UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAKEBA ATKINS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-02466 (CRC)
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
In this employment dispute, pro se plaintiff Makeba Atkins claims that the Naval Sea
Systems Command discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, refused to accommodate
her disability, and unfairly placed her on unpaid leave because her security clearance was
revoked. For the reasons given below, the Court will dismiss this case.
I. Background
At all relevant times, Ms. Atkins was employed as a systems engineer by the Naval Sea
Systems Command, a part of the Department of Navy located in Washington, D.C. See Compl.
at 5; Atkins Opp’n at 3. She raises three employment-related claims against the Command.
First, Atkins claims that, beginning in 2016, her superiors “engaged in and allowed others to
engage in a continuous pattern of verbal, sexual, and physical harassment in the workplace.”
Compl. at 5. Second, Atkins alleges that the harassment she suffered was unlawful retaliation in
response to her request for accommodations for her mental and physical disabilities. Atkins
Opp’n at 3. Third, Atkins claims that the Command unlawfully put her on unpaid leave in 2018
after she lost her security clearance for discriminatory reasons. Compl. at 5; Atkins Opp’n at 3. Atkins filed internal administrative complaints raising these issues in 2018 and 2019. See
Compl. at 5; see Compl. Ex. A at 1. According to official records, the Navy dismissed those
complaints in April 2019. See Defs.’ Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 4.1 Atkins then forwarded the
dismissal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which dismissed her complaint for
lack of jurisdiction in September 2019. Id. ¶¶ 6–8. Three years later, in November 2022, Atkins
sued the Command and several of her superiors in the Northern District of Alabama under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. Compl. at 3.
The government moved to dismiss in the Alabama court for improper venue and failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. ECF 13. That court agreed with the government as to venue
and transferred the case to this Court. Order of June 29, 2023 at 9–13. After the transfer, the
government moved again to dismiss.
II. Legal Standard
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must present “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A claim is plausible on its face if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court “assumes the truth of all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construes reasonable inferences from those
1 Some of the specific dates for relevant agency decisions are not included in the Complaint. The Court takes judicial notice of the missing dates, which are identified in Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts. See Vasser v. McDonald, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted) (“[C]ourts have taken judicial notice of Final Agency Decisions, especially for background information such as dates of filings.”). Atkins also did not dispute any of these dates in her opposition to defendants’ motion.
2 allegations in the plaintiff’s favor but is not required to accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions as
correct.” Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam);
Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 789 F.3d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “[A] district court must
consider together all allegations that pro se plaintiffs make in their pleadings – including in their
oppositions – when resolving a motion to dismiss.” Elghannam v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of
Pharmacy, 151 F. Supp. 3d 57, 60 n.1 (D.D.C. 2015) (Cooper, J.) (citing Brown, 789 F.3d at
151). Still, a pro se plaintiff must “plead factual matter that permits [the Court] to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]” Brown, 789 F.3d at 150 (citation omitted) (quotation
marks omitted).
III. Analysis
The Court will grant the government’s motion to dismiss. Atkins’s Title VII claims are
untimely, while her ADA claims fail because the ADA does not cover claims by federal
employees against their government employers. The Court will also deny Atkins leave to amend
her complaint.
A. Title VII
Federal employees suing their government employers under Title VII must sue within 90
days of final agency action. Price v. Bernanke, 470 F.3d 384, 388–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This
timing requirement is “strictly construed[,] . . . even where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.”
Ruiz v. Vilsack, 763 F. Supp. 2d 168, 173 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, Atkins sued
three years after final agency action. The Navy and the EEOC both dismissed her complaints in
3 2019. Defs.’ Stmt. of Material Facts ¶¶ 4, 8. Regardless of which dismissal is the operative final
agency action, Atkins did not sue until 2022, well after the 90-day deadline. None of her filings
identifies any other agency proceedings or actions that might have tolled her filing deadline;
indeed, her opposition to defendants’ motion does not respond at all to defendants’ timeliness
arguments. See Atkins Opp’n. The Court will therefore dismiss Atkins’s Title VII claims as
untimely.
B. ADA
The ADA does not apply to Atkins’s claims. The ADA generally prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). But the
Act specifically provides that the United States government is not an “employer” under the
ADA. Id. § 12111(5)(B)(i). Atkins does not address the ADA’s carveout, so her ADA claims
“fail as a matter of law.” Kelly v. Raimondo, No. 20-cv-3203 (RDM), 2022 WL 14807447, at
*5 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2022). The Court therefore dismisses Atkins’s ADA claims for failure to
state a claim.2
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAKEBA ATKINS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-02466 (CRC)
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
In this employment dispute, pro se plaintiff Makeba Atkins claims that the Naval Sea
Systems Command discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, refused to accommodate
her disability, and unfairly placed her on unpaid leave because her security clearance was
revoked. For the reasons given below, the Court will dismiss this case.
I. Background
At all relevant times, Ms. Atkins was employed as a systems engineer by the Naval Sea
Systems Command, a part of the Department of Navy located in Washington, D.C. See Compl.
at 5; Atkins Opp’n at 3. She raises three employment-related claims against the Command.
First, Atkins claims that, beginning in 2016, her superiors “engaged in and allowed others to
engage in a continuous pattern of verbal, sexual, and physical harassment in the workplace.”
Compl. at 5. Second, Atkins alleges that the harassment she suffered was unlawful retaliation in
response to her request for accommodations for her mental and physical disabilities. Atkins
Opp’n at 3. Third, Atkins claims that the Command unlawfully put her on unpaid leave in 2018
after she lost her security clearance for discriminatory reasons. Compl. at 5; Atkins Opp’n at 3. Atkins filed internal administrative complaints raising these issues in 2018 and 2019. See
Compl. at 5; see Compl. Ex. A at 1. According to official records, the Navy dismissed those
complaints in April 2019. See Defs.’ Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 4.1 Atkins then forwarded the
dismissal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which dismissed her complaint for
lack of jurisdiction in September 2019. Id. ¶¶ 6–8. Three years later, in November 2022, Atkins
sued the Command and several of her superiors in the Northern District of Alabama under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. Compl. at 3.
The government moved to dismiss in the Alabama court for improper venue and failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. ECF 13. That court agreed with the government as to venue
and transferred the case to this Court. Order of June 29, 2023 at 9–13. After the transfer, the
government moved again to dismiss.
II. Legal Standard
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must present “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A claim is plausible on its face if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court “assumes the truth of all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construes reasonable inferences from those
1 Some of the specific dates for relevant agency decisions are not included in the Complaint. The Court takes judicial notice of the missing dates, which are identified in Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts. See Vasser v. McDonald, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted) (“[C]ourts have taken judicial notice of Final Agency Decisions, especially for background information such as dates of filings.”). Atkins also did not dispute any of these dates in her opposition to defendants’ motion.
2 allegations in the plaintiff’s favor but is not required to accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions as
correct.” Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam);
Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 789 F.3d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “[A] district court must
consider together all allegations that pro se plaintiffs make in their pleadings – including in their
oppositions – when resolving a motion to dismiss.” Elghannam v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of
Pharmacy, 151 F. Supp. 3d 57, 60 n.1 (D.D.C. 2015) (Cooper, J.) (citing Brown, 789 F.3d at
151). Still, a pro se plaintiff must “plead factual matter that permits [the Court] to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]” Brown, 789 F.3d at 150 (citation omitted) (quotation
marks omitted).
III. Analysis
The Court will grant the government’s motion to dismiss. Atkins’s Title VII claims are
untimely, while her ADA claims fail because the ADA does not cover claims by federal
employees against their government employers. The Court will also deny Atkins leave to amend
her complaint.
A. Title VII
Federal employees suing their government employers under Title VII must sue within 90
days of final agency action. Price v. Bernanke, 470 F.3d 384, 388–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This
timing requirement is “strictly construed[,] . . . even where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.”
Ruiz v. Vilsack, 763 F. Supp. 2d 168, 173 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, Atkins sued
three years after final agency action. The Navy and the EEOC both dismissed her complaints in
3 2019. Defs.’ Stmt. of Material Facts ¶¶ 4, 8. Regardless of which dismissal is the operative final
agency action, Atkins did not sue until 2022, well after the 90-day deadline. None of her filings
identifies any other agency proceedings or actions that might have tolled her filing deadline;
indeed, her opposition to defendants’ motion does not respond at all to defendants’ timeliness
arguments. See Atkins Opp’n. The Court will therefore dismiss Atkins’s Title VII claims as
untimely.
B. ADA
The ADA does not apply to Atkins’s claims. The ADA generally prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). But the
Act specifically provides that the United States government is not an “employer” under the
ADA. Id. § 12111(5)(B)(i). Atkins does not address the ADA’s carveout, so her ADA claims
“fail as a matter of law.” Kelly v. Raimondo, No. 20-cv-3203 (RDM), 2022 WL 14807447, at
*5 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2022). The Court therefore dismisses Atkins’s ADA claims for failure to
state a claim.2
C. Leave to Amend
Finally, the Court will deny Atkins leave to amend for two independent reasons.
2 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the ADA claims for lack of jurisdiction. Ordinarily, however, the lack of a cause of action “does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 775 F.3d 409, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). Courts have recognized that some claims are so legally insubstantial as to bar federal jurisdiction, such as when “prior Supreme Court decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous.” Doe #1 v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 554 F. Supp. 3d 75, 93 (D.D.C. 2021) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). But here, defendants have not identified any prior binding decisions that “inescapably” bar Atkins’s claims. See Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 5–9 (relying only on district court opinions).
4 First, Atkins did not attach a proposed amended complaint as required by Local Civil
Rule 15.1. See Kelly, 2022 WL 14807447, at *6 (“[E]ven pro se litigants must comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (cleaned up)).
Second, amendment would be futile. An amendment is futile when the amended claims
“would not survive a motion to dismiss.” James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Here, Atkins has not identified any potential facts she could
include to toll or otherwise extend the applicable 90-day deadline. As best the Court can tell, the
only amendments she would make would be to change her ADA claims to Rehabilitation Act
claims. See Atkins Opp’n at 2. That change, however, would not make a difference. Claims
under the Rehabilitation Act, like claims under Title VII, also must be filed within 90 days of
final agency action. Featherston v. District of Columbia, 910 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2012);
see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1). As discussed above, this suit was filed well outside that time period.
So even if the Court were to grant Atkins leave to amend, the case would still be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court dismisses Atkins’s claims for failure to state a claim and
denies leave to amend. A separate Order follows.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: June 23, 2025