Atchley, Michael
Opinion
PD-1472-16
No. _________
In the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals At Austin
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ………. . . . . . . . . 2 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. . . . . . . . . . 3 IDENTITY OF COURT, PARTIES AND COUNSEL….………………………………………..3 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. . . . . . . . . 4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. . . . . . . 4 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. . . . . . 4 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. . . . . 4 ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF REVIEW.......................…... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. 4 PRAYER FOR RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. . . . . ... . . . . 8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. ... . . . . 9 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE………………………………………………………..…….9 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……….. . . . . . . . . …END
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) 5 Ex parte Skelton, 434 S.W.3d 709 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2014, pet. ref'd) 6 Ex. Parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) 8 Griffith v. State, 55 S.W.3d 598 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) 5 Hardie v. State, 807 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) 6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 5 Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575 (Crim. App. 1986) 5 Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) 5 IDENTITY OF COURT, PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all parties to the Trial Court’s Judgment and their counsel in the Trial Court:
TRIAL COURT: 336th District Court Hon. Laurine Blake
101 E. Sam Rayburn, Suite 200 Bonham TX 75418
P.: (903) 583-2863
F.: (903) 640-1826
THE STATE OF TEXAS / Appellee: Mr. Richard Glaser Don Hoover, ADA
101 E. Sam Rayburn, Suite 301 P.: (903) 583-7448
F.: (903) 583-7682
MICHAEL ATCHLEY /Appellant: Mr. Micah Belden Attorney at Law
711 N. Travis
Sherman, TX 75090
P.: (903) 744-4252
F.: (903) 893-1734
To The Honorable Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas:
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Appellant waives oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Michael Atchley pled not guilty in the 336th Judicial District Court of Fannin County, Texas to the charge of felony bail jumping - failure to appear, and trial was had to a jury. He was convicted of the same on November 13, 2015, and the jury assessed his punishment at ten years confinement.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY A panel of the Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the court’s trial court’s judgment on November 23, 2016 in an unpublished opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed. No mandate has issued. Appellant now files his petition for discretionary review.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE CASE DUE TO EVIDENCE OF POST ARREST SILENCE OF MICHAEL ATCHLEY IN HIS NOT RESPONDING TO THE JUDGMENT NISI.
2. THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT THE JUDGMENT TO REFLECT MR.
ATCHLEY’S BACK TIME FROM MARCH 20, 2015.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF REVIEW The State called Assistant District Attorney Ben Kaminar, who prosecuted the bond forfeiture allegation of Mr. Atchley, to testify as an expert witness as to the bond forfeiture proceedings against Mr. Atchley. Counsel objected to this line of testimony “as to Mr. Atchley’s lack of response to the civil case as a violation of the Fifth Amendment and Mr. Atchley’s right to remain silent…”
In preliminary questioning, Mr. Kaminar said his testimony would be relevant to the jury in that many of the legal defenses available in the forfeiture proceeding are available in the criminal case. The State asked him if he ever received an answer from Mr. Atchley in the bond forfeiture, which he did not, and no excuse was presented for Mr. Atchley’s failure to appear. This testimony was not limited to Mr. Atchley’s pre-arrest silence, but also included post-arrest silence up to the date of trial.
Officer Caleb Hackney testified that he arrested Mr. Atchley on March 20, 2015 for bail jumping, as well as the underlying offense of assault family violence. RR 3 217-218. Mr. Atchley did not bond out on either charge.
Mr. Atchley had a Federal Constitutional right to remain silent after arrest and Miranda, and a Texas Constitutional right to remain silent after arrest whether Mirandized or not. Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575 (Crim. App. 1986). The admission of Mr. Kaminar’s testimony that Mr. Atchley had a duty to respond to the judgment nisi, and the testimony that he did not, was a violation of Mr. Atchley’s right to remain silent. It is fatal to the state’s case that the testimony was not limited to pre-arrest silence. The use of post-arrest silence violates the right to be free of self-incrimination, and is not probative as an instance prior inconsistent conduct. Id., at 578.
It is indisputable that Mr. Atchley had a right to remain silent after arrest. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). “The guaranty of fundamental fairness in the Due Process Clause forbids the government from making the Miranda promises and breaking them by using a suspect's exercise of a right as evidence against him.” Griffith v. State, 55 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)); see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 640, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (“What is impermissible is the evidentiary use of
an individual's exercise of his constitutional rights after the State's assurance that the invocation of those rights will not be penalized.”). Use of a defendant's silence for either substantive or impeachment value is constitutionally prohibited; it is fundamentally unfair to simultaneously afford a suspect a constitutional right to silence following his receipt of his Miranda warnings and then allow the implications of that silence to be used against him. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245. Silence “does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent.” Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. at 640 n. 13.
Introduction of a defendant's express invocation of his right to remain silent is prejudicial to a defendant because the introduction of such evidence invites the jury to draw an adverse inference of guilt from the exercise of a constitutional right. See Hardie v. State, 807 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Ex parte Skelton, 434 S.W.3d 709, 719 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2014, pet. ref'd). In other words, the probable collateral implication of a defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent is that he is guilty. See Skelton, 434 S.W.3d at 719. It follows that, if a defendant invokes his right to remain silent after receiving his post-arrest Miranda warnings, the State cannot use the defendant's invocation of his constitutionally-protected right to remain silent as evidence of his guilt at trial. See Hardie, 807 S.W.2d at 322; Skelton, 434 S.W.3d at 719.
Counsel objected to the Fifth Amendment violation and the violation of Mr. Atchley’s Texas right to remain silent above, outside the presence of the jury following the 702 hearing on Mr. Kaminar’s testimony. The Court nevertheless allowed Mr. Kaminar to testify with no restrictions. Counsel objected to the Fifth Amendment violation again on Mr. Kaminar’s testimony in front of the jury regarding Mr. Atchley’s duty to respond to the judgment nisi, and
Mr. Atchley’s failure to ever respond to the allegations or provide an excuse on his failure to appear.
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