Askew v. Equifax Information Services, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 10, 2024
Docket5:23-cv-00107
StatusUnknown

This text of Askew v. Equifax Information Services, LLC (Askew v. Equifax Information Services, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Askew v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, (W.D. Ky. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PADUCAHDIVISION Case No. 5:23-cv-00107-BJB-LLK

MARQUITA ASKEW, PLAINTIFF

v.

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, DEFENDANTS LLC et al,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter has been referred to Magistrate Judge Lanny King for hearing and determining all pretrial matters. Text Order of August 15, 2023 [DN 6]. The parties have jointly moved the Court for a protective order on certain documents in discovery. Joint Motion for Entry of Protective Order [DN 20]. While the parties have met their burden to establish a protective order, the proposed order improperly permits documents to be filed under seal without Court review. Proposed Stipulated Protective Order [DN 20-1] at 2–3. Accordingly, the parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Protective Order is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Legal Standard Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants the Court broad discretion to grant or deny protective orders. Parker & Gamble co. v. Banker’s Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996). A Court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including . . . requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). Good cause exists when the moving party “articulate[s] specific facts showing ‘clearly defined and serious injury’ resulting from the discovery sought . . . .” Nix v. Sword, 11 Fed. App’x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Avrigan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 252, 254 (D.D.C. 1987)). “The burden of establishing good cause for a protective order rests with the movant.” Nix, 11 Fed. App’x at 500. Because a protective order is contrary to the basic policy in favor of openness, this burden is a heavy one and the moving party must show substantial justification for withholding information from the public. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (“While

District Courts have the discretion to issue protective orders, that discretion is limited by the careful dictates of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and is circumscribed by a long-established tradition which values public access to court proceedings.”); Meyer Goldberg, Inc. of Lorain v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1987) (“As a general proposition, pretrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying public access to the proceedings.”). In the context of trade secrets and confidential information, courts look to six factors to determine if good cause exists for a protective order: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the] business;

(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in [the] business; (3) the extent of measures taken . . . to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to [the business] and to [its] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended . . . in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. Williams v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., No. 3:16-CV-00236-CRS, 2018 WL 989546, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2018) (citing Nash-Finch Co. and Super Food Servs., Inc. v. Casey's Foods, Inc., 2016 WL 737903, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2016)); see also Specialty Auto Parts USA, Inc. v. Holley Performance Products, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-147-DJH-LLK, 2020 WL 1914817 (W.D. Ky. April 20, 2020).

This Court has increasingly scrutinized motions for protective orders to ensure the necessary showings of good cause. See Global Hemp, Inc. v. Industrial Hemp Solutions, LLC, No. 5:20-cv-00012-TBR-LLK, 2020 WL 12846562 at *1 (W.D. Ky October 6, 2020) (collecting cases). Bald assertions that information is confidential and private are insufficient, and parties must make a showing that a protective order is necessary before one is granted. See Bussell v. Elizabethtown Independent School Dist., 3:17-cv-00605, DN 27 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2018) (denying protective order where parties failed to explain why the order was necessary). The standard to seal documents otherwise submitted to the Court is “vastly more demanding” than the standard for a protective order on documents exchanged by parties in

discovery. Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 2016). Merely being subject to a protective order or being designated as confidential is insufficient to seal documents from the public after they are placed in the judicial record. Id. Only “the most compelling of reasons can justify” sealing documents in contravention to the public’s “strong interest” in access to a court’s decisions and the information on which the court relied in making that decision. Id. at 305. Any seal must also be “narrowly tailored” to serve those compelling reasons, and the party seeking to seal a document must make their case “document by document.” Id. at 305–6. Protective Order The parties have met their burden and shown good cause as to why certain categories of information should be subject to a protective order. They adequately note that the information subject to a protective order is “trade secret[], confidential research, development, technology or other proprietary information[.]” Joint Motion for Entry of a Protective Order [DN 20] at 2.

Following the factors laid out in Sixth Circuit caselaw, they explain that the information to be protected: (1) is not distributed outside of the business, [DN 20] at 3–4; (2) is only generated by “a very limited number of trained [Defendant] employees,” [DN 20] at 4;” (3) are subject to “detailed procedures” protecting the secrecy of the information, [DN 20] at 4; (4) would permit competitors to “reverse-engineer either defendant’s system,” [DN 20] at 2; (5) is the product of “tens of millions of dollars and countless hours of employee time,” [DN 20] at 2; and (6) is “diligently guard[ed]” from outsiders, [DN 20] at 3. Going further, the parties explain the burden disclosure of the information would place on the public. The parties note that disclosure “could indirectly assist identity thieves by educating them on how the relevant systems operate and

exposing opportunities to subvert them.” Joint Motion for Protective Order [DN 20] at 3. The parties, having identified a clearly defined and serious injury from disclosure, have established good cause to subject the proposed discovery to a protective order. Sealing procedures While the parties have met their burden to establish a protective order, their proposed order inappropriately permits sealing of documents filed with the Court. The Proposed Stipulated Protective Order would permit any “motions, briefs, pleadings, deposition transcripts, or other papers” filed with the Court which included “documents or information subject to [the proposed] Order” to be filed under seal.

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