This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-1228
Ashaunti Quantay Prowell, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed January 12, 2026 Affirmed Larkin, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-19-1303
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, N. Nate Summers, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for driving while impaired, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict and that the district court plainly erred by accepting his proposed stipulation regarding his prior conviction for
driving while impaired. We affirm.
FACTS
This is the second appeal in this case. As to the relevant procedural history, a jury
found appellant Ashaunti Quantay Prowell guilty of driving while impaired (DWI) in
August 2023.1 Prowell petitioned for postconviction relief in February 2025. He argued
that respondent State of Minnesota failed to prove the DWI charge beyond a reasonable
doubt and that he was prejudiced by the district court’s adoption of a stipulation that he
proposed. The postconviction court summarily denied Prowell’s petition. It concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to support the DWI conviction, that the district court did
not plainly err by accepting Prowell’s stipulation, and that even if the district court had
erred, the alleged error was not prejudicial.
Prowell appeals.
DECISION
We review a denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Brown
v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We review a postconviction court’s legal
determinations de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.” Id. (quotation omitted).
1 The state charged and tried additional offenses. Because the outcome of those offenses does not impact our decision, we do not discuss them.
2 I.
Prowell contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that
he was guilty of DWI. Specifically, he argues that the state failed to prove that he was
impaired by alcohol as opposed to some other intoxicating substance. Prowell relies on
evidence that the responding officers found a prescription bottle for Oxycodone bearing
his name in his vehicle, the pills in that bottle field-tested positive for amphetamine, and a
witness who observed Prowell crash his vehicle reported that he thought Prowell had been
smoking a “blunt.”2
Prowell was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2018), which
provides that it is a crime for a person to operate a motor vehicle when “the person is under
the influence of alcohol.” A person is under the influence of alcohol if he does not possess
“that clearness of intellect and control of himself that he otherwise would have” or if he
drank enough alcohol that his “ability or capacity to drive was impaired in some way or to
some degree.” State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotations
omitted).
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty
verdict, our standard of review depends on whether the verdict was based on direct or
circumstantial evidence. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). Direct evidence
is “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves
a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2 Based on Prowell’s arguments at trial, we understand this to be a reference to a marijuana cigarette.
3 2017) (quotation omitted). In contrast, circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which
the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that
is not required with direct evidence.” State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted).
The postconviction court determined that there was sufficient direct evidence to
support the jury’s finding of guilt. Prowell asserts that we should apply the circumstantial-
evidence standard of review. He cites three cases in support of that assertion. The first
case is State v. Stokes, in which we stated:
Stokes’ assertion that his conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence characterizes all of the testimony of both police officers and of [a witness] as circumstantial evidence. This characterization is in error. The observations of [those witnesses] that Stokes was “unsteady,” smelled of alcohol, etc., are direct evidence of the conditions they observed. Stokes also overlooks his own admission that he was driving and had consumed alcohol. These admissions are direct, not circumstantial, evidence.
354 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. App. 1984).
The second case is State v. Holmes, in which we rejected Holmes’s argument that
because no witness observed him consume alcohol and he refused blood-alcohol testing,
the eyewitness accounts of his condition and behavior was “circumstantial and . . . .
insufficient to prove that he was under the influence of alcohol when he drove his pickup
truck into the back of a van at an intersection in front of a police officer.” 701 N.W.2d
267, 271 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 719 N.W.2d 904
(Minn. 2006). We noted that four eyewitnesses opined that Holmes was intoxicated based
4 on their direct observations of him. Id. We also noted that the officer who testified about
Holmes’s intoxication had training and experience in detecting intoxication. Id.
We also stated that the evidence of Holmes’s intoxication was “more than sufficient
to support the verdict even if the evidence is characterized as only circumstantial.” Id. We
reasoned that no evidence supported Holmes’s assertion of a rational alternative hypothesis
of innocence, which was that “the odor of an alcoholic beverage was coming from someone
other than [Holmes], or that his behavior was due to a head injury or due to his being a
‘terrible driver and belligerent scofflaw with a major attitude problem.’” Id.
The third case is State v. Olson, in which we concluded that the direct-evidence
standard of review applied “because the state presented direct evidence of Olson’s alcohol
consumption and impaired driving through eyewitness testimony.” 887 N.W.2d 692, 700
(Minn. App. 2016). We reasoned as follows:
Here the record shows Olson consumed multiple alcoholic beverages over the course of the day—from 10:00 a.m. to around 6:00 p.m. Both [Olson’s friend] and the trooper testified that, based on their observations, they believed Olson was too drunk to drive. [Olson’s friend] took over driving and described Olson’s unusual behavior at the restaurant just before he fell and hit his head. The trooper detected an odor of alcohol coming from Olson, and observed that Olson was staggering and had an unsteady gait. Olson admitted he had been drinking, and Olson refused to perform field sobriety tests or a preliminary breath test. Based on this record, a jury could reasonably conclude that Olson was driving while impaired by alcohol. The evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for this offense.
Id.
5 In this case, the state presented evidence—described below—similar to the evidence
deemed to be direct in Stokes, Holmes, and Olson. We therefore apply the standard of
review applicable to a guilty verdict based on direct evidence. Under that standard, we
carefully analyze the record to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jury to reach its verdict. State v.
Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989); State v. Olson, 982 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn.
App. 2022). We assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
contrary evidence. State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998). We defer to the
jury’s credibility determinations and will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. State v.
Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009); State v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn.
App. 2002). We will not disturb a guilty verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
have reasonably concluded that the state proved the defendant’s guilt. Bernhardt v. State,
684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
At trial, the jury in this case heard testimony from several officers. Officer MB
testified that she was dispatched to “a vehicle that had struck the median” near Interstate
394 and Highway 169 in Golden Valley. Upon arrival, she observed a vehicle with
significant damage. It is undisputed that Prowell was the driver of that vehicle. Officer
MB testified, “As I was speaking with [Prowell] and getting him in the handcuffs, I did
smell the odor of a consumed alcoholic beverage emanating from his person.” She further
testified that Prowell had “slurred speech” and that his responses were “somewhat
delayed,” which—based on her training and experience—led her to believe that he was
6 intoxicated and laboring under the influence of alcohol. Officer MB testified that Prowell
was transported to the police station and given a breath-alcohol test, however the state did
not offer the test results as evidence at trial.
Video from Officer MB’s body-worn camera was admitted as evidence. The video
shows Prowell admit, at the scene, that he was driving the vehicle before it crashed. Later
in the video, Prowell is shown performing field sobriety tests at a police station. During
the heel-to-toe steps, Prowell was wobbly and had trouble keeping his balance. Prowell
admitted that he had consumed “a couple beers.” The officer conducting the tests remarked
that Prowell appeared to have consumed more alcohol than that. Prowell later admitted
that he had also consumed “one shot.” The postconviction court noted that, in the video,
Prowell’s “speech is noticeably slurred and delayed” and that the video shows him
“stumbling while attempting to walk in a straight line.”
Officer LS testified that, when he arrived at the accident scene, he observed a
heavily damaged vehicle. He testified that after briefly interacting with Prowell, he
“detected an odor . . . consistent with that of a consumed alcoholic beverage emitting from
him.” Officer LS also testified that he recovered an Oxycodone prescription bottle with
Prowell’s name on it from the center console of the vehicle. The pills were field tested and
were presumptively positive for amphetamine.
Video from Officer LS’s body camera was also admitted as evidence. At the
beginning of the video, the officer is shown interacting with a bystander, who confirmed
that he reported the crash. Their conversation was captured on the video. The officer asked
the bystander if Prowell was “drunk or something” and the bystander replied: “Oh man
7 he’s got to be yeah, I think he’s smoking a blunt. We were on 394 and he lost his sh-t. He
was going about 100 miles an hour, blew past us, [and] smacked into the median.” The
video also showed Officer MB ask Officer LS, “Did you smell the booze?” Officer LS
replied, “Yeah, he reeks like it.” Officer LS later stated, “[h]e reeks like booze,” and “I
don’t know how drunk, but you can smell it.”
In sum, the jury heard direct evidence that Prowell admitted that he had consumed
alcohol, a bystander observed Prowell drive approximately 100 miles per hour and crash
into the median, the bystander told a responding officer that he believed Prowell was
intoxicated, two responding officers detected an odor of consumed alcohol emanating from
Prowell, Officer MB testified that Prowell slurred his words and was slow to respond,
Officer MB testified that she believed Prowell was impaired by alcohol, and video evidence
corroborated that testimony and showed that Prowell had a difficult time maintaining his
balance. Under the caselaw described above, this is direct evidence. And based on this
evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Prowell was
driving while impaired by alcohol, as the postconviction court concluded.
Application of the circumstantial-evidence standard of review would not change our
determination that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. Under that
standard we first determine the circumstances proved, disregarding evidence inconsistent
with the verdict. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600-01. Next, we determine “whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). In doing so, we do not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between
8 reasonable inferences. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013). But we
will not reverse a conviction based on circumstantial evidence unless there is a reasonable
inference other than guilt. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
Prowell argues that “[w]hen viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved do not
preclude a reasonable inference that [he] was not impaired by alcohol but instead some
other substance” such as Oxycodone, ecstasy, or marijuana. The postconviction court
noted that even if the circumstantial-evidence standard applied and it were to accept
Prowell’s hypothesis of innocence as reasonable, “that does not prohibit him from also
being impaired by alcohol.” We agree.
We also reason that, despite the evidence of the Oxycodone bottle containing a
substance that field-tested positive for amphetamine, there was no evidence that Prowell
had consumed or was under the influence of either substance. And despite the bystander’s
report that he thought Prowell had been smoking a “blunt,” there is no evidence showing
that the “blunt” contained marijuana, and there was no evidence that the police found or
smelled marijuana on Prowell or in his car. Under the circumstantial-evidence standard of
review, we do not reverse a conviction for mere conjecture. State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d
785, 789 (Minn. 1998). “[P]ossibilities of innocence” do not justify relief. State v. Ostrem,
535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995). Prowell’s hypothesis of innocence is based on mere
conjecture and is not reasonable.
In sum, the postconviction court did not err in determining that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict.
9 II.
Prowell argues that the district court committed reversible error by accepting his
signed stipulation regarding his prior DWI conviction as a trial exhibit. The postconviction
court rejected this argument.
Prowell concedes that he did not object to the stipulation and that he invited the
error. But as he notes, although “[t]he invited error doctrine prevents a party from asserting
an error on appeal that he invited or could have prevented in the court below,” “[t]he invited
error doctrine . . . does not apply to plain errors.” State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258
(Minn. 2007). We therefore review the admission of the challenged stipulation for plain
error, as the postconviction court did.
“To establish a plain error a defendant must demonstrate that (1) there was an error,
(2) it was plain, and (3) it affected substantial rights.” Id. If a defendant establishes all
three factors, an appellate court then considers “whether the error should be addressed to
ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“An error is plain if it is clear and obvious; usually this means an error that violates
or contradicts case law, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.” State v. Matthews,
779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). Prowell asserts that admission of his stipulation was
error that was plain under Minn. R. Evid. 403, which states, “Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Under the elements of the enhanced DWI offense with which Prowell was charged,
the state had to prove that Prowell had a qualifying DWI conviction within the previous
ten years. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.26 (imposing a gross-misdemeanor penalty for DWI if
an “aggravating factor” is present), .03, subd. 3(1) (defining the term aggravating factor to
include “a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately
preceding the current offense”), subd. 20 (defining the term “[p]rior impaired driving
conviction” to include a prior conviction for DWI) (2018). When proof of a prior impaired
driving incident is required, the district court “must accept an unequivocal judicial
admission of a prior DWI and let the defendant remove from the jury the issue of whether
he had prior DWI convictions.” State v. Clark, 375 N.W.2d 59, 61-62 (Minn. App. 1985).
“By judicially admitting the existence of the element of the prior conviction, the defendant
removes that issue from the case. The effect is that the case will be submitted to the jury
as an ordinary DWI case.” State v. Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 397 n.2 (Minn. 1984).
Prowell and his counsel submitted a signed stipulation, which was later admitted
into evidence, stating that “Prowell has a conviction for driving while impaired from 2014”
and that “[t]his conviction enhances this driving under the influence incident to a Gross
Misdemeanor.” Prowell’s counsel discussed the ramifications of the stipulation on the
record and asked Prowell, “Okay. You don’t dispute that you had a prior conviction for
driving while impaired, right?” Prowell responded, “No.” Prowell’s counsel also asked,
“And you understand that by conceding that you have the prior DWI . . . , it reduces what
the State has to prove as to your priors? Do you understand that?” Prowell responded in
the affirmative. Prowell’s counsel stated, “But it also, you get the benefit from them not
11 knowing the details of these prior convictions.” Prowell responded, “Yeah.” The district
court questioned defense counsel regarding the stipulation stating:
One last thing, . . . I do want to know is the form of that stipulation. We off the record had a conversation in which I asked about the form and the stipulation. You told me that the form of the stipulation was consistent to a strategic decision that you had made, which I don’t need to know about. It’s just that you are specifically approving of as a matter of strategy to the form of the stipulation. Is that a correct statement?
Defense counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
At the beginning of trial, the district court read the stipulation to the jury. The
district court then asked counsel if this was a correct recitation of the stipulation, and
Prowell’s counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” The district court then received the
signed stipulation as an exhibit.
When instructing the jury, the district court addressed the stipulation as follows:
“The parties have agreed and you therefore must accept as true that the Defendant has a
prior impaired driving incident within ten years immediately preceding the current
offense.” The instructions also contained, at defense counsel’s request, a cautionary
instruction regarding Prowell’s prior convictions:
Now, the parties have stipulated, and you’ve heard it twice, to the existence of prior convictions. This evidence is not to be used as proof of the character of the Defendant or that the Defendant acted in conformity with such character. The Defendant is not being tried for and may not be convicted of any offenses other than the charged offenses and you’re not to convict the Defendant on the basis of his prior convictions. To do so might result in unjust double punishment.
12 In sum, Prowell expressly stipulated to having “a conviction for driving while
impaired from 2014,” instead of simply stipulating to the relevant element and removing
that issue from the jury’s consideration. Prowell complains that “submitting into evidence
a form that stated that [he] had a prior DWI” instead of “simply stipulating to his legal
status” defeated the purpose of the stipulation because by “admitting in writing to the jury
that he had previously been convicted of DWI,” the jury could conclude that he had a
propensity to drive while intoxicated and was, therefore, “likely guilty here.”
Prowell’s concern is reasonable. However, when the district court questioned his
approach to the stipulation, defense counsel assured the court that the approach was based
on trial strategy. Indeed, “[w]hat evidence to present to the jury . . . represents an
attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics and lies within the proper discretion of trial
counsel.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999). For that reason, the
postconviction court determined that the district court did not err in accepting the
stipulation.
Prowell argues that any strategy underlying the stipulation is irrelevant. He notes
that the Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the plain-error rule in a variety of situations
in which the defendant invited, presumably for strategic reasons, an error by the district
court. For example, in State v. Gisege, the supreme court addressed a “fundamental error”
arising from the district court’s provision of a jury instruction regarding a lesser-included
offense even though the defendant had requested that instruction. 561 N.W.2d 152, 158-
61 (Minn. 1997). The supreme court also applied the plain-error rule in State v. Carridine
to the district court’s provision of a self-defense jury instruction even though the defendant
13 had requested that instruction. 812 N.W.2d 130, 142-44 (Minn. 2012). Prowell asserts
that the requests by the defense for jury instructions in Gisege and Carridine were also
strategic.
This case is unique in that the district court apparently recognized that the “form”—
which we understand to mean the wording—of the defense’s stipulation was unusual.
Thus, the district court raised the issue with defense counsel, and counsel assured the
district court that his decision to use that particular wording was strategic. As the
postconviction court noted, the district court allowed Prowell “to stipulate to his prior
conviction in the specific form he approved.” The postconviction court concluded that the
district court did not err in admitting the stipulation because “rather than denying a request
to stipulate, the district court facilitated it, honoring [the defense’s] strategic choice.”
Prowell does not address whether it is appropriate to apply plain-error review if the
district court grants a defendant’s request for a specifically worded stipulation after (1)
questioning defense counsel to ensure that he wants that wording and (2) being assured by
defense counsel that the wording it is consistent with a defense strategy. But we need not
resolve that issue because the postconviction court correctly reasoned that alleged error did
not affect Prowell’s substantial rights. See State v. Moore, 863 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Minn.
App. 2015) (“If an appellate court concludes that any requirement of the plain-error test is
not satisfied, the appellate court need not consider the other requirements”), rev. denied
(Minn. July 21, 2015).
An error affects an appellant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood
that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict, that is, if the error changed the
14 outcome of the case. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998). “When
considering whether an error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, we consider the
strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper
suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the
improper suggestions.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 803 (Minn. 2014) (quotations
As to the pervasiveness of the stipulation, the state did not focus on the stipulation
during its case in chief or in its closing argument. As the postconviction court noted, the
state did not mention the stipulation during either its closing or rebuttal arguments. And
the district court provided a cautionary instruction to dissuade the jury from using Prowell’s
prior DWI conviction for an improper purpose. “We presume a jury follows a court’s
cautionary instruction.”3 State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009).
As to the strength of the evidence, Prowell argues that if the jury had not known
about his prior DWI, “it is reasonably likely that it would not have found him guilty because
the [s]tate’s evidence was otherwise weak.” Prowell notes that the state did not introduce
evidence of chemical testing or a field sobriety test, “which are expected in a DWI case.”
Prowell relies on Clark, but that case is distinguishable procedurally and factually.
3 We acknowledge Prowell’s argument that the circumstances warranted a curative instruction striking the stipulation and instructing the jury to disregard it instead of a cautionary instruction regarding proper use of the stipulation. See State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 687 (Minn. 2002) (“Because the testimony was inadmissible, the [district] court’s instruction should have been curative, rather than cautionary, and the inadmissible testimony should have been stricken.”). However, because we assume without deciding that acceptance of the stipulation was a plain error, we consider the mitigating effect of the instruction, which—like the stipulation—was proposed by the defense.
15 Procedurally, Clark is distinguishable because the district court in that case erred by
refusing to allow the defendant to stipulate to the existence of his prior DWI conviction.
375 N.W.2d at 62. We therefore applied the harmless-error standard of review, and not
the plain-error standard. Id. at 62-63. Although the standards are similar, “the state bears
the burden of establishing that [an] error was harmless.” State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453,
468 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013). But under the plain-error
standard, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the error affected his
substantial rights, and it is a “heavy burden.” See State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872
(Minn. 2010) (stating that “[p]lain error is prejudicial when there is a reasonable likelihood
that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict” and that “[t]he defendant bears
a heavy burden of persuasion on this prong”) (quotations omitted)).
Factually, Clark is distinguishable because unlike this case, in which Prowell
crashed into a median while driving at a high speed, Clark’s observed driving conduct was
much less egregious: the police stopped him because he was “traveling very slowly and
weaving in and out of [his] proper traffic lane.” Clark, 375 N.W.2d at 61. In addition, in
Clark, “[t]he evidence of intoxication was entirely observation testimony by police
officers.” Id. at 63. Unlike the facts here, Clark does not indicate that the driver in that
case admitted consumption of alcohol, smelled like alcohol, slurred his words, had slow
responses, or had trouble maintaining his balance during a sobriety test. See id. at 61. As
the postconviction court reasoned, unlike Clark, evidence in this case corroborated the
officer’s opinion that Prowell was intoxicated. For example, the body-worn camera video
showed Prowell slur his speech, respond slowly, and stumble during a sobriety test.
16 In sum, the evidence of impaired driving in this case was much stronger than the
evidence in Clark. On this record, Prowell has not met his “heavy burden” to show that
the alleged error affected his substantial rights. The postconviction court therefore did not
err in determining that he was not entitled to relief under the plain-error standard.
Affirmed.