ASHTON RYAN, JR. NO. 21-CA-32
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELINDA DOUCET COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 790-717, DIVISION "C" HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG, JUDGE PRESIDING
August 25, 2021
FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Jude G. Gravois
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS FHW SMC JGG COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, ASHTON RYAN, JR. Cesar R. Burgos Robert J. Daigre Gabriel O. Mondino George M. McGregor Leila M. Bonilla
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, MELINDA DOUCET Bailey D. Morse WICKER, J.
Plaintiff-tenant, Melinda Doucet, appeals the September 8, 2020 trial court
judgment in favor of defendant-landlord, Ashton Ryan, in the amount of
$141,320.47 for past due rental payments, property taxes, and insurance premiums
due pursuant to a Lease Agreement executed between the parties, which also
contained an Option to Purchase the leased property. Because we find that the
judgment improperly awarded Mr. Ryan monetary damages for his prescribed
reimbursement claims for taxes and insurances paid pursuant to the Lease for the
years 2003-2007, we amend the trial court judgment to reduce the award by
$11,232.66. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arises out of an unusual set of facts surrounding a Lease
Agreement executed between the parties. On August 23, 2002, Ms. Doucet and
Mr. Ryan executed a document titled “Lease Agreement” for a property owned by
Mr. Ryan and located at 116 Imperial Woods in Harahan, Louisiana. The Lease
Agreement—with a 30-year term—contained various provisions, including a
“Purchase Option” provision. The Lease granted Ms. Doucet the option to
purchase the property “for the initial price of $170,000.00” and set forth that “all
principal payments shall be forfeited by Tenant should Tenant fail to properly
exercise the purchase option.”
The Lease Agreement was introduced into evidence and provided that Ms.
Doucet would pay an “initial installment of $50,000.00 at lease inception and
thereafter in equal monthly installments of $1,131.00…payable without deduction,
set off, or demand, a percentage of said amount being applied to principal should
Tenant exercise the option to purchase... .” The Lease also contained a provision
stating that Mr. Ryan would be responsible for initial payment of all insurances
and taxes on the property; however, the Lease stipulated that, upon demand, Ms.
21-CA-32 1 Doucet would reimburse Mr. Ryan for property taxes and insurances paid.1 The
Lease additionally provided for a five-percent late fee or penalty should the
monthly rental payments not be made by the 15th of each month. On December 10,
2002, the parties executed an “Addendum to Lease Agreement,” which
acknowledged that “the property is encumbered by a mortgage in favor of Hibernia
National Bank in the approximate amount of $80,000.00” and that “Lessor will not
further encumber or otherwise alienate, in whole or in part, the subject property
without the express written consent of Lessee.” The Addendum further stated that
“Lessee shall have the right to exercise the purchase option at any time.”
Concerning cancellation, the Lease contained a provision titled “Defaults
and Remedies” which provided that under certain circumstances, including “if
tenant shall fail to keep and perform each and every covenant condition and
agreement herein…,” then, “at the sole option of the Landlord, Tenant’s right of
possession shall thereupon cease and terminate, and Landlord shall be entitled to
the possession of the Property and to remove all persons and property therefrom
and to reenter the same without further demand of rent or demand of possession of
said Property… .” The Lease further provided for the Landlord’s right to
reimbursement of attorney fees incurred in attempting to collect rent or secure
possession of the property upon Tenant’s default.
On December 26, 2018, Mr. Ryan filed a “Petition for Eviction, Declaratory
Judgment, Breach of Lease and Damages,” seeking damages totaling $205,934.99
in past due rental payments, including a 5% late fee on the past due rental
payments, as well as reimbursement for taxes and insurances paid pursuant to the
Lease. The petition alleged that Ms. Doucet ceased making full rental payments in
October 2008, at which time she made a few partial rental payments through July
1 The Lease provided that Ms. Doucet would only be responsible to reimburse the taxes “to the extent that such taxes exceed the homestead exemption allowance.” The parties submitted a joint exhibit setting forth the agreed-upon amounts of reimbursable taxes paid under the Lease.
21-CA-32 2 2012. The petition further alleged that Ms. Doucet ceased making any rental
payments whatsoever from July 2012 through the date of the filing of the
petition—December 26, 2018.
Ms. Doucet thereafter filed an Answer with various exceptions, including an
exception of prescription as to the alleged past-due rental payments, contending
that any payments allegedly owed beyond a three-year period from the date of
demand were prescribed as a matter of law. In her answer, Ms. Doucet claimed
that she learned Mr. Ryan placed an additional mortgage on the property in 2007,
which she alleged was in violation of the Lease Addendum and could have affected
her ability to obtain clear title to the property. Ms. Doucet further alleged that Mr.
Ryan failed to request rental payments or reimbursement of any taxes or insurances
paid, and that the parties’ actions during the length of the lease resulted in a
modification of the terms of the Lease such that Mr. Ryan, by his silence or
inaction, waived his right to assert claims for unpaid rent or other obligations under
the Lease.
With her answer, Ms. Doucet further asserted a reconventional demand
against Mr. Ryan2 seeking reimbursement for nearly $200,000.00 she alleged she
expended in improvements to the property, which she described as being in
“deplorable” condition at the time of the execution of the Lease. Ms. Doucet
further sought specific performance of the Purchase Option under the Lease,
seeking title to the property at issue.
Mr. Ryan subsequently filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment on Issue of
Lease versus Lease Purchase Agreement and Ms. Doucet’s Default,” requesting
the trial court make a determination that the contract between the parties is a lease
agreement with an option to purchase provision, rather than a lease-purchase
2 The reconventional demand also named Mr. Ryan’s wife, Mrs. Jolene Favalora Ryan, as a defendant-in- reconvention.
21-CA-32 3 contract. On May 14, 2019, the trial court rendered a judgment holding that the
Lease agreement at issue is a “lease agreement with the option to purchase.”3
On March 11, 2020, the trial court issued a judgment, sustaining Ms.
Doucet’s exception of prescription in part, finding that “the rental arrearages and
late payments asserted before November 2, 2015 are prescribed” and further that
“ten year liberative prescription applies [to] all remaining balances, such as the
insurances and taxes.”4
The matter proceeded to a bench trial on June 15 and June 24, 2020. At
trial, Mr. Ryan testified that he purchased the property at issue from his parents in
1983, and that he had not been to the home since his mother and siblings lived
there in 1999. When questioned how he became acquainted with Ms. Doucet, he
stated that he believed Ms. Doucet knew Mr. John Lapworth, a contractor who
built a home for Mr. Ryan in or around 2000, and that Mr. Lapworth approached
him about Ms. Doucet purchasing the home. He testified that his initial intent was
not to sell the home but Ms. Doucet asked for an option to be able to buy the house
“if at some point in time her economic and credit fortunes got better.” Mr. Ryan
agreed to that.
Mr. Ryan testified that he, Ms. Doucet, and his then-attorney Greg St.
Angelo met to execute the Lease agreement. He testified that all parties carefully
reviewed the agreement drafted by Mr. St. Angelo, as evidenced by the fact that
certain portions of the Lease Agreement had been scratched out and initialed as
amended.
Concerning Ms. Doucet’s rental payment history, Mr. Ryan testified that
Ms. Doucet paid the initial $50,000.00 installment, which he testified was pre-paid
3 That judgment is not at issue in this appeal. Mr. Ryan subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment as to the issues of “Breach and Default and Non-Exercise of Option to Purchase by Defendant, Ms. Doucet,” which was subsequently denied. That issue is not before this Court on appeal. 4 That judgment is not challenged in this appeal.
21-CA-32 4 rent that enticed him to agree to lease the property and was a beneficial
requirement to allow Ms. Doucet a lower monthly rental payment; she thereafter
made timely and full payments for approximately 18 months. He testified that,
thereafter, Ms. Doucet would make intermittent payments and, at times, would skip
a few months and then write a larger check to catch up. On two occasions, he
asked his attorney, Mr. St. Angelo, to contact Ms. Doucet to inquire about the
status of her rent payments. Mr. Ryan testified that, during that time frame, Ms.
Doucet had three young children and he was not interested in evicting her but
wanted to inquire as to her plans to catch up on rental payments. He testified that
Ms. Doucet would make promises as to either her father’s intents to help get her
caught up on rent, or that she was awaiting inheritance or additional money from
other sources. He testified that the last payment he received was in July 2012, and
that Ms. Doucet resided in the house but had not made one rental payment in
approximately eight years.5
Mr. Ryan testified that, at the time the Lease was executed, the house was
encumbered with an $80,000.00 mortgage with Hibernia National Bank. In 2007,
after the “mini perm” loan matured, Hibernia would not renew the loan and he had
to renew the loan at Omni Bank, who would approve him. He testified that the
Omni (now Iberia) Bank loan was for a total amount of $65,000.00, less than the
prior $80,000.00 Hibernia mortgage loan. Mr. Ryan testified to his opinion that the
$65,000 mortgage was not in breach of the Lease Addendum because it did not
further encumber the property and, in fact, was a lower amount of debt
encumbering the property than at the time the lease was executed. Further, he
5 Mr. Ryan testified, “even though they weren't done on a timely basis, I really didn't do anything because it was -- she was on schedule for eighteen months. That took us from '02 to about '04, middle of '04. And we all know what happened in '05; so as a result of Katrina, I didn't pursue the payments being four or five months skipped and then all of a sudden brought up. After that time frame, we went to a time frame where there was two years and nine months of no payments; and then I asked a lawyer to talk to her about getting a more payment steady approach. And she indicated to the lawyer that her father was expected to come in to some significant money from a business transaction. And she would be able to bring the lease current.”
21-CA-32 5 testified that Ms. Doucet never confronted him about the mortgage or indicated
that the $65,000.00 mortgage on the property was her reason for non-payment of
rent.
Mr. Ryan testified that he paid the Parish and City of Harahan taxes for the
property, with the exception of one year when he did not receive a notice of taxes
and later found out that Ms. Doucet had paid the taxes that year. Mr. Ryan also
testified that he paid all insurances on the property during the Lease. The parties
stipulated to the amount of taxes and insurances paid during the Lease.
At some point after he retired in 2017, Mr. Ryan retained counsel to attempt
to “put [the property] in commerce” and get a paying tenant for the property to
derive a steady income source. On March 9, 2018, he forwarded a “Notice to
Vacate and Demand Letter” to Ms. Doucet by certified mail, putting her on notice
that she had breached the terms of the Lease and asking her to vacate the premises
within five days. He further outlined the past-due rental payments as well as the
taxes and insurance reimbursements due pursuant to the terms of the lease, totaling
$226,711.98. When asked why he didn’t push the issue of past due rental
payments or insurances sooner than the 2018 eviction notice, Mr. Ryan testified
that he was a very busy businessman buying banks and working until 8:00 p.m. or
later each night. He testified that he owns multiple properties and, “from an
income standpoint, it was a thousand bucks. And it adds up to a lot of money over
time when you don’t pay a long time. But it was not a very significant amount to
my lifestyle at that point in time. And, thirdly, it was Melinda’s kids” who at that
time were growing up in the house and he trusted that she would get caught up.
Melinda Doucet testified at trial that she met Mr. Ryan through a mutual
acquaintance, John Lapworth, the contractor who was hired to do some work at
Mr. Ryan’s personal home in Kenner. She testified that Mr. Lapworth also did
some work at the Imperial Woods house, the property at issue, for Mr. Ryan. Ms.
21-CA-32 6 Doucet testified that she had recently received a $50,000.00 community property
settlement and was going through a divorce, and Mr. Lapworth asked her if she
would be interested in buying the Imperial Woods property. Ms. Doucet testified
that, at the time she executed the Lease, the property had been vacant for
approximately three years and was in “deplorable” condition.
She had only one meeting with Mr. Ryan prior to execution of the lease
agreement. She testified that, at that time, she asked if Mr. Ryan would be
interested in a bond for deed contract, and he replied that he was not interested in
executing a bond for deed but would be agreeable to a long term lease with an
option to purchase.
She testified that she made many improvements to the property prior to
moving in. She estimated that she spent approximately $135,000.00 in
improvements to the home. She testified she put up fencing and millwork on the
exterior of the home and invested approximately $14,000.00 in flooring, $6,200.00
in plumbing repairs, $18,200.00 on kitchen cabinets, $4,200.00 for kitchen
countertops, $6,000 for appliances, and $6,800.00 on the HVAC system, as well as
other renovations to the interior of the home. However, when asked to verify those
improvements or money spent, Ms. Doucet testified that she did not have any
invoices, receipts, or photos to support her position that she had improved the
home significantly.
She testified that Mr. St. Angelo prepared the Lease Agreement and an
Amortization Schedule, which she testified was a reflection of the balance she
would have to pay on the option to purchase based on the length of time passed
and number of lease payments she made.
She testified that she discovered Mr. Ryan allegedly placed a second
mortgage on the property in 2007, which is why she began withholding rental
payments. She acknowledged that she did not confront Mr. Ryan or contact him
21-CA-32 7 about the alleged second mortgage, but rather simply decided to withhold rental
payments. She testified that she “panicked” and didn’t know how to broach the
subject with Mr. Ryan. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that in her
deposition testimony to a similar question, her response as to why she did not make
payments after 2007 was that she “could not think of a specific reason” and further
that her “income was slim.” Counsel further pointed out that the mortgage she
referenced was not executed until November of 2007, but that she stopped making
payments prior to November 2007. She further testified that she never contacted
Hibernia Bank, Omni Bank, Mr. St. Angelo, or Mr. Ryan to inquire how, if at all,
the alleged mortgage would affect her ability to exercise her option to purchase the
property.
Ms. Doucet acknowledged that she did not make lease payments in
accordance with the Lease agreement. She stated however that between 2007 and
2015, neither Mr. Ryan nor anyone on his behalf sent any written demand for
payment or contacted her to inquire about her failure to pay. She stated that she
never spoke to Mr. Ryan about her failure to pay, and that he never informed her
that he would start enforcing the terms of the Lease. She further testified that she
made several late payments, and was never asked to pay a 5% late fee or penalty as
provided for in the Lease. She did recall speaking with Mr. St. Angelo in
approximately 2015. She stated that she told Mr. St. Angelo that she was
anticipating receiving an inheritance in the near future and that she intended to
exercise her option to purchase the home when she received the inheritance. She
testified that she received no further correspondence or communication indicating
that she would be required to make lease payments until the March 9, 2018 letter
stating that she was in default and purporting to terminate the Lease.
Ms. Doucet testified that she cared for an elderly woman, Ms. Carmen
Miller, who donated her home in River Ridge to Ms. Doucet in 2015 and that Ms.
21-CA-32 8 Doucet owned that property at the time of trial. She further testified that Ms.
Miller planned to leave everything to Ms. Doucet upon her death. Ms. Doucet
acknowledged that from the time she received her anticipated inheritance in late
2016 until Mr. Ryan forwarded the March 9, 2018 letter terminating the lease, she
never contacted Mr. Ryan or anyone on his behalf to exercise her option to
purchase the home.6 She further acknowledged that she did not make any monthly
lease payments after she received her inheritance.
Concerning the taxes and insurances paid on the property, Ms. Doucet
testified to her understanding that she was paying a 7% interest on the property
within her lease payments. She pointed to the “Amortization Schedule”7 that was
conducted at the same time as the Lease was executed. It was her understanding
that the Lease payments would cover the taxes and insurance on the property, and
that she would not be separately responsible for the taxes or insurance. She
testified that Mr. Ryan never requested reimbursement for any taxes or insurance
he paid on the property. Further, she testified that in 2018, she received a “Notice
of Tax Sale” on the front door of her home, indicating that the City and Parish
taxes for the previous year had not been paid.8
On April 9, 2018, in response to Mr. Ryan’s March 9, 2018 letter, Ms.
Doucet’s counsel forwarded correspondence to Mr. Ryan’s counsel stating that Mr.
Ryan’s inactions prohibit him from strictly enforcing the terms of the Lease
agreement and further making an offer of $50,000.00 as a “good faith, down
payment…to secure the option, with the remainder of the purchase price to be paid
6 Once questioned about the fact that she did not make any monthly lease payments after late 2016, Ms. Doucet testified that she may not have received the inheritance until 2017. 7 The Amortization schedule reflects 30 years of timely payments to reflect the remaining balance that would be due at any time, should Ms. Doucet exercise her option to purchase. For each $1,131,49 payment, it reflects $978.08 in interest and $183.41 toward the principal. Mr. Ryan, with FirstNBC Bank, testified that he provided this schedule as an example for Ms. Doucet to understand the balance due at any time she decided to exercise her option to purchase the property. The Amortization Scheduled does not reference insurance or taxes. 8 Ms. Doucet testified that at some point, Mr. Ryan’s wife contacted her asking for permission to have an insurance adjuster come to the property to reassess insurances.
21-CA-32 9 to Mr. Ryan upon her securing financing.” On September 18, 2018, Ms. Doucet’s
counsel forwarded correspondence to Mr. Ryan’s counsel offering to purchase the
property for $170,000.00 and formally “exercising the option to acquire the
property for $170,000.00.”
Kenneth Little, Ms. Doucet’s father, testified at trial that he recalled the
property at issue appearing “unlivable” at the time his daughter began leasing the
home. He testified that he and other family members worked on the home for a
period of time to make it livable for Ms. Doucet. He indicated that he spent some
money toward improvements on the home, but could not provide an exact amount.
He indicated that he never knew if his daughter purchased the home or leased the
home from Mr. Ryan.
On September 8, 2020, the trial court issued the judgment on appeal, finding
that the Lease between the parties terminated on March 9, 2018, and awarding
damages in the amount of $141,320.47 in favor of Mr. Ryan and against Ms.
Doucet ($84,352.58 in past due rent, $1,501.45 in property taxes, and $73,958.44
in insurances). The judgment further granted in part Ms. Doucet’s reconventional
demand, finding she is entitled to a credit in the amount of $18,492.00 for rent
paid.9 The judgment further ordered that Ms. Doucet vacate the premises at 116
Imperial Woods.
Ms. Doucet has suspensively appealed the trial court’s September 8, 2020
judgment. On appeal, Ms. Doucet asserts that the trial court erred in finding that
the Lease was properly terminated on March 9, 2018, and in failing to find that Ms.
Doucet timely exercised her option to purchase the property. Ms. Doucet further
contends that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Ryan damages in the amount of
$141,320.47, asserting that under the facts of this case, various equitable doctrines,
9 The judgment dismissed with prejudice all remaining claims of Ms. Doucet’s reconventional demand and stated that the judgment is a final and appealable judgment.
21-CA-32 10 including laches and abuse of rights, should apply. Finally, Ms. Doucet contends
that the trial court erred in dismissing her reconventional demand and in failing to
award her damages for improvements she alleges she made to the property.
Mr. Ryan has filed an Answer to the appeal, contending that the trial court
erred in failing to award attorney’s fees pursuant to the Lease agreement. For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment insofar as it awards past due
rental payments, taxes, and insurances, but amend it to delete the reimbursement of
taxes and insurances paid for the years 2003-2007, which the trial court previously
determined had prescribed. We further find that the trial court erred in failing to
award reasonable attorney fees as set forth in the Lease agreement, and remand this
matter to the trial court for a determination of that issue.
DISCUSSION
A lease is a synallagmatic contract by which one party, the lessor, binds
himself to give to the other party, the lessee, the use and enjoyment of a thing for a
term in exchange for a rent that the lessee binds himself to pay. La. C.C. art. 2668.
The essential elements of a lease are the thing, the price, or rent, and consent of the
parties. Bayou Fleet P'ship v. Phillip Fam., LLC, 11-924 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/27/12),
91 So.3d 1112, 1115. The Civil Code sets forth that if a lessee fails to pay rent, the
lessor may dissolve the lease in accordance with the law. La. C.C. art. 2704.
An option to buy is a contract whereby a party gives to another the right to accept
an offer to buy a thing within a stipulated time. An option must set forth the thing
and the price, and meet the formal requirements of the sale it contemplates. La.
C.C. art. 2620.
An option is nothing more than an elective right that, when exercised, ripens
into a binding contract to buy and sell. Monroe Real Estate & Development Co.,
Inc. v. Sunshine Equip. Co. Inc., 35,555 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/23/02), 805 So.2d 1200,
1203; Major Commodity Corp. v. Cunningham, 555 So.2d 525, 527 (La. App. 4
21-CA-32 11 Cir. 1989). In order to invoke a sale under an option to buy, not only must the
option to buy be evidenced by a written instrument but the unqualified acceptance
thereof must be evidenced in writing, giving full recognition and in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the proposal, and formally exercised and tendered
to the proposer prior to the expiration date of the stipulated time. Rushing v.
Glover, 46,980 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/12), 91 So.3d 1169, 1172, writ denied, 12-
1071 (La. 9/12/12), 98 So.3d 310.
On appeal, Ms. Doucet first argues that the March 9, 2018 notice to vacate
the premises was “premature” and could not operate to terminate the parties’ Lease
Agreement because “prior to March 2018, Ryan neither demanded payment of the
monthly rental installments, insurance premiums nor property taxes in strict
compliance with the terms of the Agreement.” On appeal, Ms. Doucet argues that
because Mr. Ryan did not strictly enforce collection of rent, he was required to first
place her on notice that he intended to strictly enforce the terms of the Agreement,
i.e., begin collecting rent, before he could terminate the Lease.
In support of her argument, Ms. Doucet cites Housing Authority of Town of
Lake Providence v. Allen, 486 So.2d 1064 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986) and Housing
Authority of St. John the Baptist Parish v. Shepherd, 447 So.2d 1232, 1235 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 1984), which held that “where a lessor customarily accepts rental
payments after the date on which they are due, such ‘custom’ by acquiescence of
the parties has the effect of altering the original contract with respect to punctuality
of rent payments.” While we agree that routine acceptance of late lease payments
may waive the right to hastily evict for a tenant’s failure to timely pay, the
jurisprudence reflects that this principle does not apply to non-payment of rent.
See O'Keefe v. Breaux Mart Gen. Meyers, Inc., 499 So.2d 598, 602 (La. App. 5
Cir. 1986), writ denied, 503 So.2d 22 (La. 1987). This Court has found that a
“lessor’s silence or inaction does not waive his right to receive the rent due.” Id.
21-CA-32 12 We find it absurd to hold that Mr. Ryan was required to notify Ms. Doucet that he
intended to begin collecting rent before he could terminate the Lease after eight
years of nonpayment. Whether there is an oral agreement that modified a written
contract is a question of fact and we cannot say that the trial court’s factual
determination that the parties did not modify the Lease by their actions or inactions
was manifestly erroneous. Wechem, Inc. v. Evans, 18-743 (La. App. 5 Cir.
5/30/19), 274 So. 3d 877, 888, writ denied, 19-01176 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So.3d
600. This assignment of error has no merit.10
Ms. Doucet next contends that the trial court erred in ordering her to vacate
the property and in failing to find that she timely exercised her option to purchase
the property. In support of her argument, Ms. Doucet points to the provision in the
Lease Addendum which provides that she can exercise her option to purchase the
property “at any time.” Therefore, she asserts that either her April 2018 letter,
wherein she offered to pay a “good faith” $50,000.00 deposit and to pay the
remainder at a later date upon obtaining financing, or her September 18, 2018
correspondence wherein her counsel specifically states, “my client is exercising the
option to acquire the property for $170,000[,]” is sufficient to exercise her option
to purchase.
First, the “at any time” language contained in the Lease Addendum is
prohibited by law. The “Louisiana Civil Code requires that an option must state a
stipulated time within which it must be exercised.” Mayne & Mertz, Inc. v. Quest
Expl., L.L.C., 401 Fed. App’x 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2010), citing La. C.C. art. 2620,
10 For the same reasons, we find Ms. Doucet’s claims under the discretionary judicial equitable doctrines of laches and abuse of rights are without merit. The abuse of right doctrine and other equitable doctrines are applied in very limited circumstances. Cases which have applied judicial control of leases generally involve circumstances where a lessee had made a good faith error and acted reasonably to correct it. See Carriere v. Bank of La., 95–3058 (La.12/13/96), 702 So.2d 648, 655 (holding that the judicial control is an equitable doctrine by which the courts will deny cancellation of the lease when the lessee’s breach is of minor importance, is caused by no fault of his own, or is based on a good faith mistake of fact). We find that Ms. Doucet, who failed to pay any rental payments under the lease for a period of more than eight years, cannot seek relief under these equitable doctrines.
21-CA-32 13 cmt. (c) (“Under this Article, an option for a perpetual or indefinite term is null.”).
Second, we find that although the “at any time” language could be interpreted to
mean at any time during the term of the Lease, we find no error in the trial court’s
determination that the Lease at issue terminated on March 9, 2018, prior to Ms.
Doucet’s attempt to exercise her option. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s
determination that any subsequent offer to purchase the property was untimely.
Ms. Doucet next contends that the trial court erred in awarding the total
amount of $141,320.47 in damages ($84,352.58 in past due lease/rent payments,
$1,501.45 in property taxes, and $73,958.44 in insurances). First she complains
that the $84,352.58 in past due rental payments should be reduced, asserting that
the parties stipulated to the amount of $66,531.61 as of the date of trial. We find
this argument lacks merit. Although the record reflects that at the conclusion of
trial, the parties informed the trial judge that they had “prepared jointly an Excel
spreadsheet that weighed out the insurance payments and the tax payments,” there
was no such stipulation on the record or any joint statement presented concerning
the past due rental payments. The record reflects that the stipulated amounts were
to insurance and taxes only, as the invoices and bills introduced into evidence were
not all legible. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Concerning past due rental payments, the trial judge’s calculations for past
due rent are those set forth in Mr. Ryan’s post-trial memorandum, which limits the
claim to three years prior to the demand. The accepted calculations total
$34,453.84 for past due rent from November 2, 2015, through March 31, 2018.11
After the date of termination of the lease in March 2018, the total outstanding
rental obligation from April 1, 2018 through date of trial totals $49,898.71. The
trial court applied the “Tenant Holding Over Provision” in the Lease, which
Mr. Ryan’s calculations provided: $1,131.49 rent+ $56.57 late fee =$1,188.06 x 29 months from 11
November 2015 through March 2018.
21-CA-32 14 provided that should the tenant fail to surrender possession of the property after
termination of the lease, the month-to-month rental payments would be 150% of
the monthly payment under the Lease. Given that the undisputed testimony at trial
reflects that Ms. Doucet failed to surrender possession of the property after
termination of the Lease through the date of trial and continued to fail to make any
rental payments during that time frame, we find no error in the trial court’s
application of this Lease provision.12 Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
court’s calculation of past due rental payments.13
As to insurance and tax reimbursements, Ms. Doucet contends that the trial
court erred in awarding reimbursement for all taxes and insurances paid by Mr.
Ryan since lease inception, where the court previously sustained her exception of
prescription as to reimbursement claims more than ten years prior to date of
demand. This argument has merit. The trial court previously sustained Ms.
Doucet’s exception of prescription as to Mr. Ryan’s reimbursement claims, finding
that such claims were subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. Accordingly, we
find that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Ryan the amounts paid in taxes or
insurances for the years 2003-2007, more than ten years from the date of demand.
We therefore amend the judgment to award Ms. Doucet a $8,312.83 credit as to the
insurance reimbursement claim and a $2,919.83 credit as to the tax reimbursement
claim, reducing the total amount of damages by $11,232.66. The judgment is
hereby amended to reflect a total award of $130,087.81, subject to the $18,492.00
credit the trial court granted to Ms. Doucet for prepaid rental payments and not
challenged on appeal.
12 The calculations provided by Mr. Ryan for the time period after termination of the Lease is as follows: $1,188.06 total monthly rental obligation x 150% = $1,782.10 x 28 months. 13 We further find no error in the trial court’s decision not to apply any credit for Ms. Doucet’s initial installment payment of $50,000.00 under the Lease toward her past due rental payments. Mr. Ryan testified that the $50,000.00 payment enticed him to offer the option to purchase and the Lease specifically provides that the Tenant forfeits all payments should Tenant fail to timely exercise her option to purchase.
21-CA-32 15 Finally, Ms. Doucet contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her
reconventional demand and in denying her reimbursement claim for alleged
improvements made to the property. In her reconventional demand, Ms. Doucet
alleged that she invested nearly $200,000.00 in improvements to the property at
issue. At trial, Ms. Doucet testified that the property was in “deplorable” condition
at the time the parties executed the Lease and that she made various improvements
to the property that she estimates cost her more than $135,000.00. She testified
that she renovated the kitchen to install new cabinetry, countertops, and appliances,
as well as performed other renovations to the plumbing system and other
improvements. However, at trial, Ms. Doucet did not introduce into evidence any
invoices or receipts for materials or work performed on the property. She failed to
introduce any photographs into evidence to show the condition of the home at the
inception of the Lease or at the time of trial, easily available to Ms. Doucet who
was still living in the home at the time of trial. Based on the lack of evidence
presented concerning Ms. Doucet’s reimbursement claims for alleged
improvements made to the property, we cannot say that the trial court was
manifestly erroneous in dismissing those claims.
ANSWER TO THE APPEAL
Mr. Ryan has filed an Answer to the appeal, contending that the trial court
erred in failing to award attorney fees to the prevailing party, as provided for in the
Lease contract. The Lease at issue provides: “Tenant expressly agrees to
reimburse Landlord for any expenses, including counsel fees, Landlord may incur
in enforcing the latter’s rights against Tenant under this lease, including, but
not limited to, the collection of rent and the securing of possession [] of the
Property.” We find this argument has merit and we remand this matter to the trial
court for a hearing to determine an award of reasonable attorney fees in this case.
21-CA-32 16 DECREE
For the reasons provided herein, we affirm the trial court judgment awarding
Mr. Ryan’s claims for past due rental payments in addition to his reimbursement
claims for paid taxes and insurances as provided for in the Lease executed between
the parties. Because we find the trial court erred in awarding reimbursement for
taxes and insurances paid from 2003-2007, previously determined to be prescribed,
we amend the judgment to reflect an additional credit of $11,232.66 to Ms.
Doucet.14 In all other respects, the trial court judgment is affirmed and this matter
is remanded to the trial court for determination of reasonable attorney fees.
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
14 This is in addition to the $18,492.00 credit awarded in the September 8, 2020 judgment to Ms. Doucet for prepaid rental payments.
21-CA-32 17 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
NANCY F. VEGA FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK HANS J. LILJEBERG JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
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