Ashton Scott Days-Carter v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 1, 2025
• Docket: 01-24-00822-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 1, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00822-CR ——————————— ASHTON SCOTT DAYS-CARTER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 208th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1686955

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Ashton Scott Days-Carter, pleaded guilty to the felony offense of

murder.1 Appellant, without an agreed punishment recommendation from the State,

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b), (c) (identifying murder as first-degree felony offense). pleaded guilty, with punishment to be assessed by the trial court after completion of

a pre-sentence investigation. As a part of the agreement between appellant and the

State, the State agreed to “cap[] the range of punishment at [appellant’s] sentencing

hearing” to forty years’ confinement.2 On October 3, 2024, the trial court entered a

judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to thirty years’ confinement.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal from his conviction on October 11, 2024.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Background

Appellant pleaded guilty to the felony offense of murder. In connection with

his plea of guilty, appellant signed a “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement

to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession,” in which he waived his right to a jury trial.

This written waiver, signed by appellant, also included the following waiver of his

right to appeal:

In exchange for the State waiving [its] right to a jury trial, I intend to enter a plea of guilty without an agreed recommendation of punishment from the [State] and request that my punishment should be set by the [trial court] after a pre-sentence investigation report and hearing. I understand that as a part of the agreement, the State has capped the range of punishment at my sentencing hearing at 40 years. I waive any further time to prepare for trial to which I or my attorney may be entitled. Further, in exchange for the [S]tate giving up [its] right to trial, I agree to waive any right of appeal which I may have.

2 An individual adjudged guilty of a first-degree felony offense is subject to a sentence of confinement “for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a).

2 The appellate record also includes a document titled “Advice of Defendant’s

Right of Appeal,” signed by appellant, explaining that because appellant “waived or

gave up [the] right to appeal, [he could not] appeal [his] conviction.”

In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court entered a

certification of appellant’s right of appeal, signed by appellant, appellant’s

court-appointed trial counsel, and the trial court, reflecting that appellant had no right

of appeal. This certification is supported by the appellate record.

After a sentencing hearing, the trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at

confinement for thirty years.

Jurisdiction

Criminal defendants have a statutory right to appeal their conviction. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018). However, in any non-capital case a defendant may waive his

right of appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(a); Carson, 559 S.W.3d

at 492. Where a defendant executes a valid waiver of his right of appeal, he is barred

from appealing any issue unless the trial court grants permission to appeal. Id. at

493.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, as a part of a plea bargain

agreement, a criminal defendant may waive his right to appeal even where there is

3 no agreement with the State as to a punishment recommendation.3 See id. at 494

(“[A] defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his appeal as a part of a plea

when consideration is given by the State, even when sentencing is not agreed

upon.”). For this waiver of the right of appeal to be valid, “the record must show

that the State gave up its right to a jury in exchange for the defendant’s waiver of his

appeal.” See id. A written waiver in which the defendant affirmatively states that

he is giving up his right of appeal in exchange for the State’s consent to his jury-trial

waiver satisfies this requirement. See Lopez. v. State, 595 S.W.3d 897, 900–01 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). Here, the record includes such a

written waiver, as appellant’s plea documents, signed by appellant and his

court-appointed counsel, affirmatively state that “in exchange for the [S]tate giving

up [its] right to trial, [appellant] agree[d] to waive any right of appeal which [he]

may have.”

Additionally, when a trial court enters a judgment of guilt, it must certify

whether the defendant has a right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Texas

Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) states that in a case where a defendant

3 We note that, although there was no agreement with the State as to a punishment recommendation, the plea documents in the appellate record indicate that the State agreed to “cap[] the range of punishment at [appellant’s] sentencing hearing” to forty years’ confinement. The State could have sought punishment of up to life imprisonment for appellant, who was indicted for the first-degree felony offense of murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a).

4 voluntarily pleaded guilty, the defendant may only appeal “those matters that were

raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial,” or “after getting the trial

court’s permission to appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A)-(B). As noted above,

pursuant to appellant’s plea agreement with the State, including appellant’s waiver

of his right of appeal, the trial court signed a certification in the underlying case

stating that appellant had no right of appeal in this case.

The record here is clear that appellant voluntarily waived his

statutorily-created right of appeal in exchange for the State waiving its right to a jury

trial. See Carson, 559 S.W.3d at 496 (holding that “State’s waiver of its right to a

jury was sufficient consideration to render [a]ppellant’s waiver of his right to appeal

knowing and intelligent”); Lopez, 595 S.W.3d at 900–01 (“A waiver of appeal prior

to sentencing may be valid if it is bargained for–that is, if the State gives some

consideration for the waiver, even if a sentence is not agreed upon.”). The record is

further clear that the trial court did not grant appellant permission to appeal.

Because appellant has no right of appeal, we must dismiss the appeal. See

Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals,

while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is

permitted to appeal by [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure] 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss

a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”).

5 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Morgan.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).