Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Rld. v. Board of Commissioners

21 Kan. 309
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJuly 15, 1878
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 21 Kan. 309 (Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Rld. v. Board of Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Rld. v. Board of Commissioners, 21 Kan. 309 (Ark. 1878).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Horton, C. J.:

This is a proceeding in mandamus, brought originally in this court, to compel the issue of forty thousand dollars of the bonds of the township of Delaware (formerly Grasshopper Falls), Jefferson county, in payment of ,a subscription of a like amount of the capital stock of the plaintiff The vote on the question of subscribing this stock and issuing these bonds was taken under the provisions of chapter 90, laws of 1870, and was had on the 11th day of July, 1871. A canvass of the votes showed that the whole number cast at said election was 393, of which number 291 were cast for subscribing the stock and issuing the bonds, and 102 against. Afterward, in pursuance of the proceedings had, the board of county commissioners of Jefferson county ordered the county clerk to make such subscription in the name of Grasshopper Falls (now Delaware) township; and on December 4th, 1871, the county clerk of the county subscribed for $40,000 of the capital stock of the plaintiff, on behalf of said township, and delivered such subscription to an attorney of the plaintiff, by whom it was delivered to the general manager of the railroad, and by him handed to the treasurer of the company. After completing the railroad in accordance with the terms of the order of submission, on January 5th, 1877, at a meeting” of the board of county commissioners of said Jefferson county, the plaintiff presented to the board an affidavit showing a full compliance on the part of the plaintiff with all the terms and conditions submitted at the election of July 11th, 1871, and then tendered to the board for Delaware township $40,000 of the full-paid capital stock of the plaintiff for the subscription, and demanded from the board the issuance and delivery to it of $40,000 of bonds in the name of said township, in payment of said subscription. This matter was taken under advisement till a meeting on February 16th, 1877, when the board refused to accept the stock, or issue the bonds, for the reason that the members were not. satisfied that the plaintiff was lawfully entitled to the bonds of the township, and declined to hear testimony offered by the plaintiff) because no evidence was presented on the part of the township, and no authority existed to compel the attendance of witnesses for the township to investigate and determine the matter. On March 15th, 1877, this proceeding was instituted to obtain the bonds.

The defendants made several • defenses to the issuance of the bonds and the granting of.a peremptory writ in this case, and we shall consider these objections in their order.

I. It is contended that the plaintiff never had the power to accept of, or become a party to, the assumed contract of subscription. The argument is that, as the railroad company was chartered and organized under a territorial act, approved February 11th, 1859, which conferred the power on the corporators, after $50,000 had been subscribed to the capital stock of the company, and ten per centum actually paid to the grantees therein named, and a certificate thereof, from a majority of them, filed in the office of the secretary of the territory, to open books for further subscription, requiring payments or installments from time to time, that the plaintiff could take no subscription upon which such requirement could not be made at any and all times when the needs of the company should require it; and as the bonds voted were not to be issued until the railroad had been completed through the township voting them, the subscription was in conflict with the charter, the act of the company in attempting to accept the same in excess of the power conferred, and the whole transaction void. We do not see any force'in the argument pressed upon us, that this subscription was ultra vires on the part of the plaintiff. Sections 17 and 18 of the original charter are as follows.

“Sec. 17. When the citizens of any county or city in this territory are desirous of subscribing to the stock of said company, the citizens of such city or county are authorized to purchase, subscribe or hold shares, not exceeding $100,000 in amount, as shall be determined by the county court or common council making such subscription, in all respects as stock owned by individuals; and such railroad company may dispose of bonds, issued for such stock by said county or council, upon such terms as may be necessary.
“Sec. 18. Subscriptions to the stock of said company may be made in land in the same manner as in cash, and said company are hereby authorized to hold, purchase and convey the same as they may deem for their interest.”

By these sections, subscriptions from counties and cities were payable in bonds; and subscriptions could also be made in land. Thus, the original charter clearly provided for the payment of stock in other modes than in money. Chapter 90, laws of 1870, expressly authorized subscriptions to be made as was done in this case. The law is entitled “An act to enable municipal townships to subscribe for stock in any railroad, and to provide for the -payment of the same.” Either this law is not applicable to the plaintiff, as it gives municipal townships authority to subscribe for stock and pay in bonds, while the original charter only contemplates cities and counties making subscriptions in this manner, or else its terms and provisions may be accepted by all the railroads in the state, including the plaintiff, that wish to take advantage of the powers conferred. There is no prohibition in the original charter preventing townships being authorized by the legislature to subscribe for stock and pay in bonds, and the provision therein for city and county subscriptions does not by implication tend to prevent the legislature from granting such power if willingly exercised by the corporation. The legislation is paramountly for the benefit of the railroad company, not for its injury, destruction, or any limitation of its franchise. The question of the impairment of a contract by legislation hostile to the interests of the corporation is not raised. If the corporation seeks the advantages of the law allowing municipal townships to aid the work in which it is engaged, it does so willingly, and because its interest runs in that direction. No force is used; no compulsion can.be effected. The issue of railroad-aid bonds has been sustained by the declarations of the legislative and the judicial departments of the state, and as the legislature has authorized subscriptions of this character to any railroad, we find nothing in the original charter of the company preventing it from accepting subscriptions on the conditions of the law of 1870. The terms and conditions of the subscription having been made in compliance with said act, with the consent of the corporation, it cannot be said to be unauthorized and void. The plaintiff had the right to accept any additional benefits provided by after-legislation which did not defeat the purposes of its charter; and certainly it had the power to accept the benefits which directly promoted these purposes. The provision in the law that the bonds were not to be issued until the railroad had been fully completed through the township voting them, or to such point in said township as was agreed upon, was a wise measure, and one which in all cases should be strictly adhered to. In this connection, we may add that, under all the authorities, when a subscription is received after the organization of a company, different principles apply than when made prior thereto.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State of Texas v. Harris County, Texas
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2025
Baird v. Salina Northern Railroad
173 P. 1069 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1918)
Wilmington, Onslow & East Carolina Railroad v. Commissioners of Onslow County
116 N.C. 563 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1895)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
21 Kan. 309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atchison-topeka-santa-fe-rld-v-board-of-commissioners-ark-1878.