Askew v. Reed
This text of 910 So. 2d 1241 (Askew v. Reed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Tom ASKEW, Appellant,
v.
John REED and T & T Logging, Inc., Appellees.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
*1242 William E. Spell, Clinton, attorney for appellant.
Edward P. Lobrano, Mel J. Breeden, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
Before LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS and ISHEE, JJ.
LEE, P.J., for the Court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 1. This case arises from a land dispute in Hinds County, involving three parties: Tom Askew, John Reed, and T & T Logging (T & T). In 2002, Tom Askew filed a complaint to enforce ownership of land against Reed and T & T. In response, Reed filed a counterclaim alleging abuse of process and that Askew's claim was "non-meritorious."
¶ 2. After the trial on the matter, the chancellor found that Askew failed to show that he had successfully acquired the land by adverse possession. The chancellor further found that Reed's counterclaim lacked merit. Reed does not seek review of his counterclaim. It is from the adverse possession ruling that Askew now appeals to this Court. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 3. In 1951, Tom Askew was deeded a tract of land in Hinds County. Askew's land is situated to the immediate west and south of the disputed property. John Reed owns a tract of land in Hinds County which is immediately east of the disputed property. T & T also owns a tract of land in Hinds County, and its property is also immediately east of the disputed property. The disputed land is 5.65 acres on the west side of Reed's property and 5.42 acres on the west side of T & T's property.
*1243 ¶ 4. In 1952, Askew instructed his brother, Knox Askew, to build a fence along what Askew perceived as the boundary to his land. Knox built the fence, and Askew used the land to graze cattle from 1952 until 1958. After 1958, Askew no longer grazed cattle on the land, the fence fell into disrepair, and Askew began to use the land for growing timber. In actuality, the fence did not correspond with the correct boundary line and encroached upon the land which is now owned by Reed and T & T.
¶ 5. From 1964 until 1976, Sam and Bessie Richardson owned the disputed property. Sam and Bessie are the parents of Thomas Richardson, the owner and sole shareholder of T & T. In 1976, the land was sold by the Richardsons to Loyd Williams, from Williams to Sidney and Mildred Holcombe, and from the Holcombes to John M. Reed and Mary Reed. Reed built his house close to the disputed property and has lived on his tract since 1976. In 1998 T & T purchased part of the disputed property from Reed.
¶ 6. The disputed property is hilly, heavily wooded, and filled with gullies and "mountains." At various times the disputed property was either wooded or cleared, the significance of which will be addressed later in this opinion.
¶ 7. On appeal, Askew argues the following four assignments of error, which we quote verbatim: (1) the court erred in its finding and conclusion that Askew could not have begun to adversely possess the disputed property until 1998, the point at which Askew learned that the fence was not located on the eastern boundary of his property; (2) the court erred in its finding and conclusion that the fact that Askew never paid taxes on the disputed property precluded an adverse possession claim; (3) the court erred in the finding and conclusion that adverse possession cannot begin with a mistake that results in placing a fence outside the property line described in the adverse possessor's deed; (4) the court erred in the finding and conclusion that Askew appears to rely on his claim of adverse possession almost exclusively on the existence of the remnant of the old fence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. Our standard of review of the decision of the chancellor in the case sub judice is quite limited, for we do not consider the evidence de novo; we apply the familiar substantial evidence/manifest error test. Johnson v. Black, 469 So.2d 88, 90 (Miss.1985) (collecting authorities). "Suffice it to say that we have no authority to grant appellant any relief if there be substantial credible evidence in the record undergirding the determinative findings of fact made in the chancery court." Id.
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT ASKEW'S ADVERSE POSSESSION BEGAN IN 1998?
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION CANNOT BEGIN WITH THE ERRONEOUS PLACEMENT OF A FENCE?
¶ 9. The chancellor determined that "[Askew] could not have begun to adversely possess the disputed property until 1998, the point at which he learned that the fence was not located on the eastern boundary line of his property." Issues I. and III. can be adequately addressed by answering the following question: "Must a claimant intend to take the land of another to commence the statutory ten year period for adverse possession?" This question is most concisely answered in Metcalfe v. McCutchen, 60 Miss. 145 (Miss.1882). In Metcalfe, the plaintiff owned land to the west, while the defendant owned land on *1244 the east. The two parcels adjoined, and the defendant mistakenly placed his fence on property belonging to the plaintiff. The defendant believed that the land on which his fence was situated was, in fact, his property. In finding that the defendant adversely possessed the land for ten years, our supreme court determined that the fact that the claim arose from mistake is not pertinent. The court opined:
[W]e adopt the views of those courts which hold that that [sic] possession is adverse in which the holder claims, and intends to claim title, without regard to the fact that the possession and claim is held and made under an honest, but mistaken, belief that the land is within the calls of his deed. It is the fact that possession is held, and that title is claimed, which makes it adverse possession, or claim, or both, though they may have resulted from a mistake; but it is their existence and not their cause that the law considers, and existing, they constitute adverse possession.
Metcalfe, 60 Miss. at 154. Thus, it is long-standing law in Mississippi that a claimant need not intend to take property from another to begin the process of adverse possession.
¶ 10. The chancellor erred in his finding that Askew's adverse possession did not begin until Askew realized that his fence was located upon the land of another.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS CONCLUSION REGARDING ASKEW'S PAYMENT OF TAXES ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY?
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT ASKEW'S CLAIM RESTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE REMNANTS OF THE OLD FENCE?
¶ 11. Assignments II. and IV. regard the chancellor's finding of facts; therefore, we will address the two errors together. This Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Gillespie v. Kelly, 809 So.2d 702, 705(¶ 9) (Miss. Ct.App.2001). Adverse possession is statutory in Mississippi. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-13 (Rev.2003) provides in pertinent part as follows:
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