Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United States

334 F. Supp. 651, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10567
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedDecember 1, 1971
DocketNo. 3-71-Civ-80
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 334 F. Supp. 651 (Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 651, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10567 (mnd 1971).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, NORDBYE, Senior District Judge, and DEVITT, Chief District Judge.

DEVITT, Chief Judge.

This is an action brought by six western railroads to enjoin, suspend, annul, and set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dated August 25, 1971, entered in its Investigation and Suspension Docket, Number 8508, titled [653]*653Increased Waterborne Charge, North Atlantic, Pacific & Canadian Ports, 377 I.C.C. 534 (1970) insofar as this order concludes that a proposed increased waterborne charge at the western ports has not been shown to be just and reasonable. The action has been submitted on the pleadings, briefs, and the record before the Commission, including a transcript of the evidence and exhibits received by the Commission. Statutory jurisdiction is established.1

It is the position of plaintiffs that the Commission failed to comply with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) in that the Commission report, insofar as it pertained to the western ports, did not include a statement of findings and conclusions, or the reasons in support of these findings.2

The waterborne charge, which was designed to defray costs incurred by terminal carriers in connection with the handling of shipments moving through or via ports, first was proposed and approved in 1958.3 In 1960 the Commission approved a one cent per hundredweight increase in the charge.4 Subsequently the Commission permitted increases in the charge to nine cents in 1965, twelve cents in 1967, and in 1968 to thirteen cents per hundredweight.5

The carriers proposed to increase the existing waterborne charge at both the eastern and western ports effective November 1, 1969. As a result of protests filed, the Commission suspended the respective tariff publications for the statutory period authorized by Section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act,6 and directed that an investigation be made to determine whether the proposed increase in the waterborne charge was just and reasonable.

An oral hearing was held before an examiner of the Commission, evidence was presented by both the eastern and western carriers and testimony was received in opposition to the proposed increases.7 Briefs were filed and on August 25, 1970, Division 2 of the Commission issued its report and order finding that the proposed increases were not just and reasonable. The order further directed respondent railroads to cancel the tariff provisions before October 12, 1970. The Commission’s order was stayed pending a hearing on the carriers’ petition for reconsideration and on January 5, 1971 the petition for reconsideration was denied and the tariff provisions ordered cancelled.8

In passing upon the determination of the Commission in this case, two sec[654]*654tions of the Interstate Commerce Act are appropriate for consideration. Section 14(1) of the Act places upon the Commission a duty to report in writing in respect to its investigations.9 This section also requires that the Commission state in this report its conclusions, together with its decision, order or requirement. Section 15(7) of the Act places upon the carrier the burden of showing that any proposed rate change, charge, or practice is just and reasonable.10

It is also important to delineate the scope of judicial review as this pertains to orders of the Commission. The judiciary has been assigned a very limited role in reviewing the action of governmental administrative agencies. This role is restricted to a determination whether the agency committed any errors’ of law or transcended the legal limitations on its authority. The courts are not empowered to weigh the evidence de novo and reach an independent conclusion. Atlantic Refining Co. v. F. T. C., 381 U.S. 357, 85 S.Ct. 1498, 14 L. Ed.2d 443 (1965); I. C. C. v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567, 67 S.Ct. 894, 91 L.Ed. 1102 (1947); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 54 S. Ct. 692, 78 L.Ed. 1260 (1934); Great Northern Ry Co. v. United States, 209 F.Supp. 230 (D.Minn.1962). Although the court in reviewing administrative action is confined to the record made before the agency, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S. Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943), the court may review the entire record and is not limited to those portions cited by the parties. 5 U.S.C. § 706. In addition, the burden of showing the invalidity of the Commission order rests on the plaintiff suing to enjoin and set aside this order. Hughes v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 11 (E.D.Pa.1967); North Carolina Utilities Commission v. United States, 253 F.Supp. 930 (E.D.N.C.1966); Frozen Food Express v. United States, 219 F.Supp. 131 (N.D.Tex.1963).

Here the issues for the court are two: First, whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence in support of the Commission’s determination that plaintiffs had failed to prove the proposed increased waterborne additive was just and reasonable; and Second, whether the Commission’s order is supported by adequate findings. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962); Interstate Commerce Commission v. J T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81, 82 S.Ct. 204, 7 L.Ed.2d 147 (1961); United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 62 S.Ct. 722, 86 L.Ed. 971 (1942); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 55 S.Ct. 462, 79 L.Ed. 1023 (1935).

In dealing with the question of whether the Commission determination is supported by substantial evidence, the test generally applied is whether the evidence is “enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 57, 87 S.Ct. 255, 260, 17 L.Ed.2d 162 (1966); National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939).

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Bluebook (online)
334 F. Supp. 651, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10567, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atchison-topeka-santa-fe-railway-v-united-states-mnd-1971.