Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States

156 Ct. Cl. 18, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 221, 1962 WL 9353
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 12, 1962
DocketNos. 10-53 and 333-54
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 156 Ct. Cl. 18 (Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 18, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 221, 1962 WL 9353 (cc 1962).

Opinion

Reed, Justice (Ret.),

sitting by designation, delivered the opinion of the court:

During the years from 1942 through 1945 the plaintiff and its connecting carriers transported quantities of army half-tracks over its lines within the United States at the instance of the defendant. The bills of lading indicated that the articles were to be shipped at the “class rate,” and, indeed, the Government paid for the service on that assumption. Recently the defendant recouped certain amounts from other debts owing the plaintiff on the theory that it was obligated to pay for the transport at the “commodity rate” rather than at the “class rate.” Other sums were refunded by the plaintiff under protest. Two suits were commenced in this court, and the cases were submitted to the Commissioner; by stipulation of the parties, their disposition awaits our determination as to which of the two rates was properly applicable.

A commodity rate is usually lower than the class rate1 and is promulgated for specific items generally moving between specified points. In effect, the commodity rate is an exception to the class rate. When the Interstate Commerce Commission rules on the question of reasonableness, determination of the justification or lack of justification for a particular commodity rate involves consideration of such factors as the volume2 and regularity 3 of movement. If the volume is large and the movement is regular, the item is usually entitled to a commodity rate. It is somewhat difficult to discover the considerations which prompted the Commission to approve the existence of any such differentiation on the basis of volume or regularity of traffic since these considerations are not necessarily related to railroad costs. While volume shipments by particular firms save the carrier expense, numerous small shipments of the same item probably do not, except in so far as total density of traffic is increased. See Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, Yol. III-B, pp. 510-18 (1936).

[21]*21We do not find, however, that the Commission in performing its adjudicatory function of determining whether the class or commodity rate applies, takes into account the factors relative to reasonableness. For example, examine Turner Marble & Granite Co. v. Atlantic, Coast Line R. Co., 147 I.C.C. 796. We conclude that courts may determine the classification of these vehicles as readily as the Commission. In short, since the agency does not use its expertize in deciding these cases, we see no reason to refer the case to that body under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See United States v. Western P. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59; see also Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285.

As found by the Commissioner, the halftrack is an armored vehicle with a truck axle and wheels in the front and a tank-like track and suspension system in the rear. The halftracks shipped were adapted for various purposes — in general, the transportation of cargo and personnel. The “Half-Track Personnel Carrier M3” and “M3A1,” as the name implies, were constructed for the primary purpose of transporting military personnel under combat conditions. Others were designed as gun-mounts for mortars and machine guns. One of the latter, the “Half-Track Car M2,” could be used as the prime mover for the 105-mm howitzer; or, in less technical language, it was capable of towing the mounted artillery piece. Others could be used for towing 57-mm anti-tank guns.

In 1941, at the request of the Quartermaster General, the Association of American Railroads established a class rate for “Half-tracks, army, with or without ramps (runways).” In 1944, the War Department requested a commodity rate for these vehicles; in both 1944 and 1945 the railroads refused to publish such a rate. The United States now contends that a commodity rate was in effect at the time which covered half-tracks. It applied to “vehicles, motor, dumping or hauling with lug wheels, tractor lug tires, or crawler type.” (Finding 9) The tariff also contained a “Rule 38” which provided in pertinent part that:

“Unless otherwise provided in the governing tariffs, if there is an effective commodity rate on a given shipment [22]*22that rate and not the class rate must ,be applied, except that rates (either class or commodity) specifically designated as applicable on import, export, coastwise or inter-coastal shipments must be applied on such shipments to the exclusion of all other rates not so designated.”

In 1931 we held that under Bule 38 if the commodity rate and the class rate apply to the same article, the former governs, and we indicated that the description contained in the bill of lading is not dispositive or even relevant to the issue. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 250. That decision has not been overruled nor distinguished in the past thirty years, and we adhere to it now. And we find support for it in Commission decisions both preceding and succeeding it. Turner Marble & Granite Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 147 I.C.C. 796 (1928); Hungerford & Terry, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 198 I.C.C. 65 (1933). In those latter cases the Interstate Commerce Commission held that even a general commodity rate is to be applied rather than a class rate which specifically includes the item. Commission holdings establish the proposition that the bill of lading designation is irrelevant. See, e.g., Penn Facing Mills Co. v. Ann Arbor R.Co., 182 I.C.C. 614. Of course, the Twmer Marble and Rungerford cases, supra, also ruled that if the class rate indicates a contrary intent, the commodity rate, even if applicable, will not govern. Originally, both the “dumping and hauling” and “halftrack” classifications were separate categories in the class rate. Only the “dumping and hauling” item was removed from the class rate schedule and made the subject of the commodity rate. But since such classifications may overlap, we do not think that the excision of only the “dumping and hauling” item necessarily indicates that it did not include halftracks.

Thus, we conclude that the only question for decision is whether the commodity rate applies to halftracks. This court has held that it will not depart, except in unusual cases, from a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission, even though the court has jurisdiction to decide the question initially. Western Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 150. While the Commission in the War Materials Separation Cases, 294 I.C.C. 5, 76, indicated that there were no [23]*23commodity rates on. “any” combat vehicles, including half-tracks, during the Second World War, the issue before it was whether the class rates were reasonable. Assuming that the Commission is more able than a court to decide a question of tariff interpretation of this sort, needless to say we defer to the experience of that body only when it has directed its attention to the matter in question. This we do not believe the Commission did in the above-cited case.

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Related

Western Pacific Railroad Company v. The United States
388 F.2d 312 (Court of Claims, 1967)

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Bluebook (online)
156 Ct. Cl. 18, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 221, 1962 WL 9353, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atchison-topeka-santa-fe-railway-co-v-united-states-cc-1962.