Asia El-Nimeiri-Williams v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al.

D. Nevada

Asia El-Nimeiri-Williams v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided July 28, 2026·No. 2:24-cv-01906·Unknown

Opinion

ASIA EL-NIMEIRI-WILLIAMS, Case No.: 2:24-cv-01906-APG-EJY

Plaintiff Order (1) Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) v. Directing Williams to Show Cause Why Doe Officer 1 Should Not Be Dismissed DEPARTMENT, et al., [ECF No. 21] Defendants

Plaintiff Asia El-Nimeiri-Williams sues defendant Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and its employees, police officers George Garcia and Doe Officer 1, related to an incident that took place at the Zouk Night Club inside Resort World Las Vegas in October 2022. Williams alleges that in the early morning hours she was exiting the club with other concert-goers when she was separated from her group. LVMPD officers were directing the crowd to exit the building, and Williams alleges that while doing so, Garcia used excessive force, assaulted her, and battered her by slamming her to the ground and slamming an unknown male patron on top of her. She asserts that as she was leaving the area following her interaction with Garcia, Doe Officer 1 punched her in the stomach. She brings a Monell1 claim against LVMPD, alleging that LVMPD failed to adequately train its officers and that LVMPD ratified the officers’ conduct because a final policymaker determined the officers’ actions were within policy. She further alleges the defendants were negligent and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. LVMPD and Garcia move for summary judgment, arguing that all of Williams’ claims rely on the assertion that Garcia used excessive force, but the video evidence shows that the

1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). force he used was reasonable. The defendants argue that Williams injected herself into the arrest of her boyfriend, so Garcia reasonably pushed her away to prevent her from obstructing the arresting officers and another patron fell on top of her while she was on the ground. Garcia also argues he cannot be liable for the alleged punch to the stomach because Williams admits he did

not punch her. Alternatively, Garcia contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity for the federal excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants argue that Williams’ negligence claim fails because it is inconsistent with her allegations of intentional use of force, there is no evidence Garcia was negligent in his tactical decisions, and he is entitled to discretionary immunity under Nevada law. The defendants contend her IIED claim fails because there is no evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct. LVMPD argues that if there is no constitutional violation, then the Monell claim necessarily fails. It also argues that she presented no evidence of ratification, and her failure to train claim fails because she conducted no discovery on this claim and did not identify any training inadequacies or similar incidents. Williams responds that issues surrounding the preparation of Garcia’s use of force report

undermine his credibility, so his version of the events should not be believed and the video evidence is “ambiguous and open to competing interpretations.” ECF No. 23 at 13. She argues that Garcia used unreasonable force by slamming her to the ground when she posed no threat to him or the other officers. As for qualified immunity, she asserts that it is clearly established that officers cannot use that level of force on a non-threatening, non-resisting individual and that fabrications in the use of force report preclude qualified immunity. She contends her negligence claim survives because Garcia and the other officers were negligent in their tactical response to the situation where they did not de-escalate and instead aggressively handled the crowd, which created the confrontation. She asserts Garcia is not entitled to discretionary immunity because actions that are unconstitutional or done in bad faith are not protected. Williams argues that a reasonable jury could find that Garcia slamming her to the ground without provocation was extreme and outrageous. Finally, Williams contends that her Monell claim survives summary judgment based on a ratification theory because supervisors found Garcia’s use of force was

within LVMPD policy and this incident shows LVMPD failed to train officers in de-escalation and crowd control. The parties are familiar with the facts, and the incident is captured on numerous videos. I therefore do not set forth the facts except as necessary to resolve the motion. Viewing the video evidence, no genuine dispute remains that Garcia used reasonable force. Additionally, he was not negligent, and his conduct was not extreme and outrageous. As a result, Williams’ claims against him fail. Williams has not presented evidence to raise a genuine dispute on Monell liability and, because Garcia did not commit a violation, LVMPD is not vicariously liable based on his actions. But genuine disputes remain regarding LVMPD’s vicarious liability for Doe Officer 1’s alleged assault and battery. Accordingly, LVMPD is entitled to summary judgment

on all of Williams’ claims except vicarious liability for her assault and battery claims based on Doe Officer 1’s conduct. Finally, because Williams has not identified Doe Officer 1, I order her to show cause why her claims against that defendant should not be dismissed. I. Garcia is entitled to summary judgment on all claims against him. Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a

genuine issue of material fact for trial. Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018) (“To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.”). I view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zetwick v. Cnty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440-41 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A. I grant Garcia summary judgment on Williams’ § 1983 excessive force, assault, and battery claims because the video evidence shows he used reasonable force.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI