Association of Poinciana Villages, Inc. v. Moore

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Association of Poinciana Villages, Inc. v. Moore

630 So. 2d 229, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 326, 1994 WL 22559

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJanuary 26, 1994

DocketNo. 92-02223

StatusPublished

This text of 630 So. 2d 229 (Association of Poinciana Villages, Inc. v. Moore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Association of Poinciana Villages, Inc. v. Moore, 630 So. 2d 229, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 326, 1994 WL 22559 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).

Pincite

Opinion

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

A homeowners’ association, the plaintiff below, appeals from a final judgment enforcing deed restrictions against appellee, one of the homeowners in the subdivision. The appellant seeks review of only that part of the final judgment denying its attorney’s fee. We reverse.

The deed restrictions contain a mandatory provision for attorneys’ fees identical to the provision construed in Garvin v. Squiers, 502 So.2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). As in Garvin, the trial court lacked the discretion to decline to award the appellant, as the prevailing party, a reasonable attorney’s fee. Accordingly, that part of the final judgment denying fees is reversed and the case is remanded for an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in [230]*230favor of appellant. The final judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Reversed and remanded.

SCHOONOVER and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

A homeowners’ association, the plaintiff below, appeals from a final judgment enforcing deed restrictions against appellee, one of the homeowners in the subdivision. The appellant seeks review of only that part of the final judgment denying its attorney’s fee. We reverse.

The deed restrictions contain a mandatory provision for attorneys’ fees identical to the provision construed in Garvin v. Squiers, 502 So.2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). As in Garvin, the trial court lacked the discretion to decline to award the appellant, as the prevailing party, a reasonable attorney’s fee. Accordingly, that part of the final judgment denying fees is reversed and the case is remanded for an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in [230]*230favor of appellant. The final judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Reversed and remanded.

SCHOONOVER and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

630 So. 2d 229, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 326, 1994 WL 22559, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/association-of-poinciana-villages-inc-v-moore-fladistctapp-1994.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack