Ashirwad v. Charter Communications, LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 18, 2024
• Docket: 3:21-cv-02101
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FERAIDOON ATHARI, an individual; Case No.: 21-cv-02101-AJB-DDL JAMES HOGAN, an individual; an 12 individual; ORDER: 13 OSCAR MARTINEZ, an individual; EDWARD MOORE, an individual; and (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 14 DAVID SHERVEY, an individual, MOTION TO SEAL and 15 (2) GRANTING IN PART AND 16 Plaintiffs, DENYING IN PART 17 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 18 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,

LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability 19 (Doc. Nos. 75, 77) Company; CHARTER 20 COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 21 through 25, inclusive, 22 Defendants. 23

24 Before the Court is Defendants Charter Communications, LLC and Charter 25 Communications, Inc.’s (collectively, “Charter” or “Defendants”) motion to seal and 26 motion for summary judgment. The motion to seal is unopposed. Plaintiffs Feraidoon 27 Athari, James Hogan, Oscar Martinez, Edward Moore, and David Shervey (collectively, 28 1 “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition, to which Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. Nos. 84, 87.) 2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to seal and 3 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART their motion for summary judgment. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 Charter is a telecommunications company that employed Plaintiffs as 6 Multi-Dwelling Unit Sales Representatives (“MDU Reps”) in California. (Doc. No. 1-3 at 7 5–6.) During their employment, Plaintiffs sold Charter’s phone, internet, and cable services 8 to members of the local community, and installed, connected, activated and troubleshot the 9 equipment they sold. (Id. at 10–11.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misclassified them as 10 outside salespeople exempt from overtime and meal and rest break laws. (Id. at 6.) 11 Plaintiffs claim they are not considered exempt under California law because they did not 12 spend more than 50% of their time selling goods or services away from Defendants’ place 13 of business. (Id.) 14 Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants in San Diego County Superior Court, 15 which Defendants thereafter removed to federal court. (Id. at 5; Doc. No. 1) The Complaint 16 raised eleven causes of action under California law: (1) failure to pay overtime wages, (2) 17 failure to provide rest periods, (3) failure to provide meal periods, (4) failure to make 18 semi-monthly payments, (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, (6) 19 failure to pay accrued vacation time, (7) waiting time penalties, (8) unfair business 20 practices in violation of the UCL, (9) theft of labor, (10) unjust enrichment, and (11) 21 declaratory relief. (Doc. No. 1-3 at 5.) 22 In a prior order, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 23 and dismissed Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. (Doc. No. 100.) All that remains for adjudication are 24 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and attendant motion to seal. 25 26

27 1 The three other plaintiffs in this action, Jagath Ashirwad, Eric Lopez, and Jeremiah Marchesano, have been compelled to arbitration as a result of the Court’s March 20, 2023 Order granting Defendants’ motion 28 1 II. MOTION TO SEAL 2 Defendants filed a motion to seal certain commission plans filed in connection with 3 their motion for summary judgment and identified as Exhibits F and G (hereinafter, 4 “Commission Plans”). (Doc. No. 75.) Plaintiffs did not file an opposition. 5 A. Legal Standard 6 Courts have historically recognized a “general right to inspect and copy public 7 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 8 Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). “Unless a particular court record 9 is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting 10 point. Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) 11 (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). 12 Courts have long acknowledged that the risk of competitive harm through disclosure of 13 confidential and proprietary information warrants maintaining documents under seal. See 14 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. 15 B. Discussion 16 According to Defendants, compelling reasons support sealing of the Commission 17 Plans because they contain confidential, competitively sensitive information regarding 18 Charter’s business and compensation plans. Defendants state that the Commission Plans 19 contain information regarding pay rates and commission structures for Charter’s sales 20 employees, as well as information reflecting its business strategies related to compensation 21 and marketing for its products and services. Defendants explain that a competitor with 22 access to Charter’s commission structure and compensation plans could undercut it in the 23 marketplace, hire away its employees, and discern its internal decision-making and 24 business strategies concerning compensation and marketing. 25 Upon review of Defendants’ motion and the exhibits at issue, the Court agrees with 26 Defendants that public disclosure of the Commission Plans could cause Charter 27 competitive harm and give its competitors an unfair advantage. Thus, the Court finds 28 compelling reasons support sealing of the Commission Plans. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 1 (courts may ensure records are not used “as sources of business information that might 2 harm a litigant’s competitive standing”); Sullivan v. Deutsche Bank Americas Holding 3 Corp., No. 08CV2370, 2010 WL 3448608, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (finding the 4 “likelihood of improper use by competitors and the proprietary nature of the confidential 5 information” was a compelling reason to seal documents). 6 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to seal Exhibits F and G filed 7 in connection with their motion for summary judgment. 8 III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 if the 11 moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement 12 to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).2 A fact 13 is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the 14 case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if 15 the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 16 party. Id. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the 17 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the 18 moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings 19 and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 20 admissions on file,” to show that a genuine issue of disputed fact remains. Id. at 324. “In 21 judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility 22 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 23 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). “Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable 24 to the nonmoving party.” Id. 25 // 26 // 27 2 Internal quotations, citations, and alterations are omitted from the cases cited in this Order unless 28 1 B. Discussion 2 Defendants seek summary judgment on the entirety of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. As an 3 initial matter, the Court notes that while Plaintiffs filed an opposition, they chose not to 4 respond to Defendants’ arguments that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 5 sixth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action, as well as their claim for punitive 6 damages. Thus, the Court finds those claims—failure to pay accrued vacation time, theft 7 of labor, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and punitive damages—abandoned. See 8 Jenkins v. Cnty. of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that Jenkins 9 “abandoned her other two claims by not raising them in opposition to the County’s motion 10 for summary judgment.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for 11 summary judgment as to those claims. 12 The Court now turns to the parties’ arguments on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims—their 13 first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh causes of action—and discusses each in turn. 14 1) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages – Claim 1 15 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were properly classified as an exempt outside 16 salesperson, and thus, they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for 17 overtime wages, as well all the remaining claims because they too depend on the 18 misclassification issue. The Court disagrees. 19 California law exempts “outside salespersons” from overtime requirements. Cal. 20 Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11010(1)(C). “The employer bears the burden of proving the 21 employee’s exemption.” Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 794–95 (1999). 22 An outside salesperson is an employee who “customarily and regularly works more than 23 half the working time away from the employer’s place of business selling tangible or 24 intangible items or obtaining orders or contracts for products, services or use of facilities.” 25 Id. § 11010(2)(J). In contrast to federal law, California law “takes a purely quantitative 26 approach,” looking to the amount of time a person is “engaged in sales activities outside 27 the workplace” rather than looking to “the primary function for which the person is 28 employed.” Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 797. 1 Whether an activity qualifies as exempt is a mixed question of law and fact. See id. 2 at 803 n.5. The court should therefore “itemize the types of activities that it considers to be 3 sales related, and the approximate average times that it finds the employee spent on each 4 of these activities.” Id. “Such itemization allows the court to resolve whether the employee 5 is exempt—a question of law.” Stickles v. Atria Senior Living, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 6 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2022). 7 Defendants argue that even assuming Plaintiffs spent the majority of their work time 8 installing and troubleshooting services, Plaintiffs were properly classified as exempt 9 outside salespersons because those tasks are sales-related activities.3 10 Instructive here, the California Supreme Court in Ramirez considered whether 11 delivering and restocking water bottles were sales activities and concluded—despite the 12 employer’s argument that a failure to deliver would lead to a loss in sales—that they were 13 not. See 20 Cal. 4th at 802. The court explained: 14 [T]he evidence is uncontroverted that Ramirez performed both sales and delivery functions for Yosemite. Delivery of preordered water bottles or the 15 restocking of “empties” is not a sales activity in the conventional meaning of 16 the word—one who only performed these delivery tasks could not be considered a salesperson. It is true, as Yosemite points out, that failure to 17 properly deliver the product would lead to loss of the customer, but that does 18 not make such delivery a sales activity, any more than an attorney's preparation of a legal brief in order to satisfy and thereby retain a client is a 19 sales activity. 20 21 Id. (emphasis in the original). 22 Based on the foregoing, the Court rejects Defendants’ assertions that the applicable 23 analysis looks to the employee’s subjective motivations or purpose for conducting the 24 activity. Rather, following the rationale in Ramirez, the Court finds that the activity at issue 25 26 3 To be clear, Defendants do not seek summary judgment based on the number of hours Plaintiffs spent 27 installing and troubleshooting the services they sold. (Doc. No. 77-1 at 9.) The parties’ briefs focus solely on whether Plaintiffs’ installing and troubleshooting of services amount to “selling” for purposes of the 28 1 must be examined objectively and in isolation, to determine whether “one who only 2 performed” the activity in question could be “considered a salesperson” within “the 3 conventional meaning of the word.” See id. (emphasis in original). 4 As to installing services, the Court finds it is not a sales activity in the conventional 5 meaning of the word—one who only performed installation tasks could not be considered 6 a salesperson. Similarly, as to troubleshooting services, it is not a sales activity in the 7 conventional meaning of the word—one who only performed troubleshooting tasks could 8 not be considered a salesperson. Tellingly, Defendants employ technicians who perform 9 only these installation and troubleshooting tasks, yet make no argument that they could be 10 considered salespersons. (Doc. No. 77-1 at 11.) Nor would such argument be defensible. 11 Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that installing or troubleshooting services 12 sold are analogous to the delivering and restocking of water bottles the Ramirez court found 13 were not sales activities. In Ramirez, the plaintiff: 14 would carry the bottles into a business or place of residence, exchange full for 15 empty bottles, and refill and replace other stock and supplies. He would also rotate bottles on his truck, check the bottles for leaks and foreign objects, and 16 carry the bottles to the customer’s house. For some customers, he would also 17 rotate the spare water bottles, wipe off the tops and place the bottles in the coolers. He would also do minor service on the coolers. 18

19 20 Cal. 4th at 791. 20 The Court finds these activities akin to the installation and troubleshooting services 21 Plaintiffs performed for Defendants. Such work occurs only after a sale has been 22 actualized. Like delivering water bottles, an installation could not happen until a sale was 23 completed and entered into Defendants’ billing system, and equipment was assigned to the 24 client’s account. And like restocking water bottles (which occurs after a sale was made and 25 the product, water, was consumed by the customer), troubleshooting services occur after a 26 sale was made, and generally after equipment was installed and the customer’s services 27 were activated. Additionally, Ramirez’s tasks of placing of water bottles in the customers’ 28 coolers is similar to Plaintiffs’ troubleshooting tasks of installing self-installation kits when 1 customers were unable to do so themselves. Moreover, even if the failure to install or 2 troubleshoot services could lead to the loss of the customer, Ramirez teaches that such 3 consequence does not make a task a sales activity “any more than an attorney’s preparation 4 of a legal brief in order to satisfy and thereby retain a client is a sales activity.” 20 Cal. 4th 5 at 802. 6 Instead of addressing the aforementioned similarities, Defendants argue that 7 Ramirez is nonetheless distinguishable because: (1) it was undisputed that Ramirez was 8 required to perform both sales and delivery functions; (2) the deliveries were pre-ordered 9 and had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s personal sales; and (3) the employer in Ramirez 10 employed solicitors whose principal task was to sign up new customers. None of 11 Defendants’ points, however, appear in the Ramirez court’s analysis of whether delivering 12 and restocking water bottles were sales activities. The Court therefore does not find these 13 claimed differences consequential. 14 In any event, Ramirez stated that “the evidence is uncontroverted that Ramirez 15 performed both sales and delivery functions for Yosemite.” 20 Cal. 4th at 802 (emphasis 16 added). Contrary to Defendants’ claim, nowhere in the case does it state that the evidence 17 was undisputed that Ramirez “was required to perform both ‘sales and delivery 18 functions.’” (Doc. No. 87 at 10 (emphasis in Defendants’ reply brief).) Defendants’ latter 19 points also fail because Ramirez’s sales motivations and the existence of other employees 20 specifically tasked with signing up new customers are irrelevant to the dispositive inquiry 21 in the case: whether delivering and restocking water bottles, examined objectively and in 22 isolation, are sales activities with the conventional meaning of the word. See Ramirez, 20 23 Cal. 4th at 802. 24 Also instructive, the Ramirez court indicated that another way to determine whether 25 an activity was directly related to sales was whether one must perform such activity to 26 attempt a sale. See, e.g., id. at 801 (“If a salesperson must travel one hour to destination A 27 in order to attempt a sale, then surely the most reasonable interpretation of the wage order 28 is to count the hour of travel time as time spent ‘selling.’”). Here, the Court additionally 1 finds that because a sale of Charter’s services may be attempted without performing 2 installation or troubleshooting services, the time spent performing such tasks does not 3 count as selling. Tellingly, Plaintiffs sold Charter’s services, and Defendants maintain that 4 they were not required to perform installation or troubleshooting services for the sale. 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that installing or troubleshooting services 6 are not sales activities within the conventional meaning of the word. See id. At best, the 7 activities are incidental to sales rather than directly related, and work incidental to sales is 8 not exempt in California. See id. at 797 (State law “does not contain any provision that 9 reclassifies intrinsically nonexempt nonsales work as exempt based on the fact that it is 10 incidental to sales. The language of the state exemption only encompasses work directly 11 involved in ‘selling . . . items or obtaining orders or contracts.’”). Accordingly, Defendants’ 12 motion for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs’ installing and troubleshooting 13 of services constitute “selling” for purposes of the outside salesperson exemption is 14 DENIED. 15 Moreover, because Defendants did not, in this motion, challenge Plaintiffs’ claim 16 that they spent more than fifty percent of their work time installing and troubleshooting 17 services, nor did they meaningfully engage with Ramirez’s multi-factor test on this issue,4 18 Defendants have not established they are entitled to summary judgment on this alternative 19 basis. 20 2) Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Breaks – Claims 2 and 3 21 Next, Defendants argue that, even assuming Plaintiffs were improperly classified, 22 they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims because 23

24 4 To determine the number of hours worked in sales-related activities (the quantitative definition of outside 25 salesperson), the court should consider the following factors: (1) how the employee actually spends his or her time; (2) whether the employee’s practice diverges from the employer’s realistic expectations; (3) 26 whether there was any concrete expression of employer displeasure over an employee’s substandard performance; and (4) whether these expressions were themselves realistic given the actual overall 27 requirements of the job. Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 802. Defendants’ briefs assert only that Plaintiffs’ installing and troubleshooting of services diverge from Charter’s realistic expectations. They do not 28 1 Charter’s lack of a written policy expressly authorizing breaks does not constitute a 2 violation and Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that their supervisors prevented or 3 discouraged them from taking breaks. 4 California law “obligates employers to afford their nonexempt employees meal 5 periods and rest periods during the workday.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 6 4th 1004, 1018 (2012) An employer satisfies their duty to provide meal and rest breaks “if 7 it relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control over their activities and permits 8 them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, and does not 9 impede or discourage them from doing so.” Id. at 1040. 10 Here, Plaintiffs point to a declaration from Ziren Coelho (“Coelho”), a supervisor 11 for MDU Reps. (Doc. No. 85-3.) Coelho attests that he has “never personally relieved any 12 MDU Rep for their meal break or their rest break.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) He also stated that although 13 their policy for breaks was “take them if you’re able to,” if one of his MDU Reps receives 14 a call from a customer, “they are expected and instructed to answer it.” (Id.) Notably, 15 Coelho expressed, “Charter instructed [him] and other supervisor[s] to encourage our 16 MDU Reps to spend as much time as possible selling and installing the services that Charter 17 offered”. (Id.) Consistent with Coelho’s statements, Plaintiffs James Hogan’s and Oscar 18 Martinez’s testimonies indicate that although no one expressly told them that they could 19 not take breaks, they felt comfortable taking a break only when they could, and often only 20 briefly and in their cars, so as not to neglect their work responsibilities. (Doc. No. 77-3 at 21 102–05, 136–39.) 22 Considering the above evidence and drawing all inferences therefrom in Plaintiffs’ 23 favor, the Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants 24 impeded or discouraged Plaintiffs from taking their break. A reasonable jury could find 25 that because Defendants expected MDU Reps like Plaintiffs to answer calls, regardless of 26 whether they were on break, and encouraged them to spend as much time as possible 27 working, they have not satisfied their meal and rest period obligations. Accordingly, the 28 Court DENIES Defendants’ summary judgment motion on this basis. 1 3) Failure to Make Semi-Monthly Payments – Claim 4 2 Defendants also assert that even assuming Plaintiffs were improperly classified as 3 outside salespersons, they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ failure to make 4 semi-monthly payments under Labor Code Section 204. Specifically, Defendants contend 5 that Plaintiffs have no right of action under Section 204. In response, Plaintiffs argue that 6 they made a mistake and ask the Court to grant them leave to amend this cause of action to 7 be pled under Section 210 instead. 8 While Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be 9 freely given when justice so requires,” the policy toward liberally granting amendment 10 “must be tempered with considerations of ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the 11 part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 12 allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, 13 futility of amendment, etc.’” Schlacter-Jones v. Gen. Tel. of California, 936 F.2d 435, 443 14 (9th Cir. 1991).5 15 Apart from Plaintiffs asserting—without explanation—that they made a mistake and 16 Defendants would not suffer prejudice, Plaintiffs have made no attempt at showing that 17 they merit leave to amend at this stage. Specifically, Plaintiffs offer no reason as to why 18 their mistake or delay in seeking leave to amend is justified when discovery has closed, 19 and the case is pending resolution of Defendants’ summary judgment motion. The Court 20 also finds that the timing of Plaintiffs’ request, that is, seeking the amendment in its 21 opposition to summary judgment, causes prejudice to Defendants. See id. (“A motion for 22 leave to amend is not a vehicle to circumvent summary judgment.”) Most notably, 23 Plaintiffs have not shown that their proposed amendment would not be futile. Indeed, 24 Defendants point out that “[p]enalties under Section 210 can only be recovered in 25 administrative proceedings before the Labor Commissioner or in a PAGA action and 26 Plaintiffs have not alleged a claim under PAGA.” (Doc. No. 87 at 11 n.10.) See also 27 5 This case was abrogated on other grounds by Cramer v. Consol. Freightways Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th 28 1 Johnson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 546 2 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2013) (“There is nothing in section 204 or 210 that indicates, in 3 clear understandable, unmistakable terms, that a private right of actions exists for violations 4 of section 204.”). 5 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have a private right of 6 action under Section 204 and considerations of undue delay, prejudice to Defendants, and 7 futility overcome the presumption of granting leave to amend this claim, the Court 8 GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Section 204 claim and 9 DENIES Plaintiffs’ belated and unjustified request for leave to amend. 10 4) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements and Waiting 11 Time Penalties – Claims 5 and 7 12 Lastly, Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs were improperly classified, they are 13 entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to provide accurate wage 14 statements and waiting time penalties based on their defense of “good faith belief.” (Doc. 15 No. 77-1 at 28.) Defendants, however, have cited no evidence—conclusive or otherwise— 16 to prove they are entitled to summary judgment on this defense. Accordingly, the Court 17 DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their good faith affirmative 18 defense. 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 28 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to seal and 3 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART their motion for summary judgment.® (Doc. 4 ||Nos. 75, 77.) Accordingly, the Court enters the following orders. 5 e Defendants’ motion to seal Exhibits F and G at Doc. No. 76 is GRANTED. The 6 Clerk of Court is directed to file those documents under seal. 7 e Plaintiffs’ fourth, sixth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action, as well as their 8 claim for punitive damages are DISMISSED. 9 e Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, fifth, and seventh causes of action remain for trial. 10 e Pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Order (Doc. No. 119), the parties are 1 DIRECTED to contact the Magistrate Judge’s chambers within 3 days of the date 12 of this Order. 13 e Counsel must comply with the pre-trial disclosure requirements of Fed. R. 14 Civ. P. 26(a)(3) no later than April 11, 2024. 15 e The parties must meet and confer no later than April 18, 2024, and prepare a 16 proposed pretrial order in the form as set forth in Civ. L. R. 16.1.f.6. M7 e Objections to pre-trial disclosures must be filed no later than April 25, 2024. 18 e The Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order as described above must be 19 prepared, served, and lodged no later than May 16, 2024. 20 e The final Pretrial Conference is scheduled for May 23, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. a1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: March 18, 2024 © ¢ 23 Hon. Anthony J.Battaglia 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 ||6 The Court acknowledges that the parties’ raised objections to certain evidence in their respective briefs. || However, because the Court reaches its rulings without reliance on the evidence objected to by the parties, the Court need not consider the evidentiary objections and hereby denies them as moot. 12