Asriian v. Pribish

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 115483
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Asriian v. Pribish, 2026-Ohio-1650.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ALEXSII ASRIIAN, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 115483 v. :

VINCENT T. PRIBISH, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 7, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-24-997747

Appearances:

JENESQ, James E. Nobile, and Eric E. Willison, for appellant.

Gallagher, Gams, Tallan, Barnes & Littrell L.L.P., and Mitchell M. Tallan, for appellee.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Plaintiff-appellant Alexii Asriian (“Asriian”) appeals from a judgment

awarding him $ 279.70 for the diminished value of his car following a motor vehicle

accident. He claims the following errors: 1. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on the pretrial Daubert motion or hold a hearing before allowing the defendant’s proposed expert to testify, thereby abdicating its gatekeeping role.

2. The trial court abused its discretion causing material prejudice to appellant by allowing the jury to hear and consider unqualified, non- expert testimony from a non-owner of personal property on the issue of valuation.

We find that the expert witness of defendant-appellee Vincent Pribish (“Pribish”)

was qualified to testify as an expert and that the trial court properly allowed him to

testify. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Asriian is the title owner of a 2021 Volkswagen Jetta GLI Automahn

(“Jetta”). On March 16, 2023, while he was driving on Interstate 71 in Cleveland,

Ohio, his Jetta was struck by a wheel that detached from a 2008 Chevrolet 2500 van

owned by Pribish. Fortunately, Asriian was not injured, but the front, left side of his

Jetta sustained damage.

Asriian took his Jetta to IGear Carstar (“Carstar”) in Cleveland for

repairs. The cost of repairs totaled $6,545.30, and Asriian received reimbursement

for the cost of repairs from Pribish’s insurance carrier.

In May 2024, Asriian filed a complaint against Pribish, seeking to

recover the residual diminution in value (“RDV”) of his Jetta. He alleged that

although he had been compensated for the cost of repairs, he was not fully

compensated for his loss because the cost of repairs did not include the RDV of his

car that now had an accident in its history. In his prayer for relief, Asriian requested

$8,416.00, plus interest and costs. The case proceeded to a jury trial. Asriian presented Daniel Hudson,

from Houston, Texas (“Hudson”), as an expert witness on the issue of RDV. Hudson

testified that he co-founded the American Society of Certified Auto Appraisers, an

organization that creates standards and guidelines for appraising motor vehicles.

He conceded that there was no structural damage to Asriian’s Jetta. However, he

did not consider the damage to be purely cosmetic because the hood had to be

replaced and the door required filler material. (Tr. 56.)

Hudson explained that in calculating the RDV of the Jetta, he used J.D.

Power’s used-car guide to determine the before-accident value of the car. Based on

J.D. Power’s data, he concluded that the car was valued at $28,000 immediately

before the accident. (Tr. 47 and 51-52.) He then concluded that the car was worth

between $14,000 and $15,000 in its “wrecked” condition and that it was worth

$20,000 in its repaired condition. (Tr. 54 and 71.)

Hudson explained that he determined the post-repair value by calling

the used-car departments of several dealerships and asking them what the car would

sell for on the open market, knowing that the car had been involved in an accident.

(Tr. 72.) Hudson used the pre-accident value, the post-accident-pre-repair value,

and the post-repair value to conclude that the RDV was $7,687, as a direct result of

the accident. (Tr. 73 and 91.)

Hudson admitted on cross-examination that there is no science to

assessing these fair market values and that he relied on outside sources such as J.D.

Power and used-car dealerships to determine the values. (Tr. 91.) Hudson also admitted that he never inspected Asriian’s Jetta and that he relied instead on the

repair estimates and photographs provided to him to appraise the RDV. (Tr. 88.)

Pribish presented Andrew Tilton (“Tilton”) as his defense expert on the

issue of RDV. Prior to trial, Asriian filed a motion to exclude Tilton’s expert

testimony, arguing that Tilton’s testimony failed to meet the requirements of

Evid.R. 702(C) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579

(1993). The trial court did not rule on the motion prior to trial, and Asriian did not

object when Pribish called him to testify for the defense.

Tilton testified that, at the time of trial, he had been in the business of

performing mechanical and body-work repairs for 45 years. He has a shop in

Cleveland and another shop in Columbus, Ohio. The Cleveland shop has 21 bays,

and the Columbus shop has six bays. Tilton explained that his business repairs

approximately 500 cars per month and that he is personally involved in the repairs.

As part of his business, Tilton also buys damaged vehicles, repairs them, and resells

them in their repaired condition. (Tr. 108 and 111-112.) Tilton explained that he

assesses the fair market value of every damaged vehicle brought to his shop for

repairs because it would not be appropriate to charge more for repairs than the

actual fair market value of the vehicle. (Tr. 126-128.)

Defense counsel asked Tilton what it means to be a certified auto

appraiser. (Tr. 128.) Tilton replied that he could buy a placard for his wall for $750

and 40 hours of his time to become certified auto appraiser, but he did not think it was necessary since he has been working on cars for 45 years and he has owned his

own auto repair business for 36 years. (Tr. 108 and 128-129.)

Tilton offered his opinion regarding the RDV of Asriian’s Jetta. He

estimated the fair market value of Asriian’s Jetta prior to the accident was $27,850,

virtually the same as Hudson’s pre-accident value of $28,000. However, Tilton

determined that the Jetta had a fair market value of $24,500 in its damaged

condition before being repaired. (Tr. 122.)

When asked how he arrived at this figure, Tilton explained that

Asriian’s Jetta is not a “boilerplate little Jetta coming off the line,” rather “it’s a fun

little turbocharged” model that is “very sellable.” (Tr. 122.) According to Tilton,

these extra features bring “value to it even in its damaged condition.” (Tr. 122.) He

explained that there was no structural damage to the car, that the damage was

merely “cosmetic, superficial,” and that many people could repair the damages

themselves. (Tr. 122.) Finally, he stated that the body shop that performed the

repairs to Asriian’s car charged for some things that were not necessary. (Tr. 124.)

According to Tilton, Asriian’s Jetta was worth $24,500 in its damaged

condition. He then received $6,545 to repair it. When $24,500 is added to $6,545,

the value Asriian received was more than the car was worth before the accident.

Therefore, under Tilton’s valuation, Asriian did not suffer any RDV and, in closing

argument, defense counsel asked the jury to render a defense verdict.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded Asriian a total of

$279.70 on his claim for RDV. The trial court also denied Asriian’s motion to exclude Tilton from testifying as an expert at the end of the trial. Asriian now

appeals the trial court’s judgment.

II. Law and Analysis

In the first assignment of error, Asriian argues the trial court erred by

failing to rule on his pretrial Daubert motion or to hold a Daubert hearing before

allowing Tilton to testify as a car-appraisal expert at trial. In the second assignment

of error, Asriian argues the trial court abused its discretion and caused material

prejudice to his case by allowing Pribish’s defense expert to offer opinion’s regarding

the RDV of his car when Pribish’s proposed expert was not qualified to offer expert

opinions on the RDV. In both assignments of error, Asriian argues the trial court

failed to independently evaluate the reliability of Tilton’s opinions and that, had it

done so, it would have excluded Tilton’s testimony. We, therefore, discuss both

assigned errors together.

A. Standard of Review

A trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of

expert testimony. State v. Froman, 2020-Ohio-4523, ¶ 87. We, therefore, will not

disturb a trial court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. In re J.G.,

2025-Ohio-1933, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in

an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. This court has also held that an abuse

of discretion may be found where a trial court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”

Thomas v. Cleveland, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

B. Expert Testimony

Evid.R. 702 governs expert testimony and states, in relevant part:

A witness may testify as an expert if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that all of the following apply:

(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons;

(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony;

(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information and the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Asriian argues Tilton was not qualified to testify as an expert and that

his testimony failed to meet the standards for reliability outlined by the United

States Supreme Court in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. The Daubert Court recognized that

a trial court has an important “gatekeeping function” to ensure that evidence is both

relevant and reliable. Id. at 589. To that end, the Court enumerated several

nonexhaustive factors courts must consider when determining whether scientific

evidence is reliable. Id. at 593-594. These factors include (1) whether a particular

theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer

review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the

methodology has gained general acceptance. Id. at 593-594. The Daubert Court explained that “in order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion

must be derived by the scientific method.” Id. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted

the Daubert standard in Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607 (1998).

A few years after Daubert, the United States Supreme Court decided

Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). In Kumho Tire, the Court

explained that the reliability test outlined in Daubert is “flexible.” Id. at 141 and 150.

It also held that the specific factors enumerated in Daubert do not all apply in every

case. Id. at 147-150. In some cases, “the relevant reliability concerns may focus

upon personal knowledge or experience.” Id. at 150. Indeed, this court has held that

“the Daubert factors do not apply in every case, particularly where the expert

testimony stems from the expert’s personal knowledge or experience.” Cleveland v.

Newell, 2024-Ohio-2064, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.). See also Berry v. Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,

1349 (6th Cir. 1994)(recognizing that “the distinction between scientific and non-

scientific expert testimony is a critical one[,]” and that Daubert is “only of limited

help” in assessing expertise grounded in personal experience); United States v.

Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir. 1997)(observing that the Daubert factors are not

always useful in cases involving expertise derived from practical experience); First

Tennessee Bank Natl. Assn. v. Barreto, 268 F.3d 319, 334-335 (6th Cir. 2001)

(noting that expert opinions based on practical experience “do not easily lend

themselves to scholarly review or to traditional scientific evaluation”).

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[p]rofessional experience and

training in a particular field may be sufficient to qualify one as an expert.” State v. Mack, 73 Ohio St.3d 502, 511 (1995), citing State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 43

(1988).

Neither special education nor certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness. The individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the field in question, as long as the knowledge he or she possesses will aid the trier of fact in performing its fact-finding function.

State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 285 (2001), citing State v. Baston, 85 Ohio

St.3d 418, 423 (1999). See also State v. Davis, 2008-Ohio-2, ¶ 148 (“Neither special

education nor certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness. The

individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the field in

question, as long as the knowledge he or she possesses will aid the trier of fact in

performing its fact-finding function.”).

Furthermore, Ohio courts have held that a Daubert hearing is not

required to determine the admissibility of an expert’s testimony in every case. For

example, in State v. Kegg, 2025-Ohio-2651 (4th Dist.), the Fourth District held that

the trial court in that case properly allowed a social worker to provide expert

testimony regarding the behavior of sexual-assault victims without holding a

Daubert hearing because the social worker had specialized knowledge derived from

extensive experience working with sexual-assault victims. Id. at ¶ 26 and 37-39.

In Sliwinski v. St. Edwards, 2014-Ohio-4655 (9th Dist.), the court

held that the trial court was not required to hold a Daubert hearing to qualify a nurse

and two doctors as nursing-home experts because the experts had specialized

knowledge, skill, and experience working in nursing-home facilities. Id. at ¶ 6 and 12-15. In rejecting the argument that a Daubert hearing was required, the court

explained:

“The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert’s relevant testimony is reliable.”

Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.

In Cleveland v. Newell, 2024-Ohio-2064 (8th Dist.), this court held

that a veterinarian with 20 years of experience was qualified to testify as an expert

even though her opinions had not been subjected to the Daubert test because her

expert testimony was based on extensive personal knowledge and experience. Id. at

¶ 41-42. The veterinarian’s testimony was not “based on novel scientific theories or

methods that needed to be scrutinized by the trial court under Daubert.” Id. at ¶ 42.

This court further held that “‘[s]cientific studies are not the exclusive means to

establish reliability under Daubert. Rather, the relevant reliability concerns may

focus upon personal knowledge or experience.’” Id., quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd.,

526 U.S. at 150-151.

It is undisputed that Tilton’s testimony relates to matters beyond the

knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons, pursuant to Evid.R. 702(A), and

is, therefore, expert testimony. It is also undisputed that assessing the fair market

value of a motor vehicle is not based on novel scientific theories or methodologies.

Hudson, Asriian’s own expert, conceded that appraising the fair market value of motor vehicles is not a scientific process. (Tr. 91.) He also stated that the appraisal

of motor vehicles “is not science.” (Tr. 92.)

Like the experts in Kegg, Sliwinski, and Newell, Tilton’s opinions were

based on specialized knowledge derived from extensive experience buying,

repairing, and selling damaged vehicles. As previously stated, Tilton had been in the

car-repair business for 45 years at the time of trial. He testified that his business

repairs approximately 500 cars per month and that he is personally involved in the

repairs. As part of his business, Tilton also buys damaged vehicles and repairs them

for resale. He stated that every time he provides an estimate for repairs to a

damaged vehicle, he must appraise the fair market value of the vehicle in both its

pre-accident condition and its post-accident condition in order to avoid charging

more for repairs than the vehicle is worth. (Tr. 126-128.)

Tilton’s experience valuing damaged cars for repair and resale

qualified him as an expert appraiser of damaged vehicles. He was, therefore,

qualified to offer an expert opinion regarding the RDV of Asriian’s car following the

accident giving rise to this case. It does not matter that Tilton did not have any

official certification as an automobile appraiser since neither special education nor

certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness. Hartman, 93 Ohio

St.3d at 285. Tilton’s specialized knowledge based on years of experience was

enough to establish the reliability of Tilton’s testimony.

Furthermore, a motion to exclude testimony, also known as a motion

in limine, “has an interlocutory or tentative nature, which requires the party opposing the motion to affirmatively raise the issue at the appropriate time during

the trial; otherwise, any error caused by the exclusion of the evidence is forfeited.”

Jones v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2021-Ohio-1095, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). As previously

stated, Asriian did not preserve the issue of Tilton’s expert testimony because he

failed to object to his testimony when Tilton took the stand. (Tr. 107-108.)

Nevertheless, the trial court did not abdicate its gatekeeping function;

it properly allowed Tilton to testify as an expert appraiser of used and damaged

vehicles. Therefore, the first and second assignments of error are overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR