Ashuelot R. R. v. Elliot

57 N.H. 397
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire
DecidedAugust 5, 1874
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 57 N.H. 397 (Ashuelot R. R. v. Elliot) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ashuelot R. R. v. Elliot, 57 N.H. 397 (N.H. 1874).

Opinions

FROM CHESHIRE CIRCUIT COURT. We think the conclusions of the judge at the trial, as stated in the printed case, with respect to the right of the Ashuelot Railroad corporation to redeem the mortgaged property, the appointment of a master to take an account, and the instructions to the master there suggested, are right, and that an order should be entered accordingly.

The defendants make two objections to the right of the corporation to redeem: (1) that they have permitted the matter to sleep so long that their present claim is stale; and (2) that the reorganization of the corporation by the election of officers at the meeting of August *Page 408 17, 1872, was invalid for the reason that the magistrate who called the meeting was disqualified by the fact that he was a stockholder at the time. Neither of these objections can, in our judgment, be sustained.

Mr. Elliot had been in possession of the road as trustee since about January 1, 1861 — a little more than eleven and a half years. There can be no pretence that any rights at law against the corporation had been gained either by him or by the bondholders by virtue of the statute of limitations; the time was not sufficient, even if the holding and management of the road by him had been such as to give the plaintiffs clear notice of an unequivocal renunciation of the trust. Nor have we been able to discover anything in the facts stated, which would justify the court in denying the plaintiffs the relief they ask, by all application of any known doctrine of equity respecting state demands. So far as regards the rights of the plaintiffs to redeem, the situation of affairs since January 1, 1861, is simply that their road and property have been in the hands of the mortgagee. No reason is seen why their rights to an account and to redeem should be lost by the lapse of eleven or twelve years, any more than the right of a mortgagor of any other property to redeem and to an account of the rents and profits should be lost by permitting the mortgagee to hold possession for the same length of time. The rents and profits in one case, as well as in the other, may in time be sufficient to pay off the whole mortgage debt; and it would be a singular consequence if the mortgagor is to be deprived of all benefit of such payment, and, in addition, be despoiled of his rights in the mortgaged property itself, merely because both parties have been content the one to pay and the other to receive payment on his debt in that way for a series of years less than the period of limitation fixed by law.

As to the disqualification of Mr. Lane to call the meeting of August 17, 1872, if it were admitted that he was disqualified, and that the doings of the meeting were thereby rendered void, it would seem to follow that the Ashuelot Railroad Co. is improperly made a party plaintiff to the bill. What would be the technical effect of such a holding upon the present proceeding we need not inquire, because we think the plaintiffs are right in their view that the act of the magistrate in calling the meeting was simply ministerial, and that the doings of the meeting were not thereby rendered invalid.

Upon these two points the court, after careful examination, are, as suggested, with the plaintiffs; and the reasons, most of which have been elaborately considered by counsel in their briefs, need not be enlarged upon. If the act of Lane in refusing the votes offered by Elliot was unauthorized and illegal, any person aggrieved had a plain and sufficient remedy by quo warranto or mandamus. Besides, the court found (and we are unable to doubt the correctness of the finding on this point) that the votes were properly rejected, because the shares upon which they were offered had been previously extinguished by the act of the corporation in buying them in; so that no wrong was in fact done, even had Lane been disqualified to rule upon the question *Page 409 when the votes were offered. But the only act which Lane did, in his official capacity as justice of the peace, by virtue of the statute, was to call the meeting. Gen. Stats., ch. 133, secs. 15, 16. After the meeting assembled, in pursuance of the call, it was necessary in order to commence proceedings that some one should assume the duties of the chair. No one not a stockholder was entitled to be present or take part in the meeting. Certainly, then, a stockholder must act as temporary as well as permanent chairman of the meeting, and no reason can be conceived why Mr. Lane, being a stockholder, might not do so as well as any one else. The rulings of the chairman, of which the defendant complained, and which, if wrong, furnished the basis of a proceeding to have the matter set right, were not made by virtue of any authority derived from the statute by Lane as a justice of the peace, but by virtue of his election by the stockholders to preside in the meeting. His functions as a public officer ended with the calling of the meeting. After it assembled he stood the same as other stockholders, and might vote and be voted for in the same way.

The defendants object to the finding that the transaction with Levi Chamberlain, in reference to the $1,000 bond, was a breach of trust on the part of Elliot. We are unable to doubt that the finding was right and that Elliot must be held to account accordingly. It is true he had not at that time taken possession of the road as trustee under the mortgage; but he was treasurer and clerk of the corporation, and we think it is very clear he had no right to make use of his official position, by any such device as this, to transfer to himself funds belonging to the company he was bound to serve. His counsel have argued that the transaction was strictly legal, — that is, that he did not go beyond his strict legal right in the matter, — and therefore cannot justly be held to account. Suppose he had accomplished exactly the same result without making use of Mr. Chamberlain or his name at all: how would it be then? He was treasurer of the corporation, and in that capacity had charge of their bonds. He was at the same time owner in his private capacity of stock in the corporation worth $200 on $1,000 less than the bonds: would it be argued that he could directly appropriate to himself a $1,000 bond of the corporation, and in place of it substitute $1,000 of his own sock worth $200 less? How does the indirect and circuitous route he took to reach the same result help the matter? In any view suggested to us by the case, or by counsel in argument, we cannot but regard this transaction as entirely indefensible, and are unable to doubt that Elliot should restore to the corporation what he took from it in this way, just as much as though it had been taken directly, without any such attempt to give it color of right. The direction to the master, suggested in the printed case, as to the other $1,000 bond to Samuel Towns, stands the same, and is approved.

Upon the facts stated in the printed case with respect to Elliot's dealings in the bonds of the Ashuelot Railroad Company after he took possession of the road as trustee, no reason is now seen why he should not account to the corporation for the profits of those transactions *Page 410 We think it is impossible to sustain the view of his counsel, that his relation to the corporation after he took possession under the mortgage was not that of a trustee. Undoubtedly he represented the bondholders in respect of their rights and interests by virtue of the mortgage, but we think it equally clear that he represented the corporation in respect of their rights and interests in the mortgaged property. All his title, and all his right to possess and manage the property, was a trust.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
57 N.H. 397, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ashuelot-r-r-v-elliot-nh-1874.