Asheville Mica Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp.

Second Circuit

Asheville Mica Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp.

360 F.2d 931

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedMay 11, 1966

DocketNos. 241-243, Dockets 30034-30036

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 360 F.2d 931 (Asheville Mica Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Asheville Mica Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 360 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1966).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM: .

This Court is no stranger to these actions. On a previous appeal,¹ we reversed and remanded, holding that the district judge² erred in declining to apply the parol evidence rule and in failing to look to extrinsic evidence as an aid in interpreting the ambiguous price escalation clause ³ appearing in identical contracts between the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and each of the appellants, all of whom are producers of the strategic material, mica. We determined that the disputed escalation clause entitled appellants to a price increment for the mica which they sold to the CCC equal to the increase in price the Government Services Administration (GSA) granted for the mica it was independently purchasing from each of the appellants. We remanded the case, however, for a determination, inter alia, whether the price increment accrued to all of the appellants as of the time the first of their number entered into a new contract with GSA providing for an increased price or whether the increase became effective as to each appellant from the date of its separate subsequent contract with GSA.

On remand, Chief Judge Ryan, considering these questions in light of the record compiled at the initial trial before Judge Leibell, found that the disputed price escalation clause was ambig[933]*933uous in several respects and that extrinsic evidence could therefore properly be considered for the purpose of determining whether the parties intended to create price uniformity between the CCC, the GSA and each appellant so as not to disrupt the highly sensitive mica market. In view of this goal of price parity, Chief Judge Ryan held that appellants were entitled to a price increment on their contracts with the CCC as of the time the GSA first raised prices in a contract with one of their number, Sigbert Loeb. And, after carefully considering the relevant case law and legislative history, Chief Judge Ryan concluded that the CCC was not immune from the running of lawful interest on judgments entered against it.

In light of the District Judge’s considered and thorough exploration and exposition of the issues of fact and law involved in these actions, we affirm in all respects on the basis of his opinion (as amended by the memorandum endorsement on stipulation of May 4, 1965) reported at 239 F.Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

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PER CURIAM: .

This Court is no stranger to these actions. On a previous appeal,¹ we reversed and remanded, holding that the district judge² erred in declining to apply the parol evidence rule and in failing to look to extrinsic evidence as an aid in interpreting the ambiguous price escalation clause ³ appearing in identical contracts between the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and each of the appellants, all of whom are producers of the strategic material, mica. We determined that the disputed escalation clause entitled appellants to a price increment for the mica which they sold to the CCC equal to the increase in price the Government Services Administration (GSA) granted for the mica it was independently purchasing from each of the appellants. We remanded the case, however, for a determination, inter alia, whether the price increment accrued to all of the appellants as of the time the first of their number entered into a new contract with GSA providing for an increased price or whether the increase became effective as to each appellant from the date of its separate subsequent contract with GSA.

On remand, Chief Judge Ryan, considering these questions in light of the record compiled at the initial trial before Judge Leibell, found that the disputed price escalation clause was ambig[933]*933uous in several respects and that extrinsic evidence could therefore properly be considered for the purpose of determining whether the parties intended to create price uniformity between the CCC, the GSA and each appellant so as not to disrupt the highly sensitive mica market. In view of this goal of price parity, Chief Judge Ryan held that appellants were entitled to a price increment on their contracts with the CCC as of the time the GSA first raised prices in a contract with one of their number, Sigbert Loeb. And, after carefully considering the relevant case law and legislative history, Chief Judge Ryan concluded that the CCC was not immune from the running of lawful interest on judgments entered against it.

In light of the District Judge’s considered and thorough exploration and exposition of the issues of fact and law involved in these actions, we affirm in all respects on the basis of his opinion (as amended by the memorandum endorsement on stipulation of May 4, 1965) reported at 239 F.Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

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360 F.2d 931, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/asheville-mica-co-v-commodity-credit-corp-ca2-1966.

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