Ashley Menwer, Plaintiff v. School Administrative Unit #15, and School Administrative Unit #37, Defendants

2022 DNH 033

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: March 16, 2022
• Docket: 20-cv-716-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ashley Menwer, Plaintiff Case No. 20-cv-716-SM v. Opinion No. 2022 DNH 033

School Administrative Unit #15, and School Administrative Unit #37, Defendants

O R D E R

On June 19, 2020, Ashley Menwer, proceeding pro se, filed

suit against defendants School Administrative Units (“SAU”) 15

and 37, asserting claims that arise from her minor child’s

enrollment in those school districts.

For a case still in its infancy, the procedural history is

somewhat complicated. Shortly after filing her complaint,

Menwer filed a motion to amend (document no. 2), which was

granted on July 24, 2020. Menwer then moved to amend her

complaint again on September 9, 2020. On September 21, 2020,

defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),

and concurrently filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement.

See Documents No. 15, 16. Defendants also objected to Menwer’s

motion to amend, arguing that the most recently amended version

of the complaint failed to comply with the court’s rules

1 regarding amendment of pleadings, and suffered from the same

deficiencies as Menwer’s earlier pleadings.

On September 22, 2020, the magistrate judge granted

Menwer’s motion to amend. On December 15, 2020, the court

denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, without prejudice, and

denied the motion for a more definite statement as moot.

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of that denial on

December 23, 2020. That motion was denied on January 21, 2021,

but the court noted that the record was “certainly confused with

respect to what relief plaintiff is seeking and on what legal

basis.” Accordingly, the court scheduled a status conference

with the magistrate judge.

Following that conference, the magistrate judge ordered

Menwer to file a new complaint, or, in the alternative, to

notify the court that she intended her previous filings as the

operative complaint. Menwer was instructed that any newly filed

amended complaint must “clearly indicate: (1) the defendants

being sued; (2) the legal theories or statute(s) under which

each defendant is being sued; and (3) the facts related to each

defendant.” Document No. 36. Menwer was encouraged to consult

the court’s pro se guide, specifically, its description of a

complaint’s requirements.

2 On May 3, 2021, Menwer filed a fourth complaint (document

no. 37). On May 17, 2021, Defendants again moved to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See Document No. 38. The

magistrate judge issued an order on July 1, 2021, noting a

“threshold issue” concerning representation: because Menwer is a

pro se litigant, and not an attorney, her claims brought on

behalf of anyone but herself, including her minor child, E.M.,

were improper. See Document No. 41, p. 2. Menwer was allowed

another opportunity to amend her complaint to state claims only

on her own behalf.

Menwer filed a fifth complaint on September 10, 2021. 1 The

SAUs have again moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), and contend that, despite considerable effort, they are

unable to determine what claims Menwer is asserting against

which defendant, the relief she is seeking for each claim, and

what facts she is relying on for each claim. Defendants quite

reasonably argue that they “should not be put in the position of

guessing or assuming what Ms. Menwer might be alleging or trying

to allege in order to ascertain whether or not she has

sufficiently pleaded the elements of any particular claim.”

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1-2.

1 That filing mooted defendant’s earlier motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint (document no.38).

3 Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint “must contain ... a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The rule

further requires that each allegation in the complaint be

“simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); see

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (requiring each numbered paragraph to

be “limited as far as practicable to a single set of

circumstances”).

“A district court may dismiss a complaint that fails to

comply with Rule 8’s ‘short and plain statement’ requirement.”

Currier v. Town of Gilmanton, No. 18-CV-1204-LM, 2019 WL

3779580, at *2 (D.N.H. Aug. 12, 2019) (quoting Kuehl v.

F.D.I.C., 8 F.3d 905, 908 (1st Cir. 1993)). While “verbosity

and length are generally insufficient grounds for dismissal,

complaints that are ‘unnecessarily lengthy, repetitive,

convoluted, or otherwise difficult to comprehend may be

dismissed.’” Id. (quoting Chalifoux v. Chalifoux, No. 14-CV-

136-SM, 2014 WL 1681626, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 2014)). “In

evaluating whether a pleading meets Rule 8’s ‘short and plain

statement’ requirement, the court should consider ‘the nature of

the action, the relief sought and a number of other pragmatic

matters.’” Id. (quoting Carney v. Town of Weare, No. 15-CV-291-

LM, 2016 WL 320128, at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 26, 2016) (internal

quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).

4 “The purpose of a clear and succinct pleading is to give a

defendant fair notice of the claim and its basis as well as to

provide an opportunity for a cogent answer and defense.”

Belanger v. BNY Mellon Asset Mgmt., LLC, 307 F.R.D. 55, 57 (D.

Mass. 2015). See also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 1281 (4th ed.) (“Unnecessary

prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the

district judge and the party who must respond to it because they

are forced to ferret out the relevant material from a mass of

verbiage.”).

In opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, the

plaintiff argues that, as a pro se litigant, her pleadings must

be construed liberally. But, while pro se submissions are

entitled to liberal construction, “pro se litigants are not

exempt from . . . basic pleading standards.” Barricello v. Bank

of Am., N.A., No. CV 18-10398-LTS, 2019 WL 1333271, at *3 (D.

Mass. Mar. 25, 2019). And, even given the most generous

reading, Menwer’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8’s

requirements. The complaint is neither “short and plain,” nor

are its allegations “simple, concise, and direct.”

As noted in the magistrate judge’s July 1, 2021, order,

Menwer seems to be asserting claims under the Individuals with

Disabilities Act (IDEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act

5 (ADA), and Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Her

complaint also references the Rehabilitation Act, as well as

“religious harassment.” See, e.g., Document No. 44, p. 8.

Riddled with typos and misspellings, her most recent complaint

alleges that she is aggrieved by the “New [Hampshire] Department

of Education [Hearing] [Decision]” (document no. 44, p. 3). She

also lists various federal acts and regulations that she

contends defendants violated, including “ANY UNKNOWN Procedural

and Substantive Safeguards per the Individuals with Disabilities

Act (“IDEA”).” Document No. 44, p. 5. Moreover, entire

sections of Menwer’s complaint are largely incomprehensible, as

the complaint is replete with inappropriate legal argument and

citations, and incoherent allegations, all of which make it

difficult to discern whether any of Menwer’s apparent claims are

supported by any factual basis. Attempting to “construe” this

complaint would be in reality to create it, a role the court

cannot assume.

Further confusing matters is that Menwer refers to herself

in her complaint as “The PL.” (see, e.g., id., p. 8), but also

refers to her minor son, E.M., as “the PL.” (see, e.g., id., p.

6 (referencing “the PL. educational placement”)). That practice

not only contributes to the complaint’s general

incomprehensibility, but also brings into question Menwer’s

compliance with the magistrate judge’s earlier instruction that,

6 as a pro se litigant, Menwer can only allege claims on her own

behalf. 2

Those paragraphs that do specifically pertain to Menwer

fail to clearly and plainly allege how, or when, or by whom she

was, for example, denied access, or discriminated against as a

result of her disability. It is particularly difficult to

discern what potentially relevant facts are alleged by

plaintiff, or the legal bases for the claims she has asserted

based upon those facts. And, as a practical matter, responding

to plaintiff’s complaint would also be particularly difficult,

given the complaint’s structure: Menwer fails to comply with

Fed. Rule Civil Pro. 10(b). The complaint’s paragraphs are

numbered sporadically, inconsistently, and often not at all.

Nor are the complaint’s paragraphs limited to a single set of

circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Accordingly, it would be

“unreasonable to expect defendants to frame a response to it.”

Sayied v. White, 89 Fed. Appx. 284 (1st Cir. 2004).

“Dismissal [for noncompliance with Rule 8] is usually

reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused,

ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true

2 Menwer’s compliance with the July 1, 2021, order is further undermined by her multiple allegations referencing harm to E.M. as a result of purported religious harassment and bullying.

7 substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. (quoting Salahuddin

v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)). Menwer’s complaint

falls squarely within that category, despite Menwer having been

given multiple opportunities to amend her complaint to comply

with federal pleading requirements. Because the Amended

Complaint does not comply Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2)’s pleading

requirements, defendants’ motion to dismiss (document no. 45) is

necessarily GRANTED. 3 4 And, because plaintiff has been afforded

numerous opportunities to amend, but has failed to correct the

complaint’s identified deficiencies, the case is DISMISSED, with

prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

March 16, 2022

cc: Counsel of Record

3 As discussed herein, defendants’ motion to dismiss an earlier version of plaintiff’s complaint (document no. 38) is DENIED as moot. 4 Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 47) that is equally obtuse and indecipherable, failing in large measure for the same reasons she has failed to state cognizable claims upon which relief might be granted. That motion (document no. 47) is DENIED as moot in light of the disposition of the motions to dismiss.