.

Attia proposes a class and subclass, membership to which turn on the objective,

verifiable criterion of individuals having had a vehicle immobilized by Atlanta

6 We note that “[a]dministrative feasibility may be relevant to the manageability criterion of [OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3) (D)], but that provision requires a comparative analysis that is incompatible with a threshold, standalone administrative feasibility requirement.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)Rensel v. Centra Tech, 2 F.4th 1359, 1369 (II) (B) (11th Cir., 2021). 7 Impound at a location within the State of Georgia where there was no vehicle

immobilization ordinance, and who paid a fine for the removal of said device within

a particular date range. Attia presented evidence that the invoices produced by Atlanta

Impound contain some combination of the make, model, tag, Department of

Transportation information, and occasionally the Vehicle Identification Number of

the booted vehicles, and submitted an affidavit from an administrative manager used

by counsel in prior class litigation who represented that the identity of the drivers

could be extrapolated from the data contained on the invoices. As such, the trial court

was authorized to conclude that Attia adequately defined its proposed class and

subclass such that they were capable of determination. See Rensel v. Centra Tech, 2

F.4th 1359, 1368-1371 (II) (B) (11th Cir., 2021); Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1303 (III) (B).

b. OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) Factors

Atlanta Impound does not meaningfully challenge the merits of the OCGA §

9-11-23 (a) requirements beyond asserting generally that they cannot be sufficiently

established without Attia’s counsel having positively identified the purported class

members and ascertained the details of their booting experiences. We disagree.

8 (1) Numerosity. In order to satisfy the numerosity requirement, a class action

plaintiff “need not allege the exact number and identity of the class members, but

must only establish that joinder is impracticable through some evidence or reasonable

estimate of the number of purported class members.” (Citation and punctuation

omitted.) Brenntag Mid South v. Smart, 308 Ga. App. 899, 903 (2) (a) (i) (710 SE2d

569) (2011). “Additionally, the class simply must meet a minimum standard of

definiteness which will allow the trial court to determine membership in the proposed

class.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

Attia presented over 1,000 invoices reflecting vehicles that had been booted at

various locations in Georgia lacking immobilization ordinances, and further presented

evidence that the owners of those vehicles could be identified from the information

contained on the invoices. The trial court did not err in concluding that Attia’s

proposed class and subclass satisfied the numerosity requirement of OCGA § 9-11-23

(a), as it would be impractical to litigate the claims of the putative class members

individually. See Bible, 351 Ga. App. at 833 (3) (“[I]mpracticability of joinder is

generally presumed if the class includes more than 40 members.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

9 (2) Commonality. Commonality requires evidence that there are “questions of

law or fact common to the class.” OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2). But it is not necessary to

prove that all questions of law and fact be common to every member of the class. See

Brenntag Mid South,, 308 Ga. App. at 903 (2) (a) (ii). “Rather, the rule requires only

that resolution of the common questions affect all or a substantial number of the class

members.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.; see Williams v. Mohawk

Industries, 568 F.3d 1350, 1355 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here be at least one

issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of the putative class

members.”) (citation and punctuation omitted.); Atlanta Postal Credit Union v.

Holiday, 367 Ga. App. 168, 177 (2) (b) (885 SE2d 196) (2023). “Generally, this

requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same

injury.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rice v. Fulton County, 370 Ga. App. 353,

356 (3) (a) (897 SE2d 491) (2024).

Atlanta Impound argues that Attia failed to prove that there are common

questions of law and fact sufficient to meet the commonality requirement because

Attia’s counsel has not yet identified the names of or spoken to the remaining

10 members of the putative class. It is therefore impossible to know, Atlanta Impound

contends, “if their cases have anything in common with [Attia’s case].”

The invoices of record reflect over 1,000 vehicles, including Attia’s, that were

immobilized by Atlanta Impound, and that the immobilizing devices were not

removed until payment was received. Attia contends that this was done in locations

lacking vehicle immobilization ordinances. As correctly determined by the trial court,

this evidence satisfies the commonality requirement because “the common question

that is central to the validity of each of the class members’ claims is whether [Atlanta

Impound] had a legal right to immobilize vehicles at the subject properties[,]” and

that “[t]he resolution of this legal question resolves liability for all of the class

members’ claims and does not depend on individualized issues of fact.” The identities

of the individual drivers were not necessary to make that initial determination. See

generally Rice, 370 Ga. App. at 356 (3) (a) (holding trial court erred by ruling plaintiff

failed to meet commonality requirement because “[t]he answer to this question [of

whether defendant acted lawfully when calculating property taxes] will not vary with

each class member because it is binary — either the method used by Appellees to

calculate the putative class members’ property taxes was legal or it was not”).

11 (3) Typicality. The typicality requirement is satisfied if “the claims or defenses

of the class and the class representative arise from the same event or pattern or

practice and are based on the same legal theory.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Williams, 568 F.3d at 1357 (III) (B); see OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (3). Put another way, “[a]

class representative must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the

class members.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.; Brenntag Mid South, 308 Ga.

App. at 904 (2) (a) (iii) (“The typicality requirement under OCGA § 9-11-3 (a) is

satisfied upon a showing that the defendant committed the same unlawful acts in the

same method against an entire class.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Again, Atlanta Impound contends that without Attia’s counsel having identified

and spoken to the other members of the putative class, “questions of what supposedly

made [Atlanta Impound’s] actions improper cannot be addressed” to determine

whether they are typical of Attia’s injury. The trial court determined that Attia’s

claims “are typical of the proposed class members’ claims because they arise from the

exact same pattern or practice: [Atlanta Impound] unlawfully booting vehicles at the

subject properties and refusing to remove the boot until a fee is paid.” Again, we agree

with the trial court, which did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the typicality

12 requirement was met. See Holiday, 367 Ga. App. at 182-183 (2) (c); Liberty Lending

Svcs. v. Canada, 293 Ga. App. 731, 738 (1) (b) (668 SE2d 3) (2008).

(4) Adequacy. “The important aspects of adequate representation are whether

the plaintiffs’ counsel is experienced and competent and whether plaintiffs’ interests

are antagonistic to those of the class.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brenntag

Mid South, 308 Ga. App. at 905 (2) (a) (iv). The record in this case supports the trial

court’s conclusion that the adequacy requirement is met. Atlanta Impound does not

challenge the competence or experience of counsel, nor does it allege that Attia has

antagonistic interests. His counsel have experience in class action litigation and are

lead counsel in other proposed class action lawsuits in Georgia involving alleged

unlawful vehicle immobilizations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

the adequacy requirement was satisfied. See generally Canada, 293 Ga. App. at 739

(1) (c).

For these combined reasons, the trial court did not err in certifying the class and

subclass as proposed by Attia.

Judgment affirmed. Mercier, C. J., and McFadden, P. J., concur.