Ashley Jane Rathjen v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: April 26, 2023
• Docket: 21-1609
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1609 Filed April 26, 2023

ASHLEY JANE RATHJEN, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah Crane, Judge.

Ashley Rathjen appeals the denial of her application for postconviction

relief. AFFIRMED.

Ronald William Kepford, Winterset, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2

VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

Ashley Rathjen was charged with crimes in two separate cases. In each of

the cases, she pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance

(methamphetamine) with intent to deliver as a second or subsequent offender.

The district court simultaneously sentenced her to prison terms not exceeding

twenty-five years in the first case and thirty years in the second case, with the

obligation to serve a one-third mandatory minimum. The court ordered the

sentences served consecutively, “for a total not to exceed 55 years.” The court of

appeals affirmed Rathjen’s conviction and preserved her ineffective-assistance-of-

counsel claims for postconviction relief. See State v. Rathjen, No. 17-1606, 2018

WL 5291330, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2018).

Rathjen filed a postconviction-relief application raising several claims. The

parties agreed to submit the case to the court on the exhibits, without the need for

an evidentiary hearing. At an abbreviated non-testimonial hearing, Rathjen’s

postconviction attorney limited the issue for decision to her plea attorneys’ failure

to adequately communicate plea offers to her. In particular, Rathjen claimed the

State offered her a plea providing for a maximum prison term of thirty years for

both offenses.

The postconviction court concluded Rathjen did not establish “counsel

failed to correctly inform [Rathjen] of any plea offers.” The court further rejected

Rathjen’s assertion that her plea attorneys had an obligation to inform her the

thirty-year plea offer “was the best offer she would get,” reasoning “defense

counsel didn’t and couldn’t have known the answer to that.” The court denied the

postconviction-relief application. 3

On appeal, Rathjen argues she “was never told about the expiration of” the

plea offer with “a 30 year sentence.” In her view, the record indicates “the 30-year

offer was at a minimum open for a significant amount of time in the case” and it

was “unreasonable to expect [her] to clearly understand her options as a defendant

uneducated regarding laws and criminal proceedings.” Rathjen had to establish

deficient performance and prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687–88 (1984); see also Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2022).

Rathjen did not offer deposition testimony from the attorney who

represented her at the time of the claimed thirty-year offer. While she did depose

her second attorney, that attorney testified there were no outstanding plea offers

when she entered the case. She pointed to a status conference order

documenting the absence of any offers. She further stated, if there had been a

plea offer with an expiration date, she “would have told” Rathjen. When Rathjen

later asked her if they could “get that 30-year offer back,” the attorney told her,

“[N]o,” “[t]he best we can do is argue” for a 30-year sentence. The attorney was

confident Rathjen understood the earlier thirty-year plea offer was not on the table

at the time she ultimately pled guilty.

The plea and sentencing transcripts corroborate counsel’s deposition

testimony. The district court provided detailed explanations of the maximum

sentences in both cases. Following the explanations, the court twice asked

Rathjen if she understood the potential penalties as explained. The first time,

Rathjen responded, “I do now that you’ve said them, yes.” She responded in a

similar fashion the second time. She did not express a belief that any prior plea

offers were extant nor did she question the court’s pronouncement of a fifty-five 4

rather than thirty-year term. Her responses undercut her later assertion in a

deposition that she was “so confused and very uneducated” about what was

happening at the guilty plea hearing. In the same deposition, she made it clear

that she had no intention of accepting the “thirty-year” plea offer at the time it was

offered because the mandatory minimum term seemed too long and she was

hoping for a “better deal”—a deal that counsel could not have predicted would

materialize. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (requiring applicants

to establish they “would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been

afforded effective assistance of counsel” and that “the plea would have been

entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it,

if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law”).

On our de novo review, we conclude Rathjen failed to establish deficient

performance by either of her plea attorneys, or prejudice. We affirm the denial of

her postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED.