Ashkan RAJAEE v. Rebecca CALLAHAN

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedMarch 15, 2026
Docket3:25-cv-01164
StatusUnknown

This text of Ashkan RAJAEE v. Rebecca CALLAHAN (Ashkan RAJAEE v. Rebecca CALLAHAN) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ashkan RAJAEE v. Rebecca CALLAHAN, (S.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Ashkan RAJAEE, Case No.: 25-cv-1164-AGS-SBC Plaintiff, 4 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO v. DISMISS (ECF 6) 5 Rebecca CALLAHAN, 6 Defendant. 7

8 Displeased with an arbitrator’s ruling against him, the self-represented plaintiff here 9 brought a civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The arbitrator now moves to dismiss. 10 BACKGROUND 11 Plaintiff Ashkan Rajaee and “non-party Tyler Davis” entered a joint “operating 12 agreement of TopDevz, LLC” (ECF 1, at 3), which provides that arbitration is “the 13 exclusive dispute resolution process” between the members (ECF 1-2, at 31). Rajaee 14 commenced arbitration against Davis, and defendant Rebecca Callahan was appointed as 15 the arbitrator. (See id. at 2–4.) After extensive arbitration, and “over Rajaee’s objections to 16 jurisdiction, Callahan . . . decree[d] dissolution of TopDevz under [California 17 Corporations Code] § 17707.03.” (Id. at 8.) Rajaee moved to vacate the decision, but the 18 state court denied the motion and “confirm[ed] Callahan’s final arbitration determination.” 19 (Id. at 14; see also ECF 1-5; ECF 1-6.) 20 Rajaee then sued Callahan here, alleging a single claim: that Callahan’s arbitral 21 award “deliberately and willfully deprived [Rajaee of] his property and liberty interests in 22 TopDevz” without “due process.” (ECF 1, at 2, 9, 14, 17.) 23 DISCUSSION 24 Callahan moves to dismiss on multiple grounds, but this Court need only address 25 one: the “under color of state law” requirement. A “§ 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate a 26 deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the 27 defendant acted under color of state law.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 28 1 2003). “[P]rivate parties” like defendant Callahan “are not generally acting under color of 2 state law.” See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 Courts analyzing the “under color of state law” element in the context of arbitrators 4 have come to the same conclusion: “The arbitration involved here was private, not state, 5 action; it was conducted pursuant to contract by a private arbitrator.” Federal Deposit Ins. 6 Corp. v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987). The “[p]rivate actions 7 of an arbitrator are not undertaken under color of state law [even though] the arbitration 8 has been conducted pursuant to a state statute or the arbitrator’s award is enforced by a 9 state court.” McDaniels v. City of Philadelphia, 56 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1999); 10 see also Narula v. Orange Cnty. Super. Ct., No. 8:19-cv-00133-DSF-JC, 2020 WL 11 5289926, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020) (collecting cases and holding arbitrators’ “private 12 conduct cannot form the basis for a viable Section 1983 claim”), report and 13 recommendation adopted, No. 8:19-cv-00133-DSF-JC, 2020 WL 5289856 (C.D. Cal. 14 Apr. 1, 2020). 15 Because Callahan was not acting under color of state law, this civil-rights suit is 16 meritless and must be dismissed.1 17 CONCLUSION 18 The motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Rajaee’s single-claim complaint is dismissed 19 without leave to amend. See Travis v. Couture, 385 F. App’x 615, 615 (9th Cir. 2010) 20 (ruling that “the district court acted within its discretion by dismissing [the] complaint 21 without leave to amend” when the plaintiff “failed to explain how the defendants acted 22 under color of state law or conspired to deprive him of his civil rights”); Narula v. Orange 23 Cnty. Sup. Ct., No. 21-55974, 2022 WL 17500721, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2022) (affirming 24 25 26 1 In addition, since plaintiff’s claim arises directly from an arbitrator’s decisional 27 acts, it is foreclosed by arbitrator immunity. See Narula v. Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct., No. 21- 55974, 2022 WL 17500721, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2022) (affirming dismissal against 28 1 ||“[d]ismissal with prejudice” of § 1983 claims against an arbitrator as “futile” because the 2 arbitrator “was not acting under color of state law’). The requests for judicial notice 3 || (ECF 6-1; ECF 7-1) are “den[ied] as irrelevant.” See Turnacliff v. Westly, 546 F.3d 1113, 4 1120 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008). The Clerk 1s directed to close this case and issue a judgment. 5 ||Dated: March 15, 2026

7 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Ashkan RAJAEE v. Rebecca CALLAHAN, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ashkan-rajaee-v-rebecca-callahan-casd-2026.