NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-2456 ___________
ASIMAN MANSIM OGLU SADIGOV, Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A219-045-444) Immigration Judge: David Cheng ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 3, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 23, 2026) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Asiman Mansim Oglu Sadigov, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of a
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”). The Government moves to
dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. We will dismiss the petition for
review in part and deny it in part.
I.
Sadigov, originally from Azerbaijan, became a lawful permanent resident of the
United States. Later, he was convicted in Pennsylvania for unlawful contact with a minor,
a sexual offense, and indecent assault against a person less than sixteen years of age. The
Government charged him with removability for being convicted of a crime of domestic
violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect or child
abandonment, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as defined in § 1101(a)(43)(A) (sexual abuse of a minor). An
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the removability charge under only
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
The parties and the IJ agreed that Sadigov was statutorily eligible for cancellation
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). After a hearing, the IJ denied Sadigov’s pro se
application for cancellation of removal as an act of discretion. The IJ found that the
negative factors, such as Sadigov’s convictions, his history of domestic violence, and his
failure to provide financial support to his family, weighed heavily against cancellation of
removal. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals likewise found that Sadigov did
not warrant cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion. The Board acknowledged
2 the positive factors, including his long residence in the United States, his employment,
and the hardships that his wife and daughter would face upon his removal, but it
determined that Sadigov failed to produce “countervailing evidence that outweigh[ed] the
seriousness of his criminal conduct.”
Sadigov timely filed a petition for review, and the Government filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of an application
for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601
U.S. 209, 225 n.4 (2024); Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 347 (2022). But we retain
jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law” that are raised in a
petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). “The question of our jurisdiction over a
colorable legal claim does not turn on whether that claim is ultimately meritorious[,]” but
“a party may not dress up a claim with legal clothing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.”
Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2010). “[Q]uestions of law” include
inquiries into whether the Board applied the correct standard of review or burden of
proof. Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). We review such claims de
novo. See id.
Sadigov first contends that the Board applied the wrong legal standard when
considering the seriousness of his crimes. The basis for Sadigov’s argument is that the
Board improperly considered his conviction for unlawful contact with a minor in its
3 discretionary analysis because the IJ did not sustain his removal charge under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for sexual abuse of a minor. But the IJ sustained his removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), determining that both his indecent assault and
unlawful-contact-with-a-minor convictions were categorically crimes of child abuse,
neglect, or abandonment. In any event, when weighing the positive and negative factors
in support of and against cancellation of removal, the Board is not limited to considering
the circumstances of the removal ground at issue; it may also consider the noncitizen’s
overall criminal history and other character evidence. See, e.g., Solano-Chicas v.
Gonzales, 440 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006); see also In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7,
11 (BIA 1998) (explaining that the factors deemed adverse to a noncitizen include “the
existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness, and the
presence of other evidence indicative of a respondent’s bad character or undesirability”).
Sadigov also argues that the Board failed to consider mitigating factors when
assessing the seriousness of his crimes. He points to factors that the agency considers
when determining whether a conviction was a “particularly serious crime” such that it
bars asylum and withholding of removal. See Amos v. Att'y Gen., 157 F.4th 313, 327–28
(3d Cir. 2025). That inquiry is inapplicable to Sadigov’s application for cancellation of
removal. Essentially, Sadigov argues that the Board overstated the seriousness of his
conduct. That is a disagreement with the Board’s exercise of discretion in rendering its
decision, which we lack jurisdiction to review. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225 n.4.
4 Next, Sadigov asserts that the Board did not properly apply clear-error review to
the IJ’s factual findings because it “engaged in its own independent factfinding.” See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (iv). Particularly, Sadigov argues that the Board found a new
fact about the circumstances leading to his convictions. “[W]hether the [Board] failed to
follow its regulations by impermissibly finding facts is a question of law.”
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 126 F.4th 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2025); see also Roye, 693 F.3d
at 339. But the Board did not do that here. The Board discussed a fact from the police’s
criminal complaint, which was part of the record and considered by the IJ. That was
permissible and not a violation of clear-error review. Cf. Adeyanju v. Garland, 27 F.4th
25, 49 (1st Cir. 2022) (explaining that the Board “has the authority to review the
undisputed facts in the entire record”); Hammerschmidt v.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-2456 ___________
ASIMAN MANSIM OGLU SADIGOV, Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A219-045-444) Immigration Judge: David Cheng ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 3, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 23, 2026) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Asiman Mansim Oglu Sadigov, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of a
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”). The Government moves to
dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. We will dismiss the petition for
review in part and deny it in part.
I.
Sadigov, originally from Azerbaijan, became a lawful permanent resident of the
United States. Later, he was convicted in Pennsylvania for unlawful contact with a minor,
a sexual offense, and indecent assault against a person less than sixteen years of age. The
Government charged him with removability for being convicted of a crime of domestic
violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect or child
abandonment, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as defined in § 1101(a)(43)(A) (sexual abuse of a minor). An
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the removability charge under only
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
The parties and the IJ agreed that Sadigov was statutorily eligible for cancellation
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). After a hearing, the IJ denied Sadigov’s pro se
application for cancellation of removal as an act of discretion. The IJ found that the
negative factors, such as Sadigov’s convictions, his history of domestic violence, and his
failure to provide financial support to his family, weighed heavily against cancellation of
removal. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals likewise found that Sadigov did
not warrant cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion. The Board acknowledged
2 the positive factors, including his long residence in the United States, his employment,
and the hardships that his wife and daughter would face upon his removal, but it
determined that Sadigov failed to produce “countervailing evidence that outweigh[ed] the
seriousness of his criminal conduct.”
Sadigov timely filed a petition for review, and the Government filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of an application
for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601
U.S. 209, 225 n.4 (2024); Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 347 (2022). But we retain
jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law” that are raised in a
petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). “The question of our jurisdiction over a
colorable legal claim does not turn on whether that claim is ultimately meritorious[,]” but
“a party may not dress up a claim with legal clothing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.”
Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2010). “[Q]uestions of law” include
inquiries into whether the Board applied the correct standard of review or burden of
proof. Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). We review such claims de
novo. See id.
Sadigov first contends that the Board applied the wrong legal standard when
considering the seriousness of his crimes. The basis for Sadigov’s argument is that the
Board improperly considered his conviction for unlawful contact with a minor in its
3 discretionary analysis because the IJ did not sustain his removal charge under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for sexual abuse of a minor. But the IJ sustained his removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), determining that both his indecent assault and
unlawful-contact-with-a-minor convictions were categorically crimes of child abuse,
neglect, or abandonment. In any event, when weighing the positive and negative factors
in support of and against cancellation of removal, the Board is not limited to considering
the circumstances of the removal ground at issue; it may also consider the noncitizen’s
overall criminal history and other character evidence. See, e.g., Solano-Chicas v.
Gonzales, 440 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006); see also In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7,
11 (BIA 1998) (explaining that the factors deemed adverse to a noncitizen include “the
existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and seriousness, and the
presence of other evidence indicative of a respondent’s bad character or undesirability”).
Sadigov also argues that the Board failed to consider mitigating factors when
assessing the seriousness of his crimes. He points to factors that the agency considers
when determining whether a conviction was a “particularly serious crime” such that it
bars asylum and withholding of removal. See Amos v. Att'y Gen., 157 F.4th 313, 327–28
(3d Cir. 2025). That inquiry is inapplicable to Sadigov’s application for cancellation of
removal. Essentially, Sadigov argues that the Board overstated the seriousness of his
conduct. That is a disagreement with the Board’s exercise of discretion in rendering its
decision, which we lack jurisdiction to review. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225 n.4.
4 Next, Sadigov asserts that the Board did not properly apply clear-error review to
the IJ’s factual findings because it “engaged in its own independent factfinding.” See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (iv). Particularly, Sadigov argues that the Board found a new
fact about the circumstances leading to his convictions. “[W]hether the [Board] failed to
follow its regulations by impermissibly finding facts is a question of law.”
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 126 F.4th 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2025); see also Roye, 693 F.3d
at 339. But the Board did not do that here. The Board discussed a fact from the police’s
criminal complaint, which was part of the record and considered by the IJ. That was
permissible and not a violation of clear-error review. Cf. Adeyanju v. Garland, 27 F.4th
25, 49 (1st Cir. 2022) (explaining that the Board “has the authority to review the
undisputed facts in the entire record”); Hammerschmidt v. Garland, 54 F.4th 282, 290
(5th Cir. 2022) (rejecting Petitioner’s impermissible-fact-finding argument because she
did not allege, and the Board decision did not show, that the Board “developed a record,
gathered new information, or chose between disputed facts”).
Sadigov also argues that the Board did not adequately consider the hardship that
his family would face upon his removal. A Board decision that “completely ignore[s] the
evidence” may raise a question of law. See Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th
Cir. 2008); Contreras v. Bondi, 134 F.4th 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2025). But the Board’s decision
did not do that. When considering the positive factors weighing in favor of cancellation,
the Board acknowledged that Sadigov identified hardships to his family, including
medical issues. We lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s exercise of discretion in
5 weighing that factor. See Jarbough v. Att'y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that arguments that the Board incorrectly weighed evidence or improperly
weighed equitable factors are not questions of law).
Finally, Sadigov states that the Board imposed “an impossible evidentiary burden”
on him. But he is really arguing that the Board should have accorded more weight to his
rehabilitation efforts and good moral character. The Board explained that Sadigov’s
rehabilitation efforts and expressions of remorse did not outweigh his serious criminal
conduct. We do not have jurisdiction to re-weigh this evidence. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S.
at 225 n.4; see also Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 189; cf. Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166,
170 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“A party cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court where
none exists simply by attaching a particular label to the claim raised in a petition for
review.”).
For these reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review to the extent that we lack
jurisdiction to consider Sadigov’s arguments and will otherwise deny it. The
Government’s motion to dismiss the petition for review is granted in part and denied in
part to the same extent.