Aspire Power Ventures, LP v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Thomas Gleeson, Lori Cobos, Jimmy Glotfelty, Kathleen Jackson, and Courtney Hjaltman

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 26, 2026
Docket15-24-00118-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Aspire Power Ventures, LP v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Thomas Gleeson, Lori Cobos, Jimmy Glotfelty, Kathleen Jackson, and Courtney Hjaltman (Aspire Power Ventures, LP v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Thomas Gleeson, Lori Cobos, Jimmy Glotfelty, Kathleen Jackson, and Courtney Hjaltman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aspire Power Ventures, LP v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Thomas Gleeson, Lori Cobos, Jimmy Glotfelty, Kathleen Jackson, and Courtney Hjaltman, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion filed March 26, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-24-00118-CV

ASPIRE POWER VENTURES, LP, Appellant

V.

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, THOMAS GLEESON, LORI COBOS, JIMMY GLOTFELTY, KATHLEEN JACKSON, AND COURTNEY HJALTMAN, Appellees

On Appeal from the 345th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-003384

OPINION As part of its responsibility to ensure an adequate and reliable Texas electric grid, the Legislature requires ERCOT to procure Ancillary Services aimed at keeping electricity supply and demand balanced. ERCOT did just that when it adopted protocols establishing and modifying the ERCOT Contingency Reserve Service (ECRS), a program designed to complement other Ancillary Services already in use. When ERCOT adopted the ECRS protocols, it did so under authority delegated to it by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC), but outside of the rule-making requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This appeal concerns whether ERCOT’s noncompliance with the APA renders the protocols invalid and whether the PUC’s Commissioners exceeded their authority in relation to ERCOT’s adoption of ECRS. We hold that ERCOT protocols are not subject to the APA, the Commissioners’ acts were well within their statutory authority, and the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction over ERCOT protocols. We affirm the trial court’s orders granting the PUC’s and ERCOT’s pleas to the jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND A. ERCOT and its protocols ERCOT is the PUC-certified “independent organization” charged with operating the State’s competitive electric market and ensuring the “reliability and adequacy” of the electric grid.1 Although ERCOT “is organized as a membership- based nonprofit corporation,” it “is not a typical corporation.”2 ERCOT’s “business” is “set forth by statute,” and it “operates under the direct control and oversight of the PUC,” which “has complete authority to oversee and investigate” ERCOT’s “operations” so as to ensure that ERCOT “adequately performs [its] functions and duties.”3 This appeal concerns one of those duties: adopting protocols. The PUC has delegated to ERCOT the authority to “adopt and enforce rules

1 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(a), (c); CPS Energy v. ERCOT, 671 S.W.3d 605, 626 (Tex. 2023). 2 CPS Energy, 671 S.W.3d at 626. 3 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d); CPS Energy, 671 S.W.3d at 623, 626.

2 relating to the reliability of the regional electrical network.”4 ERCOT, in turn, “has utilized this delegated rulemaking authority to establish operational rules known as Nodal Protocols”—highly detailed rules that, along with other policies, guidelines, and procedures, “provide the framework for the administration of the Texas electricity market.”5 ERCOT’s process for adopting and revising protocols—referred to as the Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) process—“has long been in effect.”6 It is open to numerous entities, permits comment on an NPRR, involves committee review before ERCOT’s board acts, and provides “a process for review … which culminates in a suit for judicial review in district court.”7 In 2021, the Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to require (1) that ERCOT “establish and implement a formal process for adopting new protocols or revisions to existing protocols,” and (2) that ERCOT-adopted protocols “may not take effect before receiving [PUC] approval.”8 ERCOT “already had … in place” a formal process for adopting and revising protocols (the NPRR process), but in response to the 2021 legislation added a provision that “[a]ll Revision Requests require approval

4 PUC v. RWE Renewables Am., LLC, 691 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Tex. 2024) (quoting TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d)). 5 Id. at 486, 489. 6 Id. at 489, 491; see ERCOT, Nodal Protocols § 21, https://www.ercot.com/mktrules/ nprotocols/current. 7 RWE, 691 S.W.3d at 489–90 (“This painstaking procedure serves to leverage the expertise of ERCOT members and industry stakeholders while maintaining transparency and affording interested parties plentiful opportunities to weigh in.”), 492 n.11; see ERCOT, Nodal Protocols § 20.1 (ADR with ERCOT); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 22.251, 25.362(c)(5) (complaint with the PUC); TEX. UTIL. CODE § 15.001 (suit for judicial review). 8 RWE, 691 S.W.3d at 487, 492; see Act of May 30, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 425, § 3, sec. 39.151(d), (g-6), 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 830, 830–32 (current version at TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-6)).

3 by the PUCT prior to implementation.”9

B. Ancillary Services and ECRS “For the ERCOT grid to remain functional, electricity supply and demand must remain balanced at a frequency of 60 hertz.”10 Yet “consumption and generation of electricity are not always equally matched,” as the PUC notes. So to maintain a balanced grid and “reduce operational risks associated with variability and uncertainty,”11 ERCOT is required to “procure[] ancillary or reliability services.”12 ERCOT’s protocols list four Ancillary Services: Regulation Service, Responsive Reserve Service (RRS), Non-Spinning Reserve Service, and the primary target of this litigation: the ERCOT Contingency Reserve Service, or ECRS.13 ERCOT established ECRS in 2019 with the adoption of NPRR 863. ERCOT modified ECRS over the next few years with the adoption of several other NPRRs, and it implemented the service in 2023. According to ERCOT, ECRS is used “to restore or maintain” a balanced grid “[i]n response to significant depletion of RRS,” “[a]s a backup Regulation Service,” and “to avoid getting into or during an Energy Emergency Alert.”14 In other words, ECRS is meant to “address certain reliability risks that ERCOT’s other Ancillary Services do not adequately address,” including risks related to “intermittent wind and solar generation resources” and “the ever- present heightened reliability risks presented by ERCOT’s intrastate nature.”

9 ERCOT, Nodal Protocols § 21.4.11; see RWE, 691 S.W.3d at 492. 10 PUC v. Luminant Energy Co., 691 S.W.3d 448, 455 (Tex. 2024). 11 ERCOT, ERCOT ANCILLARY SERVICES STUDY 10 (2024), https://www.ercot.com/ files/docs/2024/10/07/ERCOT-Ancillary-Services-Study-Final-White-Paper.pdf. 12 TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 39.159(b)(3), 39.159(d). 13 ERCOT, Nodal Protocols § 3.17.1–.4. 14 ERCOT ANCILLARY SERVICES STUDY 30; see id. at 7 (“ECRS is capacity that can respond in 10 minutes and is used to recover frequency; cover intra-hour forecast uncertainties; address load, wind, and solar variability/ramps; and replace deployed reserves.”).

4 C. Aspire’s lawsuit Aspire is a Qualified Scheduling Entity (QSE) that “buys and sells wholesale electricity in ERCOT’s real-time electricity market, serving as a conduit between companies that generate electricity and companies that sell electricity on a retail basis.” Aspire’s view of ECRS does not align with ERCOT’s and the PUC’s. Describing it as a “costly, market-distorting attempt to bolster reliability,” Aspire claims that ECRS “unnecessarily increases the price of electricity” because participating generators are paid “to withhold part of their generating capacity,” which “decrease[s] the supply of electricity available to the grid.” The resulting “artificial fluctuations in prices,” Aspire says, expose QSEs like Aspire to a risk of financial loss because they contract in advance to buy and sell electricity at specific prices before the wholesale price is determined. Flaws aside, Aspire also believes that ECRS is illegal. This appeal is part of Aspire’s efforts to establish so.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Aspire Power Ventures, LP v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Thomas Gleeson, Lori Cobos, Jimmy Glotfelty, Kathleen Jackson, and Courtney Hjaltman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aspire-power-ventures-lp-v-public-utility-commission-of-texas-electric-texapp-2026.