Atkins v. . Kron

43 N.C. 1
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedDecember 5, 1851
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 43 N.C. 1 (Atkins v. . Kron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atkins v. . Kron, 43 N.C. 1 (N.C. 1851).

Opinion

*2 Ruffiw, C. J.

Under the interlocutory order, made at the last term in this cause, 2 Ire. Eq. 424, the mister has reported that Frances Augustus T)e la ‘Mothe and Mary C. Kron were not qualified to hold land in this State, at the death of the testator.

'To that the counsel for the Fores tiers have excepted, because, in 1824, Mrs. Kron made a declaration in this Court of her intention to become a citizen, and Frances A. De la Mothe made a similar declaration in 1840.

The exception must be overruled. The .testator died in 1838, and therefore clearly the brother could not take land when the testator died and the. legacy to him could be charged on land. But if he had made his declaration as Mrs. Kron did, it would not make them citizens. The alienage continues after the declaration until the order for naturalization; which, indeed,' has not yet' been made.— Nor could these persons hold land under the 4th section of our State Constitution, since it does not appear that they bad taken the oath of allegiance to the State.

In setting a value upon the real and personal estates, so .as to apportion between them the common charges,on them, the Master found the value of the fee simple in possession of the land assigned for the dower of the testator’s, widow to be 12600 ; and that the value of the life estate js $1650, and of the reversion #950, on which latter sum.Mrs. Kron’s children are to contribute, in respect to this part of the land, with the personalty, towards the payment of the legacies and.expenses chargeable thereon.

To this part of the report the Forestiers have also excepted, “because the sum deducted from the estimated value of the real estate, on account of the encumbrance of th.e dower, is unreasonably large.”

The Master states in the report, that the widow'is 34 years old, and that he estimated her life at 29 years'; 'and *3 that, so doing, he assumes the sum of $950, to be the value of the inversion, because that sum and the interest thereon at 6 per.cent, for 29 years, will amount to $2000.

The Court is really at a loss to say, whether the value of it or the reversion is too low or not. The rule, indeed, by which the Master arrived at his result is not satisfactory, nor can we say, that there is any other that can be laid down. If we could be sure from our own knowledge upon such questions, or it the exceptants had shown by evidence that probably the deduction for dower was too much, and, consequently, their reversion valued too low, and had move d for another enquiry, it would be ordered. The truth is, that we have to encounter many and great difficulties here in estimating the relative values of a life estate in land, and of the dry reversion expectant thereon. There is more or less uncertainty every where, as it depends upon a life. But, from long and careful observation, averages have'been struck in particular countries, which enable persons skilled in such matters to make, in their calculations, such probable approaches to actual results, that they guppose, taking a large number of lives together, they can deal respecting their duration, rather upon the basis of mathematics than of chances. It is in that way that tables of longevity are constructed and the value'of life annuities calculated. And in those countries, when land has a fixed price, not varying indeed, but with the-value of money in different agrs, and when all land readily finds a tenant, and generally an improving one, at a rent that does not fluctuate perceptibly within the period of one life, the value of a life estate may be estimated, from the existing income, with nearly the same confidence that a personal annpity may be. Hence in the same country its value, or ffie rule of valuing it, may vary with different eras in the condition of the country. Formerly the average in England was one third for *4 the life estate and two thirds for the reversion. But, as was observed by us in Jones v. Sherrard 2 Dev. & Bat. 179, and on the authority of the case there cited, that rule has been decidedly condemned in more recent times. Now, no arbitrary proportion is taken, but it is referred to the master to enquire of the actual values, estimating that of the life estate upon the principle of life annuities, and therefore having regard- to the rate of interest, the annual value of the land, and the age, state of health, and the habits of the tenants for life. To calculate the value even upon those data is not an office of the Judge, but belongs to a distinct profession : Upon the opinions given by which the Court acts, as evidence, in the same measure as in any other case, depending on a question of science. The J udge is not an actuary, nor bound to assume the functions of that personage. It is much safer to proceed on the opinions of the profession, than on any the Court should undertake to form for itself. Now, it is obvious, that the reliance, to which those calculations are entitled, depends on the degree of certainty in the different elements which enter into it. These are the probable- duration of life : which depends on the salubrity of the climate, and the age, health, and habits of the person : then, the annual income of the estate for the term of years, which has been fixed on as the measure of the life: and, lastly, the consideration, whether the price of land be stationary or rising or falling in the country, and whether the fertility of the particular tract will be increased or diminished by the intermediate culture, or the like, so that the fee simple in possession will be intrinsically worth, when it shall fall in, as much as it is now, or more or less.

In the most of Europe, and, perhaps, in some parts of this country, the annual income, received in the form of rent., may be anticipated almost as certainly as interest on *5 capital m money. The price, also, of the fee in possession is much the same, take the country throughout, in the end, as at the beginning, of the same life. But, in all those particulars there is the utmost uncertainty here; an uncertainty so.great, that no general rule for estimating the value of those different interests can be laid down, which would not do great injustice in, perhaps, more than half the cases which might arise. The income from land is seldom divided by way of rent, but of crops from the cultivation of the owner; and hence, the profits depend much upon what-other capital the tenant has, besides the land. 'Those profits, for a course of years to come, cannot be computed with any confidence. Besides, it is á fallacy to assume, that the intrinsic value of the land, or the market value, will be the same at the beginning and end of the life estate. We know that depends bn such a variety of circumstances, that there can be no positive rule, A rice-swamp and other alluvial flats, being all cleared and prepared for successful culture, and of extraordinary fertility, may be so considered. But, in the hill country, and where tobacco or cotton are the crops, under the usual system ot tillage by the greater part of our citizens, or even of those who are called prudent and successful planters, we know that, in twenty-five or thirty years, a plantation of ordinary size is so nearly cleared of its timber, and reduced by continued and exhausting cropping and detrition, as often not to be worth half what it was.

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Bluebook (online)
43 N.C. 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atkins-v-kron-nc-1851.