Ashvani Sood v. FCA US LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: October 14, 2021
• Docket: 2:21-cv-04287
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 'O' JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 ASHVANI SOOD and SHAREVIA CV 21-4287-RSWL-SKx LEE, 13 ORDER re: MOTION TO REMAND Plaintiffs, [11] 14 Vv. 15 16 | FCA US, LLC; GLENDALE DODGE, LLC; and DOES 1 to 17 | 10, 18 Defendants. LQ | 20 Currently before the Court is a Motion to Remand 21 (the “Motion”) [11] filed by Plaintiffs Ashvani Sood and 22 | Sharevia Lee (“Plaintiffs”). Having reviewed all papers 23 | submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court NOW FINDS 24 | AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS the Motion. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26] A. Factual Background 27 Plaintiffs are residents of Los Angeles, 28 | California. Notice of Removal Ex. A (“Compl.”) JI 2, ECF

1 No. 1-3. Defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant”) is a

2 limited liability company organized under the laws of

3 Delaware, with its principal place of business in 4 Michigan. Id. ¶ 4. Its sole member is a citizen of 5 Delaware and Michigan. Def.’s Notice of Removal 6 (“Removal”) ¶ 28, ECF No. 1. 7 On or about February 28, 2016, Plaintiffs purchased 8 a 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee (the “Vehicle”) for 9 approximately $50,779.04. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs 10 allege that Defendant manufactured and/or distributed 11 the Vehicle. Id. Plaintiffs received various 12 warranties, wherein Defendant undertook to preserve or 13 maintain the Vehicle’s utility or performance or to 14 provide compensation if a defect developed. Id. ¶ 10. 15 During the warranty period, Plaintiffs allege that the 16 Vehicle contained or developed defects, and Defendant 17 has been unable to service or repair the Vehicle to 18 conform with the warranties. Id. ¶¶ 11, 125. 19 B. Procedural Background 20 Plaintiffs filed their Complaint [1-3] in the 21 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, on 22 January 28, 2021, alleging: (1) violations of the Song- 23 Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”) against Defendant, 24 (2) fraudulent inducement against Defendant, and 25 (3) negligent repair against Glendale Dodge. Plaintiffs 26 filed a request for dismissal [1-8] of Glendale Dodge on 27 April 22, 2021. 28 On May 21, 2021, Defendant removed [1] this Action 1 to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction, and

2 Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Remand [11] on

3 August 18, 2021. Defendant filed its Opposition [15] on 4 August 31, 2021, and Plaintiffs replied [16] on 5 September 7, 2021. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 To establish removal jurisdiction over a diversity 8 action, the removing defendant must demonstrate that (1) 9 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; and (2) the 10 suit is between citizens of different states. See 28 11 U.S.C. § 1332. “The amount in controversy includes all 12 relief claimed at the time of removal to which the 13 plaintiff would be entitled if she prevails.” Chavez v. 14 JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 418 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 When a complaint filed in state court alleges on its 16 face “damages in excess of the required jurisdictional 17 minimum,” the amount pled controls unless it appears “to 18 a legal certainty” that the claim is for less than the 19 jurisdictional amount. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. 20 Co., 102 F.3d 398, 402-04 (9th Cir. 1996). Conversely, 21 “[w]here it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a 22 state-court complaint whether the requisite amount in 23 controversy is pled, the removing defendant bears the 24 burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the 25 evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the 26 jurisdictional threshold.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. 27 of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 28 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)). 1 A motion for remand is the proper procedure for

2 challenging removal and may be ordered for either lack

3 of subject matter jurisdiction or any procedural defect 4 in removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Courts strictly 5 construe the removal statutes against removal 6 jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be rejected if there 7 is any doubt as to the right of removal. See Gaus v. 8 Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 1. Judicial Notice 11 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, “[a] 12 court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject 13 to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately 14 and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 15 cannot reasonably be questioned.” Accordingly, while a 16 court may take judicial notice of matters of public 17 record, a court may not take judicial notice of the 18 substance of such records if subject to reasonable 19 dispute. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689- 20 90 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a court may take 21 judicial notice of the fact that certain court records 22 were filed but not of the truth of any facts stated 23 therein). 24 Plaintiffs request the Court take judicial notice 25 of eight remand orders in this Circuit that involved 26 allegations like those made in this Action. See 27 generally Pls.’ Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 12. 28 Because these documents are all court records and 1 consequently their existence is not subject to

2 reasonable dispute, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’

3 request. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 4 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a 5 court may take judicial notice of court filings and 6 other matters of public record). However, the Court 7 does not take judicial notice of any reasonably disputed 8 facts within these filings. See Selane Prods., Inc. v. 9 Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 2:20-cv-07834-MCS-AFM, 2020 WL 10 7253378, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2020). 11 2. The Motion 12 Defendant argues that the Court has diversity 13 jurisdiction over this Action because the amount in 14 controversy exceeds $75,000, Plaintiff is a resident of 15 California, and Defendant is a limited liability company 16 whose sole member is a citizen of Delaware and Michigan. 17 Removal ¶¶ 12, 27-29. Plaintiffs move to remand this 18 Action, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter 19 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1332 because Defendant has 20 not carried its burden to demonstrate that the amount in 21 controversy requirement is satisfied. Pls.’ Mem. P. & 22 A. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand (“Mot.”) 16:15-21. 23 When a defendant removes a complaint to federal 24 court, the defendant’s burden with respect to the amount 25 in controversy varies depending on the circumstances. 26 Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th 27 Cir. 2007). Where “it is unclear or ambiguous from the 28 face of a state-court complaint whether the requisite 1 amount in controversy is pled,” the applicable standard

2 is a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Sanchez

3 v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 4 1996)). This requires that the defendant offer evidence 5 establishing that it is more likely than not that the 6 amount in controversy is met, exclusive of costs and 7 interest. Id. In considering whether the removing 8 defendant has satisfied its burden, the court “may 9 consider facts in the removal petition” and “summary- 10 judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in 11 controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v. State 12 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 13 1997) (quoting Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas. Co., 63 F.3d 14 1326, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995)). 15 Here, Plaintiffs allege that they “suffered damages 16 in a sum to be proven at trial in an amount that is not 17 less than 25,001.00.” Mot. at 5:19-21 (citing Compl. 18 ¶ 12). In the Complaint’s Prayer for Relief, Plaintiffs 19 do not repeat that allegation or include any total 20 dollar amount in controversy. Mot. at 5:21-24. Because 21 it is not facially evident from the Complaint that the 22 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, it is Defendant’s 23 burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 24 that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 25 jurisdictional threshold. See Guglielmino v. McKee 26 Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (holding that allegations 27 relating to monetary relief not repeated in the “Prayer 28 for Relief” section render the amount in controversy 1 uncertain, giving rise to the preponderance standard).

2 The SBA permits buyers of consumer goods to recover

3 “damages and other legal and equitable relief” from 4 defendants who fail to comply with an express or implied 5 warranty. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(a). The measure of 6 actual damages is “the amount paid or payable by the 7 buyer,” less the “amount directly attributable to use by 8 the buyer.” Id. § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). Additionally, 9 “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply 10 was willful, the judgment may include . . . a civil 11 penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of 12 actual damages.” Id. § 1794(c). Finally, prevailing 13 plaintiffs may recover “the aggregate amount of costs 14 and expenses, including attorneys’ fees based on actual 15 time expended.” Id. § 1794. 16 a. Actual Damages 17 Actual damages under the SBA are equal to the 18 purchase price of the vehicle less the reduction in 19 value “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. 20 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). To determine the 21 amount directly attributable to the buyer’s use of the 22 vehicle, the manufacturer multiplies the price of the 23 vehicle the buyer paid by a fraction—the denominator is 24 120,000, and the numerator is the number of miles the 25 buyer drove the car before the first relevant repair. 26 Id. § 1793(d)(2)(C). 27 Defendant argues that the amount in controversy is 28 met because the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs 1 “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an

2 amount that is not less than $25,001.00,” meaning

3 Plaintiffs’ actual damages are at least $25,001.00. 4 Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Remand (“Opp’n”) 8:9-9:2, 5 ECF No. 15. After adding two times that amount in civil 6 penalties, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 7 Id. Plaintiffs counter that the word “damages” in this 8 allegation refers to total damages, which encompasses: 9 (1) actual damages; (2) civil penalties; (3) attorneys’ 10 fees; and (4) punitive damages. Mot. at 6:24-28. 11 Defendant’s reading of the Complaint is 12 unpersuasive. Plaintiffs may very well have included 13 the $25,001 figure only to clarify that the total amount 14 in controversy qualifies the case as unlimited in 15 California courts, and not to establish a minimum amount 16 of actual damages to be recovered. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 17 Code § 85 (classifying civil cases as unlimited where 18 the amount recovery sought exceeds $25,000). Moreover, 19 Defendant’s interpretation is unsupported by the 20 majority of case law in this Circuit. See, e.g., 21 Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 909, 913 22 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court could just as easily 23 infer that the $25,001 refers to Plaintiff’s total 24 damages. This lack of clarity forecloses Defendants’ 25 argument that the $25,001 ‘more likely than not’ 26 satisfies the federal-jurisdictional amount.”); Edwards 27 v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV1605852BROPLAX, 2016 WL 28 6583585, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016) (“Plaintiff’s 1 allegations . . . [do] not make clear whether he is

2 seeking more than $25,000 in actual damages, or total

3 damages . . . [thus] Defendant’s assertion that these 4 damages refer only to actual damages is only an 5 assumption.”). Because Defendant has not provided 6 evidence that Plaintiffs’ allegation referred to actual 7 damages rather than total damages, Defendant has not met 8 its burden in proving that the amount in controversy is 9 met. 10 Alternatively, Defendant seeks to show that the 11 amount in controversy has been satisfied based on the 12 sales contract by arguing that “[t]he total sales price 13 [$50,779.00] plus $101,558.00 as a double civil penalty 14 . . . totals $152,337.00. . . . [and] [e]ven if a more 15 conservative calculation is used . . . Plaintiffs paid 16 to date [$34,972.52].” Removal ¶ 22 n.1. Plaintiffs 17 counter that: (1) Defendant’s mere use of the sales 18 contract is insufficient, and (2) Defendant fails to 19 address a mileage offset that would reduce Plaintiffs’ 20 actual damages. Mot. at 8:14-9:28; see also Cal. Civ. 21 Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). 22 Although Defendant provides facts regarding the 23 Vehicle’s total purchase price and the amount Plaintiffs 24 have paid thus far, Removal ¶ 22 n.1, Defendant fails to 25 explain why either of these figures more likely than not 26 represents the amount of actual damages to be recovered 27 in this case. Plaintiff pleads a multitude of defects 28 contained in the Vehicle, see Compl. ¶ 11, but Defendant 1 provides no information as to the cost of repair for

2 those defects. Without such maintenance or repair

3 records, the Court cannot properly assess actual 4 damages. See Eberle v. Jaguar Land Rover North Am., 5 LLC, No.218CV06650VAPPLA, 2018 WL 4674598, at *2 (C.D. 6 Cal. Sept. 26, 2018) (granting motion to remand even 7 though the car’s purchase price was “considerable” 8 because “[d]efendant offered no maintenance record or 9 any facts to assist the Court in determining what the 10 actual damages might be without resorting to 11 speculation”). 12 Defendant requests that Plaintiffs provide the 13 computation of damages pursuant to Rule 14 26(a)(1)(A)(iii), arguing that it cannot fully assess 15 actual damages or the offset amount without more 16 information from Plaintiff. Opp’n at 5:26-6:5. 17 However, Defendant, as warranty provider, presumably has 18 access to the information relevant to the amount in 19 controversy calculation (such as payments made, 20 maintenance records, warranty repair history, etc.), and 21 Defendant has failed to bring a formal Motion to Compel 22 Initial Disclosures per Rule 37(a). Indeed, Defendant’s 23 request for additional information to determine the 24 mileage offset is undermined by Defendant’s statement in 25 its Opposition that the Vehicle had driven 3,189 miles 26 at the time of Plaintiffs’ first repair visit. Id. at 27 5:18-24. Moreover, even if Defendant lacks access to 28 necessary information, Defendant would not be prejudiced 1 by remand at this time because it can “ostensibly

2 attempt removal again within 30 days of learning facts

3 that actually serve to establish the amount in 4 controversy.” Boatright v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18-cv- 5 03157-BLF, 2018 WL 4488762, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 6 2018). Thus, delaying the ruling of this Motion to 7 allow jurisdictional discovery is unnecessary. 8 Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ refusal 9 of Defendant’s offers to settle this case for $75,000 10 makes it “clear Plaintiffs value this case as 11 potentially over $75,000.” Opp’n 7:2-3. However, 12 Defendant provides no evidence indicating that 13 Plaintiffs rejected the offers because they found that 14 amount to be insufficient. Because actual damages are 15 uncertain for the reasons stated above, this Court 16 cannot presume that Plaintiffs rejected the offer on 17 that ground. See Boatright, 2018 WL 4488762, at *3 18 (“Without additional evidence to ground the offer, this 19 Court cannot find that rejection of the offer reasonably 20 serves as evidence of the amount in controversy.”). 21 Because Defendant has not met its burden to 22 establish the actual repair cost or appropriate mileage 23 offset without resorting to speculation, Defendant has 24 not met its burden of proving the amount of actual 25 damages that are in controversy by a preponderance of 26 the evidence. 27 b. Civil Penalties 28 A successful Song-Beverly plaintiff may be entitled 1 to recover civil penalties of up to twice the amount of

2 the actual damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). However,

3 a civil penalty may be awarded only if a court 4 determines that a defendant’s failure to comply with the 5 SBA is willful. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). Id. 6 Additionally, if the amount of actual damages is 7 speculative, an attempt to determine the civil penalty 8 amount is equally uncertain. See Edwards v. Ford Motor 9 Co., No. 16-cv-05852 BRO (PLAx), 2016 WL 6583585, at *4 10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016). 11 Defendant argues that the full civil penalty should 12 be included in the amount in controversy because the 13 Complaint expressly alleges that Plaintiffs are entitled 14 to a civil penalty of two times their actual damages. 15 Opp’n at 7:15-22; see also Compl. at 31:18. Plaintiffs 16 argue that Defendant has not met its evidentiary burden 17 because Defendant has proffered no evidence of: 18 (1) willfulness, or (2) that Plaintiffs will receive the 19 maximum civil penalties given the SBA only permits a 20 civil penalty up to two times the actual damages amount. 21 Mot. at 10:16-11:4. 22 Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. First, 23 Plaintiffs are entitled to a civil penalty only if 24 Defendant’s violations were willful, and Defendant has 25 not provided any evidence, nor pointed to any 26 allegations in the Complaint, to support Plaintiffs’ 27 entitlement to civil penalties. Without any evidence as 28 to willfulness, Defendant fails to carry its burden of 1 proving that Plaintiffs are more likely than not

2 entitled to a civil penalty, even if they prevail on the

3 merits of their claim. See Ronquillo v. BMW of North 4 Am., LLC, No.3:20-CV-1413-W-WVG, 2020 WL 6741317, at *3 5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2020) (“Rather than simply assuming 6 that because a civil penalty is available, one will be 7 awarded, the defendant must make some effort to justify 8 the assumption by, for example, pointing to allegations 9 in the Complaint suggesting such an award would be 10 appropriate.”). 11 Additionally, given that Defendant has not met its 12 burden in establishing the amount of actual damages, it 13 follows that determining the amount of civil penalties 14 likely to be awarded is also uncertain. See Nobakht v. 15 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 221CV03564ODWEX, 2021 WL 16 3674589, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2021) (finding that 17 defendant failed to meet its burden in determining the 18 amount of a civil penalty because the amount of actual 19 damages was speculative). 20 Defendant provides no support that any civil 21 penalty would be awarded or what the amount of any civil 22 penalty would be in this case. Because the removal 23 statute is strictly construed against removal, Defendant 24 has failed to meet its burden of showing that the full 25 civil penalty available under the SBA should be included 26 in the amount in controversy. 27 c. Punitive Damages 28 “It is well established that punitive damages are a 1 part of the amount in controversy” for purposes of

2 establishing diversity jurisdiction. Gibson v. Chrysler

3 Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001). “When 4 assessing the probable amount of unspecified punitive 5 damages for jurisdictional purposes, courts may look to 6 verdicts in analogous cases as a reasonable 7 approximation.” Campbell v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 825 8 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1009 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Simmons 9 v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 10 2002)). 11 While Plaintiffs seek punitive damages in their 12 Prayer for Relief, they do not state a specific amount. 13 Compl. at 31:24. Defendant only points to the fact that 14 Plaintiffs seek punitive damages in attempting to meet 15 the jurisdictional minimum, which is insufficient. See 16 Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 994 F. 17 Supp. 1196, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“Defendant’s burden 18 cannot be met simply by pointing out that the complaint 19 seeks punitive damages and that any damages awarded 20 under such a claim could total a large sum of money, 21 particularly in light of the high burden that must be 22 met in order for a plaintiff even to be eligible for 23 receipt of discretionary punitive damages.”). Defendant 24 has not provided any analogous verdicts or estimates of 25 the amount of punitive damages in its papers, and makes 26 no showing of any “oppression, fraud, or malice” that 27 might support a punitive damage award. Thus, Defendant 28 has failed to meet its burden of showing any amount of 1 punitive damages that should be included in the amount

2 in controversy.

3 d. Attorneys’ Fees 4 The SBA provides for an award of attorney's fees. 5 Cal. Civ. Code. § 1794(e). “[W]here an underlying 6 statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either 7 with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may 8 be included in the amount in controversy.” Galt G/S v. 9 JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998). 10 Moreover, “a court must include future attorneys’ fees 11 recoverable by statute or contract when assessing 12 whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met.” 13 Fritsch v. Swift Trans. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 14 794 (9th Cir. 2018). Nevertheless, district courts have 15 discretion to disregard attorneys’ fees in determining 16 the amount in controversy where a fee estimate is too 17 speculative. Id. at 795. In this regard, the Ninth 18 Circuit requires “a removing defendant to prove that the 19 amount in controversy (including attorneys’ fees) 20 exceeds the jurisdictional threshold by a preponderance 21 of the evidence.” Id. 22 Defendant provides a declaration in which 23 Defendant’s counsel references numerous cases and 24 attests that “plaintiffs’ attorneys regularly request 25 more than $75,000 in Song Beverly cases tried or 26 prepared for trial.” Decl. of Richard L. Stuhlbarg 27 (“Stuhlbarg Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 1, Ex. D. Defendant 28 also relies on Brady v. Mercedez-Benz, USA, Inc., 243 F. 1 Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2002), to argue that a

2 declaration detailing fee awards in similar lemon law

3 cases is sufficient to calculate the amount in 4 controversy. Opp’n at 9:22-10:7. Plaintiff counters 5 that the declaration is self-serving and conclusory 6 because Defendant fails to compare the present case to 7 any of the cases referenced in the declaration. Mot. at 8 14:1-14. 9 Defendant’s reliance on Brady is misplaced. There, 10 the court relied on both a declaration stating an 11 estimate of fees incurred to date and a declaration 12 detailing fee awards in similar lemon law cases to 13 calculate the amount in controversy. 243 F. Supp. 2d at 14 1011. Here, however, Defendant provides no estimate of 15 the attorneys’ fees that have accrued or will accrue in 16 this case. Defendant has therefore failed to provide 17 the Court with a fee estimate that is more likely than 18 not in controversy. See Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford 19 Accident & Indemnity Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (N.D. 20 Cal. 1998) (finding that “[d]efendant’s contention that 21 attorney fees are likely to total at least $20,000 is 22 too speculative” because defendant failed to estimate 23 “the amount of time each major task will take” or vary 24 the hourly billing rate for each task); Savall v. FCA US 25 LLC, No. 21CV195 JM (KSC), 2021 WL 1661051, at *3 (S.D. 26 Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (distinguishing the Brady case 27 because “[w]ithout making some effort to set forth the 28 value of attorneys’ fees that Plaintiff is expected to 1 incur, or that Plaintiff has incurred, [Defendant] has

2 failed to meet its burden . . . .”).

3 Furthermore, Defendant has failed to explain why 4 the circumstances or services required in this case are 5 comparable to the numerous cases cited in the 6 declaration where “plaintiffs’ attorneys regularly 7 request[ed] more than $75,000.” See D’Amico v. Ford 8 Motor Co., No. CV 20-2985-CJC (JCX), 2020 WL 2614610, at 9 *4 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020) (“Defendant makes no effort 10 to explain what amount of attorney fees might be sought 11 or awarded in this case . . . . Instead, Defendant 12 argues only more generally that ‘plaintiff’s attorneys 13 regularly request more than $65,000 in Song Beverly 14 cases tried or prepared for trial.’”). As a result, the 15 Court finds that Defendant has failed to substantiate 16 any specific amount in potential attorneys’ fees by a 17 preponderance of the evidence. 18 Thus, because Defendant fails to meet its burden of 19 proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 20 amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional 21 threshold, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand 22 this Action to state court. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 23 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal jurisdiction 24 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right 25 of removal.”). 26 27 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS 3 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [11]. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 7 DATED: October 14, 2021 _______/_s/_ R_o_n_a_ld_ S_._W_. _L_ew_______ HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW 8 Senior U.S. District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28