Ashton v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co.

49 Pa. 261
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 1, 1865
StatusPublished

This text of 49 Pa. 261 (Ashton v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ashton v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 49 Pa. 261 (Pa. 1865).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Strong, J.

All the complainants are holders of shares in the capital stock of The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, and some of them are holders of a part of the loan secured by a mortgage of the company, dated March 7th 1842. The case imposes the necessity of considering their rights both as stockholders and as creditors under the mortgage. These rights are distinct, and it will avoid confusion to consider them separately.

As loanholders, the complainants pray that the company may be enjoined against making new bonds, secured by a new mortgage for three millions of dollars, and against the use proposed to be made of the bonds or certificates thus secured, for the reason that, as they allege, their security will thereby be changed [263]*263or diminished, and the contract of the company with them will be violated.

The mortgage of 1842 was authorized by an Act of Assembly, approved on the 16th day of February of that year. That act, after conferring upon the company power to mortgage their property to the extent of $6,150,000, enacted that no dividend should be made to the stockholders while any loans which had fallen due should, after demand, remain unpaid. It also required that all profits arising from the business of the company, after defraying the expenses thereof, and of the completion and repairs of their works, should be applied, in the first place, to the payment of interest on all loans of the company, and then to the payment of the principal of all loans and other debts which, for the time being, should be due and unpaid. It imposed no other obligation in regard to the profits of the business. It did not require their devotion either to the payment or security of loans or debts not due and payable; but when, on the 7th of March 1842, the mortgage authorized by it, came to be executed, larger securities were given to the creditors than the Act of. Assembly enjoined. After following the directions of the legislature so far as. they went, by stipulating with the mortgagees that no dividend or profits should be made to the stockholders of the company while any loan which had been theretofore or should be thereafter made, and which should or might have fallen due, should, after demand, remain unpaid; and after providing that all profits arising from the business of the company, after defraying the expenses thereof, and of the completion and repairs of their works, should be applied in the first place to the payment of the interest on all loans to the company, and then to the principal of all loans and other debts which, for the time being, should be due and unpaid; the mortgage provided further that when and as often as the principal of all loans and debts then due and payable should be fully paid and discharged, or reservations of money shotild le made to meet them when demanded, the surplus moneys on hand arising from the profits might be applied, at the discretion of the board of managers of the company, to the payment of a dividend to the stockholders, not exceeding six per cent, in any one year on the capital stock, and, in case after such dividend there should be a surplus of moneys on hand arising from said profits, the board of managers should apply the remainder for the time being, for the benefit of the loan-holders secured by the mortgage, “ so far as their security may require” (creating a sinking fund for the purpose), and afterwards, or (as we understand the stipulation), when such security has been created, apply it for the benefit of the stockholders of the company. In the absence of loans and debts past due and unprovided for, the security given by these covenants of the [264]*264mortgage to holders of loans not presently payable was twofold; first, an engagement of the mortgagors to apply all profits arising from the business to the payment of interest on all loans; and secondly, an engagement to apply the remainder of the profits, after deducting a dividend on the stock not exceeding six per cent, (which the managers were authorized to make), to a sinking fund for their benefit, so far as their security might require. What was more than this was left to be applied to the benefit of the stockholders. It is quite clear, both from the general intent and from the particular language of the mortgage, that it imposed no obligation upon the company to impound the surplus profits remaining after a dividend, to any greater extent than the security of the loanholders may require. Its manifest purpose was ample security to the creditors in the first instance, and no more. When that should be accomplished it was intended by the parties to leave the profits to be enjoyed by the debtors. Hence the insertion of the clause declaring that the surplus profits should be applied for the benefit of the loanholders, but with the qualification “ so far as their security may require,” and afterwards, for the benefit of the stockholders. If such was not the intention of the parties, and if such is not the true construction of the contract, this clause is without meaning, and it is, in effect, stricken from the mortgage. ■ Then all the surplus profits must accumulate, without regard to their amount, and must remain impounded until March 7th 1870, though they may, and probably would, greatly exceed the unpaid portion of the loan. Indeed the loan may all be purchased by the mortgagors, except the last thousand dollars. Yet the sinking fund must continue to increase, and must receive all the profits till the last bond shall fall due. Such a construction of the contract is unreasonable, and it mutilates the language. It denies effect to all parts of the instrument, and loses sight of the object which the contracting parties had in view, the security of the creditor without unnecessarily hampering the debtor.

Such, then, are the rights which these complainants, as loan-holders’under the mortgage, have. Without their consent their rights cannot be lessened or changed by any act of the mortgagors.

We pass now to consider what the defendants have done, and those acts which they propose to do, that are regarded by the complainants as a breach of the stipulations of the mortgage. On the 1st of May 1855, a resolution was unanimously adopted by the stockholders of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, by which it was recommended to the board of managers “ to issue scrip for additional shares of stock, not in the whole to exceed the number of shares authorized to be issued by an Act of Assembly passed March 13th 1841, and to distribute the [265]*265said scrip among the holders of stock or scrip rateably, in proportion to the number of shares of stock or scrip held by them respectively, at the dates of said issues; said scrip to be in place of loans of the company, to be cancelled simultaneously with the issue of said scrip to an amount equal' to the par value of the stock for which said scrip is issued.” Provided, that the scrip so issued should not be entitled to any cash dividend until the then existing funded debt of the company should be paid off, or adequate provision be made for its discharge when due and payment demanded; when the holders of said scrip should have a right to convert it into stock, to stand, in all respects, upon the same footing as the then existing stock. The board of mana-gers have carried out this resolution by issuing scrip from time to time, and distributing it among the stock and scrip holders until the amount issued, if converted into stock at its par value, is $1,803,000.

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49 Pa. 261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ashton-v-lehigh-coal-navigation-co-pa-1865.