Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland
This text of 218 So. 2d 59 (Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ASSOCIATE DISCOUNT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Chester HAVILAND et al., Clinton "Bill" Bazar, Garnishee, Defendant-Appellee.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Dragon & Kellner, by Robert A. Dragon, Jr., Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.
*60 Tate & Tate, by Donald J. Tate, Mamou, for defendant-appellee.
Before FRUGÉ, SAVOY, and HOOD, JJ.
FRUGÉ, Judge.
On May 9, 1968, Associate Discount Corporation, the judgment creditor of Chester Haviland, instituted garnishment proceedings against Clinton "Bill" Bazar, the employer of Chester Haviland, the judgment debtor. The original judgment was in the amount of $1,883.82, with eight percent interest per annum from November 6, 1965 until paid, plus twenty-five percent of the interest as attorneys' fees and all costs. Plaintiff filed a petition for garnishment naming the judgment debtor's employer, Clinton "Bill" Bazar, as the garnishee. The petition was personally served on Mr. Bazar on May 11, 1968.
Upon service, Clinton Bazar warned Chester Haviland that his employment would be terminated unless suitable arrangements were made with the creditor. After taking time off from work supposedly to confer with the creditor, Haviland returned and assured defendant that the garnishment was suspended and that arrangements had been made. As a result, defendant failed to answer interrogatories attached to the petition of garnishment until June 12, 1968, when he learned of the filing of a "Motion for Judgment Pro Confesso" by the creditor on June 11, 1968. This motion sought judgment against defendant for the entire amount of the debt, plus attorney's fees for the rule of $110.00, all under Article 2413 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure (1960).
After answering the interrogatories on June 12, 1968, defendant, Clinton Bazar, filed a "Motion to Deny Attorney's Fees to Seizing Creditor and to Fix Attorney's Fee of Garnishee". In the motion, he placed principal reliance upon the following as defenses against the garnishment petition.
1) The misnomer of the defendant as "Bill" Bazar, instead of his real name, Clinton Bazar, "Bill" being only a nickname.
2) Defective citation and petition.
3) Estoppel (Defendant's having been assured that arrangements had been made).
The trial court, after hearing evidence on both motions, dismissed the plaintiff's suit at his cost, and denied defendant attorney's fees. From this ruling, the plaintiff has appealed.
In its specification of error, plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred in finding that it was estopped from holding the garnishee responsible in this matter because it used a wrong name for the garnishee in the petition. Further, that the trial court erred in dismissing the entire matter at its cost.
Before getting to a discussion of the actual issues, we note that the record reveals that the defendant, Bill Bazar, did pay the judgment debtor, Chester Haviland, the sum of $150.00 after receipt of the petition of garnishment and interrogatories. It was also brought out on the trial of the motions that the judgment debtor, Chester Haviland, owed defendant the amount of $28.80.
In deciding this case, the court notes a number of possible issues, but only three of which are significant; namely, the issue as to waiver of improper citation and service, untimely answer to the petition and interrogatories, and the question as to the merits.
Of these more narrow issues, we shall discuss each separately.
1) Waiver.
Defendant claims that he was never properly before the court, even after answer to *61 the interrogatories, because the answer to the interrogatories is not a "pleading" under an interpretation of C.C.P. Art. 1312, Comment (d).[1] Furthermore, his "answer" sought no "relief" under Article 7, so again there was no appearance.
With the above propositions, we shall not wrestle, for the simple reason that we feel the motion filed by defendant entitled "Motion to Deny Attorney's Fee to Seizing Creditor and to Fix Attorney's Fee of Garnishee", did constitute an appearance, did ask for relief, and under the jurisprudence of this state, did constitute a waiver of any objections to the presence of the defendant before the court and a general appearance under C.C.P. Article 7. Of significance here, we quote from one of the averments from said motion, namely Number 6:
"That the fee of the garnishee's attorney for appearing in this court in answer to the defective Rule taken against garnishee, pursuant to defective garnishment process, is approximately $75.00, and his fee for answering the Interrogatories and corresponding with the attorney for the seizing creditor is approximately, $50.00."
The pertinent part of C.C.P. Article 7 reads as follows:
"* * * [A] party makes a general appearance which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the court and impliedly waives all objections thereto when, either personally or through counsel, he seeks therein any relief other than * * *."
The request by defendant for attorney's fees is not among the request for relief allowable under the article as not constituting an appearance. Therefore, under the jurisprudence, this request for attorney's fees was fatal to defendant's objections as to improper citation, improper petition, or generally the presence of the defendant before the court.
In the case of Doll v. Mallard, 95 So.2d 692 (Orl.La.App., 1957), the court had this to say:
"It is well settled in our jurisprudence that when one who has not been properly served with citation or upon whom there was no service voluntarily makes his appearance in the case, he thereby waives any right to object to the insufficiency of citation or the lack of it." (P. 693).
The above principle of procedural law has been observed and followed in numerous cases, among which we cite: Baton Rouge Building Trades Council v. T. L. James & Co., 201 La. 749, 10 So.2d 606 (1942); Stanley v. Jones, 197 La. 627, 2 So.2d 45 (1941); and the now famous case of Forbess v. George Morgan Pontiac Company, 135 So. 2d 594 (La.App. 2d Cir., 1961), wherein it was held that a request for damages, in an attempt to dissolve an attachment, constituted a general appearance and subjected the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. Of this case, the late Dean Henry G. McMahon in 23 La.L.Rev. 378 at 381 (1963) had this to say:
"* * * The writer completely agrees with the majority holding that, by seeking the recovery of damages for the illegal issuance of the attachment, the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This result is called for by the specific language of the general appearance article of the new Code [Art. 7], which provides. * * * A defendant makes a general appearance whenever he affirmatively invokes the jurisdiction of the court. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.)
By asking for attorney's fees, the defendant did affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore, we *62 feel, made a general appearance, and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court and impliedly waived all objections to citation, misnomer of defendant, or improper petition.
2) The failure of the defendant to answer the garnishment petition timely.[2]
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