Ashley A. Mason v. The Derryfield School

2023 DNH 123

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 27, 2023
• Docket: 22-cv-104-SE
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ashley A. Mason

v. Civil No. 22-cv-104-SE Opinion No. 2023 DNH 123 The Derryfield School

ORDER

Before the court is the second attempt by defendant the

Derryfield School (“School”) to dismiss pro se plaintiff Ashley

Mason’s claim that she suffered pregnancy-based discrimination

during her brief employment at the School. The School’s prior

motion was denied because, at the motion to dismiss stage, the

court must consider the well-pleaded allegations in the

complaint and make all reasonable inferences in Mason’s favor.

Applying that standard, the court held that Mason sufficiently

pleaded allegations to establish that she timely filed her

pregnancy-discrimination claim and that School employees knew

that she was pregnant. Notwithstanding the court’s prior

conclusion, the School has seized upon Mason’s amended complaint

to renew its arguments. Although evidence may ultimately prove

meritorious the School’s view of the facts, the current motion

suffers the same infirmities as the first. However, because the amended complaint alleges additional claims that the School also

moves to dismiss, a perfunctory denial would be inadequate.1

Standard of Review

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, a plaintiff must make factual allegations

sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is

facially plausible if it pleads “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

To test a complaint’s sufficiency, the court must first

identify and disregard statements that “merely offer ‘legal

conclusions couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action.’” Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño-

Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (alterations omitted)). Second, the court must credit as

true all nonconclusory factual allegations and the reasonable

inferences drawn from those allegations, and then determine if

the claim is plausible. See id. In light of Mason’s pro se

1 In addition, both parties move to seal certain documents in the record that refer to sensitive medical information regarding Mason. Doc. nos. 17 & 20. The court grants those motions.

2 status, the court liberally construes her pleadings. Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

Background2

Mason was employed by the School as a Technical Support

Specialist for 17 days, from August 10, 2020, until the School

terminated her employment on August 27, 2020. From August 18 to

August 21, Mason was absent from work to undergo and then

recover from emergency surgery related to an ectopic pregnancy.

Upon her return to work, Mason furnished a doctor’s note to

Deborah Bremberg, an HR Generalist at the School. The note

stated that Mason had undergone gynecological surgery on August

19. The note did not provide any further details about the

specific nature of the surgery.

On August 27, Mason met with Bremberg and Jonathan DeYoung,

the School’s Information Technology Director and Mason’s

supervisor, to discuss her continued employment. Bremberg fired

Mason at that meeting. While explaining the School’s decision,

Bremberg referred to the doctor’s note and specifically told

2 The following facts are taken from Mason’s complaint and the documents fairly incorporated into it. See Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may consider “the complaint, documents annexed to it or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice”).

3 Mason that the School considered her August 20 and 21 absences

unexcused. Although Mason was out of work from August 18 to

August 21, the doctor’s note that she provided to the School

stated that she was cleared to return to work on August 19, the

same day as her surgery. Mason told Bremberg that the note was

inaccurate as to her recovery period. She asked if she could

supplement it with additional medical documentation. Bremberg

declined and reiterated that the School wanted to part ways.

Mason filed a charge of discrimination against the School

with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

After the EEOC issued Mason a right-to-sue letter, she filed the

instant action against the School, Bremberg, and DeYoung,

alleging that she was unlawfully terminated based on sex

discrimination. Doc. no. 1. The defendants moved to dismiss

Mason’s complaint on the grounds that it improperly named

individual School employees as defendants, was untimely, and

failed to state a claim under Title VII. Doc. no. 4. On November

7, 2022, the court granted the defendants’ motion as to the

individual School employees but otherwise denied the motion.

Mason v. Derryfield Sch., No. 22-CV-104-SE, 2022 WL 16859666

(D.N.H. Nov. 7, 2022).

On December 19, 2022, Mason moved to amend her complaint,

which the court allowed. The amended complaint includes five

counts. Doc. no. 15. Counts I, II, and III allege that the

4 School treated Mason differently because of her gender.3 Mason

also seeks relief for “unlawful withholding of wages” (labeled

“Count IV”) as well as “infliction of emotional distress” (also

labeled “Count IV,” which the court assumes was in error and

hereinafter calls “Count V”). The School now moves to dismiss

Mason’s amended complaint. Doc no. 16. Mason objects as to most

of her claims but does not object to dismissal of Count V, her

infliction of emotional distress claim. Therefore, the court

dismisses Count V.

Discussion

The School asks the court to dismiss Counts I, II, and III

on the same two bases on which it sought dismissal of Mason’s

pregnancy-discrimination claim in its prior motion. First, it

argues that Mason’s claims are untimely. Second, it contends

that Mason fails to state a claim under Title VII by

insufficiently alleging that the School knew that she was

pregnant when it fired her. Mason’s amended complaint, however,

includes three separate claims of discrimination supported by

separate allegations. Count I alleges that the School fired

Mason because of her pregnancy. Count II alleges that Mason was

3 In its motion to dismiss, the School construes Counts I, II, and III to allege pregnancy-based discrimination under Title VII. As discussed further below, the School’s conflation of those claims is incompatible with the allegations in each count.

5 treated differently than a male co-worker was treated, because

of her gender, after they both returned from sick leave. Count

III alleges that the School failed to follow its hiring policies

in relation to her employment and favored a male applicant to a

similar IT position.

The School treats all three claims as one single Title VII

claim alleging discrimination based on Mason’s pregnancy. Doc.

no. 16 at 4-5. However, Counts II and III of Mason’s amended

complaint do not allege pregnancy-based discrimination. The

School does not address these distinct allegations, or whether

either claim is properly before the court under Title VII.

Instead, it focuses singularly on issues relevant to Count I.

Thus, the School has not provided any argument in support of

dismissing Counts II and III and its motion is denied insofar as

it seeks dismissal of those counts.

I. Count I

In Count I, Mason again alleges that the School

discriminated against her by wrongfully terminating her for

being absent from work for surgery related to her pregnancy. In

its motion to dismiss, the School again argues that the court

should dismiss the claim as untimely because Mason did not file

her complaint within 90 days after receiving notice of the

EEOC’s right-to-sue letter and because Mason does not allege

6 that the School or its employees knew that she was pregnant when

they terminated her.

A. Untimeliness

The court previously explained that it could not dismiss

the case as untimely without some admission, evidence, or

presumption that Mason actually received the December 9, 2021

EEOC email that the School argues triggered her duty to file her

civil action within 90 days. Mason, 2022 WL 16859666, at *3. The

School attempts to address this proof-of-receipt issue in its

instant motion to dismiss by attaching as an exhibit an EEOC

email received by the School’s counsel on December 9, 2021

announcing that a decision was available on the EEOC portal.

Doc. no. 16-2. The School contends that this email helps to

prove that Mason herself received an identical EEOC email on the

same day. Doc. no. 16-1 at 3.

Even if the court could consider the email at this stage of

the litigation, it would not entitle the School to dismissal of

Count I. The School’s email does not contain any reference to

Mason, let alone an email address through which the EEOC sent

her correspondence. As the court previously stated, to conclude

that Count I is untimely, “the court would need to infer that

the email was sent to Mason’s correct email address,” an

inference that weighs in the School’s, not Mason’s, favor.

7 Mason, 2022 WL 16859666, at *4. The email to the School’s

counsel does not establish, at this stage of the litigation,

that Mason received the EEOC’s email on December 9, 2021.4 As the

court previously stated, this issue may be appropriate for

resolution on a properly-developed summary judgment record.

B. Employer’s Knowledge of Pregnancy

In its order denying the School’s motion to dismiss the

first complaint, the court held that Mason is required to allege

that the School was aware that Mason was pregnant when it fired

her. Mason, 2022 WL 16859666, at *5. But the court also

concluded that it was ”reasonable to infer that the [doctor’s]

letter itself or the conversation surrounding it included

information from which Bremberg could conclude that Mason’s

surgery was related to a pregnancy.” Id. Neither Mason’s

amendments to the complaint nor the School’s newly proffered

evidence alter the court’s prior determination.

Although the School attached to the present motion the

doctor’s note in question, placing its substance newly before

the court, it does not change the court’s analysis of Mason’s

allegations regarding the School’s knowledge. Specifically, at

4 Even if the School’s email did include evidence that the email was sent to Mason’s email address, there would remain the question of whether the court should presume Mason received the email; a presumption that she could potentially rebut.

8 this stage, it is reasonable to infer that School knew of

Mason’s pregnancy from the written and verbal communications

between Mason, Bremberg, and DeYoung, together with the note

referring to Mason’s “gynecological surgery.” As with the

School’s arguments regarding timeliness, this issue is better

addressed at the summary judgment stage.

The court held on November 7, 2022 that Mason’s Title VII

allegations are sufficient at this stage to survive a motion to

dismiss. Mason, 2022 WL 16859666, at *5. For the reasons stated

above, none of the defendant’s arguments in its instant motion

to dismiss change the court’s analysis.

II. State Law Withholding of Wages Claim

Mason alleges in Count IV of her amended complaint that the

School unlawfully withheld her wages for certain days that she

was recovering from surgery. The School considered those days to

be unexcused absences. Mason does not cite a specific law that

the School violated, but the School fairly interprets her claim

as an alleged violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275:48. Doc.

no. 15 at 6. The School states, as a factual matter, “it paid

all wages owed [to] Mason (who was a salaried exempt employee)

in accordance with RSA 275:43, V.” Doc. no. 16-1 at 13. To the

extent that the School intended to argue that it is entitled to

9 dismissal of Count IV on that basis, that argument is properly

The School also argues that the claim “should be dismissed

because Mason’s federal Title VII claims fail as a matter of

law” and the court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the wage claim. Id. Because the court does not

dismiss Mason’s Title VII claims, it will not dismiss Mason’s

wage claim on jurisdictional grounds.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to

dismiss (doc. no. 16) is granted as to the claim for infliction

of emotional distress in Count V of the amended complaint but is

otherwise denied. Both parties’ motions to seal, doc. nos. 17 &

20, are granted.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Samantha D. Elliott United States District Judge

September 27, 2023

cc: Ashley Ann Mason, pro se Counsel of Record.