Ashlock v. Dumaine

Maine Superior

Ashlock v. Dumaine

DecidedMay 30, 2008

DocketKENcv-07-345

StatusUnpublished

This text of Ashlock v. Dumaine (Ashlock v. Dumaine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ashlock v. Dumaine, (Me. Super. Ct. 2008).

Pincite

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss CIVIL ACTION , DOCKET NQ. CV-W-345 1Ijf) - KE- N--- >-- / / ' ~I -) .'

JERRY ASHLOCK, and BARBARA NICCOLI-HILTZ and RODNEY HILTZ, individually and as next friends of JANE DOE

Plaintiffs

v. DECISION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER 1. DUMAINE

Defendant

Plaintiffs Jerry Ashlock (Jane Doe's father), Barbara Niccoli-Hiltz (Jane Doe's

mother), and Rodney Hiltz (Jane Doe's stepfather) have filed a complaint against the

defendant and 'seek damages as individuals and as next friends of Jane Doe for

negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages. The defendant moves pursuant to

M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the individual claims of these plaintiffs.

On this motion to dismiss, the court treats as admitted the material allegations of

the complaint. Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882,885 (Me. 1995). The question for the

court is whether those allegations create a legally sufficient claim upon which relief can

be granted. Id. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in

part.

1. Count I: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

There is no general duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm to others.

Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, <[ 18, 784 A.2d 18, 25. The Law Court has "recognized a duty to act reasonably to avoid emotional harm to others in very limited circumstances:

first, in claims commonly referred to as bystander liability actions; and second, in

circumstances in which a special relationship exists between the actor and the person

emotionally harmed." Id. CJI 19, 784 A.2d at 25.

The scope of the duty in parent bystander liability cases is limited to those

situations in which parents actually witness their child receiving an injury. Cameron v.

Pepin, 610 A.2d 279,284 (Me. 1992). The plaintiffs argue that this case is distinguishable

from Cameron and Curtis because the ongoing sexual relationship between the

defendant and their daughter made them witnesses to the ongoing harms incurred by

their daughter. There is no basis on which to extend the explicit requirement that

parents actually witness the child receiving the injury. While these parents may have

been subjected to witnessing the day-to-day harm of the injury, they did not witness

their daughter receiving the injury itself.

Alternatively, plaintiffs must establish that defendant, as the educator of their

daughter, is under a general obligation for their benefit as parents. Brian R. v.

Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of NY, Inc., 1999 ME 144, CJI 11, 738 A.2d 839, 844.

Plaintiffs note that Brian R. dealt with liability of a third party church, not the

perpetrator, and rely instead on Rowe v. Bennett. That case, however, concerns the

person harmed and not the parents of the person harmed. Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d

802, 807 (Me. 1986). In the absence of case law to the contrary, a teacher has no general

obligation to the parents of his student to avoid negligently causing them emotional

harm.

II. Count II: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order to be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) defendant

must have intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress to the parents

2 or must have been certain or substantially certain that such distress to the parents

would result from his conduct; (2) the conduct must be "so extreme and outrageous as

to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, utterly

intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) defendant's actions must cause the parents

emotional distress; and (4) the parents emotional distress must be "so severe that no

reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Curtis, <[ 10, 784 A.2d at 22-23

(quoting Champagne v. Mid-Maine Medical Center, 1998 ME 87, CJI IS, 711 A.2d 842, 847

(articulating the standard on a summary judgment motion)). The defendant argues

that there are no allegations that he engaged in sexual acts with plaintiffs' daughter

with the intent to cause them emotional distress or was certain or substantially certain

that such distress to the parents would occur because of his actions.

The plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. This

court cannot say beyond doubt that the plaintiffs are entitled to no relief under any set

of facts they might prove in support of count II. See Hall v. Board of Environmental

Protection, 498 A.2d 260, 266 (Me. 1985); Champagne, <[CJI 15-16, 711 A.2d at 847.

III. Count II: Breach of Fiduciary Duty

[B]ecause the law does not generally require individuals to act for the benefit of others, the factual foundations of an alleged fiduciary relationship must be pled with specificity. Simple recitations of a trusting relationship will not suffice for identifying a fiduciary duty. In brder to survive a motion to dismiss a clam for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts constituting the alleged relationship with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine whether, if true, such facts could give rise to a fiduciary relationship.

Brian R., CJI 21, 738 A.2d at 846-47. Maine law has not recognized that a teacher owes a

fiduciary duty to the parents of his student. There are no facts alleged that could give

rise to a fiduciary relationship in this case.

3 IV. Count I: Punitive Damages

The plaintiffs argue that defendant's actions were "so outrageous" that malice

against them as injured parties can be implied and an award of punitive damages is

available. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985). This determination is

fact specific. Based on the allegations in count II, the court cannot conclude that the

plaintiffs are entitled to no relief based on any set of facts they might prove. Hall, 498

A.2d at 266.

The entry is

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiffs Jerry Ashlock, Barbara Niccoli-Hiltz, and Rodney Hiltz's individual claims in Counts I and III of Plaintiffs' Complaint are DISMISSED.

Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against Plaintiffs Jerry Ashlock, Barbara Niccoli-Hiltz, and Rodney Hiltz on their individual claims in Counts I and III.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Jerry Ashlock, Barbara Niccoli-Hiltz, and Rodney Hiltz's individual claims in Counts II and IV is DENIED.

•

Date: May 30, 2008 ancy Mills Justice, Superior Court

4 JERRY ASHLOCK - PLAINTIFF OBO SUPERIOR COURT 149 NORTH MAINE STREET KENNEBEC, ss. NORTH MONMOUTH ME 04265 Docket No AUGSC-CV-2007-00345 Attorney for: JERRY ASHLOCK MICHELLE ALLOTT - RETAINED 11/26/2007 FARRIS LAW, P.A. DOCKET RECORD 251 WATER STREET PO BOX 120 GARDINER ME 04345-0120

BARBARA NICCOLI-HILTZ - PLAINTIFF OBO 83 RED TOP DRIVE MONMOUTH ME 04259 RODNEY HILTZ - PLAINTIFF aBO 83 RED TOP DRIVE MONMOUTH ME 04259

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