Atkin v. Lewis

232 F. Supp. 2d 770, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23607, 2002 WL 31681346
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedAugust 13, 2002
Docket5:02CV 57
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 232 F. Supp. 2d 770 (Atkin v. Lewis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atkin v. Lewis, 232 F. Supp. 2d 770, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23607, 2002 WL 31681346 (N.D. Ohio 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LIMBERT, United States Magistrate Judge.

The instant case is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See ECF Dkt. # 24. For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES and REMANDS the instant case back to the Defendants. See ECF Dkt. # 1.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2001, Plaintiff, prose, Sanford I. Atkin (Plaintiff) filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) against Trudy Lewis, Assistant Regional Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Jane Doe, an unknown official at the Social Security Administration, and the Social Security Administration (Defendants). See ECF Dkt. # 1. Plaintiff avers that since 1994 he has been entitled to federal old-age and survivors insurance *772 benefit payments under 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (old-age benefits). See id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff further alleges that on or about June 25, 1995, he applied to receive old-age benefits, and that he began to receive old-age benefits in July, 1995. See id. at ¶7. Plaintiff then alleges that in early 1996 the Defendants suspended his old-age benefits effective November, 1995, without providing a notice or an opportunity for a hearing. See id. at ¶ 8. 1 On March 16, 2000, Plaintiff contends that he requested Defendants personally and in writing to reinstate his old-age benefits. See id. at ¶ 9. At the same time that Plaintiff admits that Defendants reinstated his old-age benefits on April 1, 2000, he also maintains that Defendants notified him that he owed Defendants for an overpayment of old-age benefits along with a medicare premium. See id. at ¶ 10.

According to Plaintiff, Defendants notified him again in a notice of reconsideration dated December 21, 2000 that he still owed Defendants for an overpayment of old-age benefits. See ECF Dkt. # 1 at ¶ 11. Defendants’ notice of reconsideration did contain a request for hearing provision, which stated as follows, “If you believe that the reconsideration determination is not correct, you may request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Hearings and Appeals. If you want a hearing, you must request it not later than 60 days from the date you receive this notice. You should make your request through any Social Security office.” ECF Dkt. #24, exhibit 1. Plaintiff avers that he filed a timely notice of appeal with Defendants within the 60 day time frame provided for in the notice of reconsideration. See ECF Dkt. # 1 at ¶¶ 12, 13. Plaintiff contends that Defendants never scheduled a hearing to consider his appeal of the Defendants’ overpayment determination. See id. at ¶ 18. 2 Defendants responded by filing a motion for more definite statement which specifically requested that Plaintiff provide Defendants with his social security number and copies of documents referred to in his complaint. See ECF Dkt. 16. 3

On June 24, 2002, in response to Defendants’ motion for more definite statement, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide said information to Defendants within sixty days. See ECF Dkt. # 17. Additionally, the Court gave Defendants an additional thirty days to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiffs complaint. See id. The Court specifically ordered that Defendants’ thirty day extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiffs complaint began to run on the date Plaintiff provided Defendants with his social security number and documents that were referenced in his complaint. See id. Plaintiff provided said information to Defendants on July 2, 2002. See ECF Dkt. # 18. Thus, pursuant to the Court’s order regarding Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, Defendants had up to and including August 2, 2002 to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiffs complaint.

On July 18, 2002, Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery and status report. *773 See ECF Dkt. # 19. On July 29, 2002, clearly within compliance of the Court’s previous order, Defendants pled to Plaintiffs complaint by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See ECF Dkt. # 24. Defendants essentially argue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs complaint because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See id. In addition, Defendants filed a declaration of a program expert within the Social Security Administration wherein that individual admitted that Plaintiffs hearing request was “unprocessed.” Id., exhibit 3. Further, the program expert for Defendants declared that Plaintiffs hearing request was lost, and that the follow-up done by the local Social Security field office was inadvertently overlooked. See id. Lastly, the program expert stated that he sent Plaintiffs hearing request to the Social Security Administration’s Office of Hearings and Appeals in Cleveland, Ohio on July 19, 2002, along with a request for an expedited hearing. See id.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss prompted Plaintiff to file a battery of motions and memoranda, including a motion to compel discovery (ECF Dkt. # 20), a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF Dkt. #21), a motion for sanctions (ECF Dkt. # 22), and a motion for default judgment (ECF Dkt. # 23). Defendants responded by filing a motion for extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs litany of motions. See ECF Dkt. # 25.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs complaint contains two distinct causes of action. See ECF Dkt. # 1. Plaintiffs first cause of action centers around his claim for old-age benefits, and the Defendants’ alleged wrongful suspension of those benefits and their attempts to recover overpayment of those benefits. See id. In Plaintiffs second cause of action, he avers that Defendants failed to provide him with a statutory mandated hearing even though he properly requested such hearing after receiving a notice of reconsideration affirming the Defendants’ overpayment determination. See id. at ¶ 12, 13. Plaintiffs second cause of action states a claim for a procedural due process violation. See id.

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See ECF Dkt. #24. However, in an attached declaration, Defendants admit that Plaintiffs hearing request was “unprocessed”, i.e.

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Bluebook (online)
232 F. Supp. 2d 770, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23607, 2002 WL 31681346, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atkin-v-lewis-ohnd-2002.