Ass'n of Rock Island Mechanical & Power Plant Employees v. Lowden

15 F. Supp. 176, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1167
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedMarch 26, 1936
DocketNo. 1891—N
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 15 F. Supp. 176 (Ass'n of Rock Island Mechanical & Power Plant Employees v. Lowden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ass'n of Rock Island Mechanical & Power Plant Employees v. Lowden, 15 F. Supp. 176, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1167 (D. Kan. 1936).

Opinion

HOPKINS, District Judge.

The suit is one in equity testing legality of a contract whereby defendant railway undertook collection of dues owing to a company union by employees of defendant who were members of the company union. The contract provides for collection of the dues by means of pay roll deductions. The plan was first put in use in 1925 and the contract here involved was made effective in January, 1933. Legality of the contract is brought in question by reason of enactment by Congress in 1934 of an amendment "to the Railway Labor Act (section 2, as amended by Act June 21, 1934, § 2 [45 U.S.C.A. § 152]), making it unlawful for a carrier to deduct from wages of its employees dues payable to labor organizations. Because of penalties imposed by the act for violation of its terms, the railway notified the union that effective June 21, 1934, it would no longer comply with the contract.

This suit was instituted July 12, 1934. Complainants (hereinafter referred to as the association) seek to enjoin the railway’s discontinuance of the contract and to enjoin the District Attorney from bringing proceedings to enforce the statute.

The railway does not challenge the allegations of the complaint, but the District Attorney denies the allegations attacking the constitutionality of those provisions of which complaint is made, and denies that he was about to prosecute defendant or bring proceedings for violations, of (he statute.

Following institution of the action July 12, 1934, a motion to dismiss was overruled and the government, on July 3, 1935, answered. On November 6, 1935, the parties filed stipulations covering the evidence and were given extension of time to file briefs. Briefs were filed and thereafter argument was had on December 23, 1935, The parties filed suggested findings of fact, and on January 5, 1936, the case was submitted for final decision.

[178]*178Findings of fact made by the court and an analysis of part of the evidence are separately filed. See, also, the note appended to this opinion, giving a brief historical review of the labor movement. A review of the facts so far as pertinent to the decision will follow later in this opinion.

It may here be observed that forfnation of company unions was an outgrowth of the general strike in 1922 of the mechanical employees of practically all the railroads in the country. The striking employees were supplanted by others who were not members of labor organizations. They were without organization and had no representative for the purpose of dealing with their employer in matters relating to collective bargaining. On July 3, 1922, the United States Railroad Labor Board passed a resolution, the preamble to which recited that it was “desirable, if not a practical necessity, for the employees of each class on each carrier to form an organization or association to function in the representation of the employees before the railroad labor board.” The first paragraph of the resolution provided: “That it be communicated to the carriers and the' employees remaining in the service and the new employees succeeding those who have left the service to take steps as soon as practicable to perfect on each carrier such organizations as may be deemed necessary for the purposes above mentioned.” The officers of defendant company interpreted this as a suggestion or request and proceeded immediately to organize a company union, which grew into what is now the plaintiff association.

The contract (in controversy) dated December 15, 1932, provides:

“Whereas, The Association has requested the Railway Company, through the medium of pay roll deductions, to collect the monthly dues from members who have requested the Railway Company to do so, which Railway Company agrees to do upon following terms:
“First: Railway Company will, so far 'as it can legally do so, comply with request of Association by deducting the monthly dues from the pay of those employes who have filed with the Railway Company a request in writing that such deductions be made, and shall, in each case, file with the Railway Company an order of assignment of such deduction to the Association.
“Second: The Railway Company will make a monthly report * * * and * * * remit to the Association monthly at the time of making such report the full amount of such deductions, less three (3%) per cent of such deductions as hereinafter provided.
“The Association agrees:
“(1) That it will pay to the Railway Company a sum equal to three (3%) per cent of amount deducted monthly by the Railway Company, the said payment to be in compensation and indemnity for the labor of making the deductions specified and paying the same less three (3%) per cent of amount deducted and to be remitted by it to the Association as hereinbefore provided. * * *
“That this agreement * * * shall remain in effect until it .shall be terminated at the option of either party hereto, which may be by either party giving to the other 30 days written notice of the option “of the moving party to terminate this contract, and at the expiration of such 30 days’ notice this contract shall terminate.”

Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended June 21, 1934, § 2, so far as important here, reads as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any carrier to * * * deduct from the wages of employees any dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions payable to labor organizations, or to collect or to assist in the collection of any such dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions.” 48 Stat. 1186 (45 U.S.C.A. § 152).

In a general sense, the constitutional validity of the foregoing provisions is the only issue in the case.

Presumption of validity goes with the act. Courts always presume that the Legislature acts advisedly and with full knowledge of the situation, and its action must be accepted by the courts as that of a body having full power to act, and only acting when it has acquired sufficient information to justify its action. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S. 238, 245, 22 S.Ct. 881, 46 L.Ed. 1144.

In considering validity of statutes as affected by the power of Congress, it has been said: “The scope of judicial inquiry in deciding the question of power is not to be confused with the scope of legislative considerations in dealing with the matter of policy. Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result, [179]*179whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limns should be exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.” Chicago, B. & O. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, at page 569, 31 S.Ct. 259, 263, 55 L.Ed. 328.

In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 350, 24 S.Ct. 436, 462, 48 L.Ed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
15 F. Supp. 176, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/assn-of-rock-island-mechanical-power-plant-employees-v-lowden-ksd-1936.