RENDERED: JULY 2, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2024-CA-1163-MR
ASHLEY FERREIRAS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MARY K. MALLOY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CR-00769
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EASTON, A. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: Ashley Ferreiras appeals from the trial court’s judgment
sentencing her to a term of eighteen months in prison following her conviction at a
jury trial. After our review of the facts and the law, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
During the late evening of May 4, 2023, Officers Fritsch and Ullrich
were working a patrol shift as police officers for the City of Covington. Officer Fritsch was a relatively new hire by the Covington Police Department, and Officer
Ullrich was accompanying him that evening as his traffic enforcement field
training officer. The two officers were on patrol in a marked police cruiser when,
shortly before midnight, Officer Fritsch observed a sport utility vehicle (SUV) with
one headlight out, an equipment violation.1 The officers followed the SUV on to
Nancy Street, intending to conduct a routine traffic stop for the violation, when
they noticed the SUV had already pulled over to the curb. The officers parked,
exited the cruiser, and approached the SUV. As they did so, they noticed the smell
of marijuana wafting from the vehicle.
When Officer Fritsch collected the driver’s information, he saw a
number of issues which required further investigation. The SUV driver did not
possess registration information or insurance for the vehicle. Additionally,
although the driver possessed a valid license with no outstanding warrants, the
license was issued by the state of Arizona, even though the driver stated he was
currently a Kentucky resident residing on Nancy Street.2 In addition to these
issues, Officer Fritsch called dispatch with the vehicle’s information, and he
learned that the Ohio plate on the vehicle was registered to a BMW, and the SUV
was not a BMW.
1 Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 189.040. 2 Under KRS 186.435, a licensed driver moving to Kentucky must apply for a Kentucky driver’s license within thirty days.
-2- As Officer Fritsch was conducting this investigation, Officer Ullrich
heard a woman, later identified as Ferreiras, yelling at him from an adjacent
building’s second-story window. Officer Ullrich would later testify that this
incident caught his attention for two reasons. First, bystanders do not normally
insert themselves into routine traffic stops. Second, the woman in the window
appeared to be topless.3 Shortly thereafter, Officer Ullrich observed that Ferreiras,
now clothed, had emerged from the home on crutches, with a bandaged foot, and
began crossing her fenced yard toward the parked vehicles. It so happened that
Ferreiras was the paramour of the SUV driver, she had been waiting for him to
return home, and she had observed the flashing lights from the cruiser coming
through her window.
As Ferreiras crossed the yard and approached her gate, Officer Ullrich
informed her that she was not welcome at his stop, and he repeatedly ordered her
to go back to her yard, behind the gate. Ferreiras did not comply and began
arguing with Officer Ullrich. Officer Ullrich later testified that she smelled of stale
beer and appeared to have slurred speech and glassy eyes. Ferreiras’s brother had
also emerged from the house, but two other officers on bicycles had arrived as
support, and they warned Ferreiras’s brother to return to the yard. Unlike
Ferreiras, her brother complied with the officers’ instructions.
3 At trial, Ferreiras vigorously denied that she was unclothed at the time of this incident.
-3- Meanwhile, Ferreiras continued to argue with Officer Ullrich instead
of returning to her yard. Officer Ullrich offered Ferreiras the choice of either
returning to her yard or going to jail. When she did not comply, Officer Ullrich
stated that she was now under arrest. By this time, Officer Fritsch had returned
from the cruiser to aid Officer Ullrich. The two officers approached Ferreiras to
remove her crutches, because she would need to be handcuffed and placed inside
the cruiser. Officer Ullrich also believed that the crutches posed a potential hazard
to officer safety if Ferreiras decided to use them as bludgeoning weapons.
The attempt to remove Ferreiras’s crutches led to a scuffle between
Ferreiras and the two officers. As Officer Fritsch removed one crutch and tried to
support her weight, Ferreiras responded by elbowing him in the nose. This act
broke Officer Fritsch’s eyeglasses and knocked them off of his face. The blow
also simultaneously led to Officer Fritsch losing his hold on Ferreiras. This sudden
lack of support resulted in the three individuals losing their balance and tumbling
to the ground. A brief but vicious altercation ensued. Ferreiras fought as the
officers were putting her in handcuffs, kicking Officer Ullrich and biting his
forearm. Officer Ullrich later admitted that he responded to the bite by punching
Ferreiras in the head. The officers then gained control of Ferreiras’s arms,
handcuffed her, and placed her in the cruiser. As the officers tried to close the
cruiser’s door, Ferreiras kicked it open, causing the door to nearly strike Officer
-4- Ullrich in the process. Eventually, the officers were able to securely shut the car
door with Ferreiras inside.
After Ferreiras was in custody, the officers were able to return to their
traffic stop. The incident with Ferreiras had delayed the business of the stop by
about ten minutes. The SUV driver was cited for the traffic violations and
released. The SUV itself was impounded. Ferreiras’s brother, who stayed in the
yard as directed, was not cited or charged with an offense. For Ferreiras, however,
the incident had more severe consequences. The Kenton County grand jury
indicted Ferreiras on two counts of third-degree assault,4 one count of third-degree
criminal mischief,5 and obstructing an emergency responder.6
Several weeks before trial, Ferreiras filed a civil suit pursuant to 42
United States Code (“U.S.C.”) § 1983 against the City of Covington, Officer
Fritsch, and Officer Ullrich, alleging excessive force and deprivation of her rights
under the United States Constitution. The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine
to prohibit references to Ferreiras’s injuries or the federal civil suit at trial, arguing
4 KRS 508.025, a Class D felony. 5 KRS 512.040, at that time a Class B misdemeanor. The General Assembly recently repealed KRS 512.040 when it recodified the criminal mischief offenses. Previously, third-degree criminal mischief covered property damage amounting to less than $500.00. The General Assembly has amended the statutes so that first-degree criminal mischief applies to property damage of $500.00 or more, second-degree criminal mischief is for damage less than $500.00, and third-degree criminal mischief no longer exists. See 2024 Ky. Acts ch. 174 §§ 10, 11, 54. (effective Jul. 15, 2024). 6 KRS 525.015, a violation for a first offense.
-5- such testimony or evidence was not relevant, could confuse the issues, or could
mislead the jury. Further, the Commonwealth argued that references to the civil
suit lacked probative value outweighing the danger of undue prejudice. Ferreiras
argued that she had the right to introduce evidence from the civil suit for
impeachment value or to explore bias regarding Officer Ullrich’s testimony. The
trial court heard arguments and granted the Commonwealth’s motion, ruling that
the civil suit matter involved mere allegations and were not relevant unless the
“door was opened” in some fashion.
The trial court conducted a three-day trial ending on June 27, 2024.
The jury heard narrative testimony from Officers Fritsch and Ullrich, as well as
one of the supporting bicycle patrol officers, describing the incident leading up to
Ferreiras’s arrest. The Commonwealth also showed the jury video footage of the
incident taken from the officers’ body cameras. Ferreiras and her brother both
testified for the defense. The defense argued Ferreiras never formed the requisite
mens rea to intend criminal acts, her injured leg prevented her from assaulting the
officers, and she was a victim of Officer Ullrich’s overly aggressive behavior.
After its deliberation, the jury found Ferreiras guilty of resisting arrest,7 third-
degree criminal mischief, obstructing an emergency responder, and third-degree
assault. The jury recommended sentencing as follows: sixty days’ incarceration
7 KRS 520.090, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court included resisting arrest as a potential lesser-included offense to third-degree assault.
-6- and a $500 fine for resisting arrest; a $100 fine for third-degree criminal mischief;
a $100 fine for obstructing an emergency responder; and a prison sentence of one
year and six months for third-degree assault. On August 30, 2024, the trial court
entered final judgment sentencing Ferreiras in accord with the jury’s
recommendation. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Ferreiras presents three overarching issues on appeal. First, she
argues the trial court erred when it limited the scope of her cross-examination of
Officers Fritsch and Ullrich. Second, Ferreiras contends the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to consider probating her sentence. Third, Ferreiras
argues that Officer Ullrich lacked probable cause to arrest her for any crime. We
consider each issue below.
In her first argument, Ferreiras contends the trial court erroneously
curtailed her ability to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s witnesses.
Specifically, she argues that she: (1) should have been allowed to cross-examine
the officers about the potential bias against her in light of the allegations in her
federal civil suit, and (2) should have been permitted to cross-examine Officer
Ullrich about his training and Officer Fritsch’s status as a trainee.
“In Kentucky, the trial court’s rulings concerning limits on cross-
examination are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Davenport v. Commonwealth,
-7- 177 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Ky. 2005) (citing Nunn v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 911,
914 (Ky. 1995)). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “The
right to cross-examine witnesses is . . . an essential aspect of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause . . . [b]ut that right is not absolute,” and “trial courts have
broad discretion to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination[s.]”
Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63, 85 (Ky. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and footnotes omitted). “So long as a reasonably complete picture of the
witness’ veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys power and
discretion to set appropriate boundaries.” Holt v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d
647, 653 (Ky. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721
(Ky. 1997)).
Here, Ferreiras asserts that the jury should have been permitted to
learn about her pending civil suit against the police officers, arguing that this
would have shown the jury the potential for bias in the officers’ testimony. For its
part, the Commonwealth asserts that this issue was not properly preserved by a
contemporaneous objection. Alternatively, the Commonwealth asserts that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination.
-8- We cannot agree with the Commonwealth that the issue is
unpreserved. The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine specifically referencing
civil suits against the officers or injuries received by Ferreiras as a result of this
incident. (Record (R.) at 43.) Ferreiras filed a memorandum opposing the
Commonwealth’s motion (R. at 51), and the trial court heard arguments on the
motion in a pretrial hearing. “Motions in limine can preserve issues for appellate
review, provided they are sufficiently detailed about what the moving party intends
to exclude.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 826, 836 (Ky. 2018) (quoting
Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Ky. App. 2016)). The lack
of a contemporaneous objection is no obstacle to preservation in such instances.
Id. For these reasons, we deem this matter to have been adequately preserved.
That said, we agree with the Commonwealth that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in restricting references to the civil suits. “[T]he
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,
the defense might wish.” Davenport, 177 S.W.3d at 768 (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 683 (1986))
(emphasis omitted). Moreover, “evidence should have some proclivity to
demonstrate impropriety or partiality beyond abject speculation. When it does not,
-9- the trial court is well within its purview in limiting evidence[.]” Holt, 250 S.W.3d
at 653.
Ferreiras’s generic claim that she was prevented from showing bias
will not suffice to show an abuse of discretion. Despite the trial court’s ruling
forbidding mention of the civil suits, Ferreiras was permitted to cross-examine the
officers regarding their use of force during the altercation, including extensive
questioning about the officers’ Use of Force Report, which they filed after the
incident. Ferreiras was also able to specifically cross-examine Officer Ullrich and
elicited testimony regarding how he punched Ferreiras in the head while she was
on the ground. Ferreiras was also able to cross-examine the officers about their
actions in the body camera video footage, and the jurors were able to view those
actions for themselves.
In short, even though Ferreiras could not bring up the civil suit itself,
the trial court provided her with ample opportunity to cross-examine the officers
about the aspects of the incident which formed the basis for her civil claims.
Under the circumstances, the jury received “a reasonably complete picture of the
witness’ veracity, bias and motivation[.]” Holt, 250 S.W.3d at 653. We cannot
say the trial court abused its discretion when it limited Ferreiras’s cross-
examination to exclude specific mention of the civil suit.
-10- Similarly, Ferreiras’s assertion that the trial court improperly
restricted her from asking questions about the officers’ training is likewise
unfounded. Ferreiras argues that the trial court violated her right to cross-examine
the officers regarding their training for impeachment purposes. Her argument to
the trial court, on the morning of the trial, was that the officers may have violated a
policy on deescalation prior to the use of physical force. However, the trial court
agreed with the Commonwealth that this training issue was not directly relevant to
the question of whether Ferreiras was guilty of the crime of assaulting a police
officer. The trial court left open the possibility that the officers’ testimony could
open the door to admitting the training issue under impeachment, but otherwise
barred Ferreiras from pursuing this avenue.
We start by noting that the proposed inquiry into the officers’ training
for possible impeachment is a collateral matter to whether Ferreiras was guilty of
the counts in the indictment. Issues regarding collateral impeachment are closely
related to those regarding relevancy. Commonwealth v. Prater, 324 S.W.3d 393,
397 (Ky. 2010). As such, “the trial court has discretion to determine whether or
not to permit impeachment on collateral issues when a party has opened the door to
such issues by raising them in direct testimony.” Id. at 399. Here, the trial court’s
ruling was squarely within the bounds described in Prater. Furthermore, despite
its ruling, it is noteworthy that the trial court allowed Ferreiras to briefly explore
-11- this issue in Officer Fritsch’s cross-examination, touching upon whether the use of
force in this case was in keeping with his training and whether grabbing Ferreiras’s
crutches or the use of force was necessary.8 Based on these considerations, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in how it chose to limit cross-
examination regarding the officers’ training.
In Ferreiras’s second issue on appeal, she contends the trial court
abused its discretion when it failed to consider probating her sentence. The
Commonwealth asserts that this question is moot, as Ferreiras is no longer in the
custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections. Ferreiras admits in her brief
that she was granted parole on December 5, 2024. (Appellant’s Brief at 5.) In
response, Ferreiras contends that being denied probation “can carry collateral
consequences such as impacts on employment, civil rights, and reputational harm.”
(Appellant’s Reply Brief at 7.) Ferreiras fails to cite any relevant authority
supporting this premise; her direct citation to Howard v. Commonwealth, 496
S.W.3d 471, 475 (Ky. 2016), merely describes how a trial court retains “immense
discretion in setting criminal penalties[,]” without any discussion of collateral
consequences for a denial of probation. Id. (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the
collateral consequences to which Ferreiras alludes are typically attributed to a
8 When questioned about the choice to use force, Officer Fritsch simply answered, “The situation required it.” However, the officer also admitted during cross-examination that Ferreiras had not actually used the crutch as a weapon when it was removed from her.
-12- guilty plea or a conviction, not an adverse probation decision. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Ky. 2012) (discussing adverse
immigration consequences as the result of a plea in the case of Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010)).
We agree with the Commonwealth that this issue is moot. “[A] ‘moot
case’ is one which seeks to get a judgment . . . upon some matter which, when
rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then
existing controversy.” Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Ky. 2014).
Because the question of whether Ferreiras should have been granted probation
cannot have any effect on her current status, we cannot reach the merits of this
issue. “[A]n appellate court is generally without jurisdiction to reach the merits of
a moot appeal.” Commonwealth v. Branham, 717 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Ky. App.
2025).
Furthermore, even if this issue was not moot, a brief examination of
the record shows that the trial court actually did consider whether to grant
probation and rejected it for reasons within its sound discretion. “[T]he Court is of
the opinion that . . . imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public
because probation, probation with an alternative sentencing plan or conditional
discharge would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the Defendant’s crimes.”
-13- (Final Judgment, R. at 154.) Accordingly, whether by mootness or merits, we will
not reverse the trial court’s decision regarding Ferreiras’s probation.
For her third and final issue on appeal, Ferreiras argues that Officer
Ullrich lacked probable cause to arrest her. She contends that it was “impossible
for [her] to disrupt a traffic stop because, as Officer Fritsch observed, she couldn’t
even walk without crutches.” (Appellant’s Brief at 18.) This is a conclusory
argument at best, given that Ferreiras’s jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
she did disrupt the traffic stop. However, we need not consider this argument
further because the Commonwealth correctly points out that Ferreiras has failed to
identify where this issue was raised before the trial court and thus preserved for
appellate review. “The Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not
raised in or decided by the trial court.” Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770
S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and
sentence.
ALL CONCUR.
-14- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Justin M. Whittaker Russell Coleman Cincinnati, Ohio Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph A. Beckett Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-15-