Arturo C. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 Jul 14, 2026 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 ARTURO C.,1 No. 4:26-cv-5015-EFS 7 Plaintiff, v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS 9 FRANK BISIGNANO, 10 Commissioner of Social Security,

11 Defendant.

12 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a partially favorable 13 decision as to Plaintiff Arturo C.’s Title 2 application for benefits, 14 finding him disabled from March 27, 2020, through April 30, 2022. 15 Plaintiff contends substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s 16 17

18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 decision that he was not disabled after April 30, 2022, due to a

2 contradictory medical opinion and several errors at step five in the 3 sequential evaluation process. For the reasons explained herein, the 4 ALJ’s decision is affirmed.

5 I. Background 6 Plaintiff filed his Title 2 application for benefits in June 2022, 7 alleging disability beginning March 27, 2020, due to a back injury,

8 thyroid problems, high blood pressure, leg spasms, foot pain, problems 9 with standing and walking, and inability to sit because of pain.2 After 10 his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff

11 appeared for a hearing before ALJ Marie Palachuk in October 2024, at 12 which Plaintiff, a medical expert, and a vocational expert testified.3 13 The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision finding Plaintiff

14 disabled from March 27, 2020, through April 30, 2022, and not disabled 15 16

18 2 Administrative Record (AR) 335–38, 368. 19 3 AR 105–29. 20 1 after April 30, 2022.4 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s degenerative disc

2 disease and herniated disc were disabling until his conditions 3 materially improved after April 30, 2022.5 For the period after the 4 closed period of disability, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms

5 were “not entirely consistent” with the medical evidence and other 6 evidence.6 As to the medical opinions, the ALJ found: 7 • the treating opinion of Keith Goodman, DO, unpersuasive.

8 • the examining opinion of Marquetta Washington, ARNP, 9 persuasive. 10 • the testifying opinion of Mark Stevens, MD, persuasive.

11 12 13

14 4 AR 40–60. Per 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)–(g), a five-step evaluation 15 determines whether a claimant is disabled. 16 5 AR 50–53. 17 6 AR 54. As recommended by the Ninth Circuit in Smartt v. Kijakazi, 18 the ALJ should consider replacing the phrase “not entirely consistent” 19 with “inconsistent.” 53 F.4th 489, 499 n.2 (9th Cir. 2022). 20 1 • the prior administrative medical findings by the state agency

2 medical consultants unpersuasive for the period after April 30, 3 2022.7 4 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found:

5 • Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through 6 December 31, 2025. 7 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

8 activity since March 27, 2020, the alleged onset date. 9 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 10 severe impairments: herniated disc at L5-S1 status post

11 microdiscectomy and two-stage fusion at L4-S1; Graves’ 12 disease; and degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine. 13 • Step three: Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of

14 impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one 15 of the listed impairments from March 27, 2020, through April 16 30, 2022, but did not thereafter.

17 • RFC: after April 30, 2022, Plaintiff had the RFC to: 18

19 7 AR 57–58. 20 1 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he could stand and/or walk up to four hours total 2 in an eight-hour day and would need to alternate between sitting and standing at will; he could frequently 3 push and pull bilaterally; he could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and climb ramps or stairs but could never 4 crouch, crawl, or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he would need to wear glasses to read small print; and he 5 should avoid all exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and hazards (e.g., unprotected heights, dangerous moving 6 machinery)

7 • Step four: Plaintiff was not capable of performing past relevant 8 work. 9 • Step five: after April 30, 2022, considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, 10 education, and work history, Plaintiff could perform work that 11 existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such 12 as small-products assembler, routing clerk, and production 13 assembler.8 14 15 16 17 18

19 8 AR 50–60. 20 1 Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the

2 Appeals Council, which denied review.9 Plaintiff now appeals to district 3 court.10 4 II. Standard of Review

5 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by 6 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”11 and such error 7 impacted the nondisability determination.12 Substantial evidence is

8 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 9 10

12 9 AR 1–3. 13 10 ECF No. 1. 14 11 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. § 15 405(g). 16 12 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on 17 other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may 18 not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is 19 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 20 1 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

2 support a conclusion.”13 3 III. Analysis 4 A. Substantial Evidence of Improvement After April 30, 2022:

5 Plaintiff fails to establish error. 6 Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s determination that his 7 conditions improved such that he was no longer disabled after April 30,

8 2022. Plaintiff notes that his primary care provider, Dr. Goodman, 9 opined in November 2023 that Plaintiff’s back issues and pain would 10 limit him to lifting ten pounds and standing or walking up to two

12 13 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 13 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 14 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 15 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 16 detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion,” not simply the evidence 17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 hours. The Commissioner responds that Plaintiff waived any challenge

2 to the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Goodman’s opinion because Plaintiff 3 did not argue that the ALJ erred in considering it. 4 Plaintiff—not the Court—must flesh out and support his

5 arguments with law and facts.14 In general, a claimant forfeits an 6 argument by not challenging the ALJ’s decision in that regard in 7 briefing.15

8 Here, Plaintiff did not forfeit his argument. True, Plaintiff did not 9 plainly articulate any specific challenge to the ALJ’s weighing of 10 Dr. Goodman’s opinion; Plaintiff simply argued that his conditions did

12 14 See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 930 (9th 13 Cir. 2003) (“We require contentions to be accompanied by reasons.”); 14 McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[I]ssues 15 adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at 16 developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a 17 party to mention a possible argument in a most skeletal way, leaving 18 the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”). 19 15 See Nadon v. Bisignano, 145 F.4th 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2025). 20 1 not materially improve after April 30, 2022, and then summarized

2 Dr. Goodman’s opinion.16 But Plaintiff’s summary of Dr. Goodman’s 3 opinion includes his lifting/carrying and standing/walking restrictions, 4 both of which contradict the ALJ’s crafted RFC.17 Therefore, Plaintiff

5 sufficiently argued that substantial evidence does not support the 6 lifting/carrying and standing/walking restrictions in the ALJ’s crafted 7 RFC based on Dr. Goodman’s contradictory opinion. The Commissioner

8 was not prejudiced by the inartful presentation of this argument in 9 Plaintiff’s brief, as the Commissioner responsively argued that 10 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding.18

11 In any event, substantial evidence supports the exertional 12 components of the RFC and the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Goodman’s 13 opinion. Dr. Goodman completed a medical questionnaire in November

14 2023 indicating his opinion that Plaintiff’s lumbar radiculopathy, 15 surgeries in 2020 and 2021, spinal stenosis, and chronic pain would 16

17 16 ECF No. 10 at 13. 18 17 See id.; AR 54, 1171. 19 18 See ECF No. 12 at 4–5. 20 1 limit him to lifting/carrying ten pounds daily and standing/walking two

2 hours daily.19 The ALJ reasonably considered this opinion 3 unpersuasive for lack of supportability and consistency.20 The ALJ 4 correctly noted that Dr. Goodman did not support his opinion with any

5 explanation or treatment records,21 and Dr. Goodman’s treatment 6 records themselves, which the ALJ considered elsewhere in her 7 decision,22 do not support Dr. Goodman’s opinion.23 The ALJ also

8 reasonably determined that Dr. Goodman’s opinion was inconsistent 9 with the objective medical evidence from around the time of the opinion 10 and the other medical opinions of record, as an August 2023 MRI

12 19 AR 1171. 13 20 See AR 57; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)–(c). 14 21 AR 57, 1171. 15 22 AR 54–56. 16 23 See, e.g., AR 803–10, 848–51, 1199–201; cf. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 17 F.3d 664, 677 n.4 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that the ALJ is to 18 consider whether treatment notes are consistent with a checkbox 19 opinion). 20 1 showed no new disc herniation, two mild disc bulges, and mild stenosis;

2 Plaintiff’s neurosurgeon did not recommend any treatment except for 3 physical therapy; and NP Washington, who evaluated Plaintiff in 4 December 2023, and Dr. Stevens, an orthopedic specialist who

5 reviewed the entire medical record, opined that Plaintiff could lift/carry 6 up to twenty pounds and stand/walk for at least four hours if 7 alternating between sitting and standing/walking.24 Accordingly,

8 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s consideration of 9 Dr. Goodman’s opinion and the light-work RFC25 with a four-hour 10 standing/walking limitation.

11 B. Step Five: Plaintiff fails to establish error. 12 At step five, considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, marginal education 13 level, and work history, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform any of

14 the 10,000 small-parts assembler jobs existing nationwide, 10,000 15

16 24 AR 57, 110–14, 870, 876–78, 1146–49, 1157–58, 1173–79. 17 25 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with 18 frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 19 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). 20 1 production assembler jobs, and 25,000 routing clerk jobs. Plaintiff

2 raises three challenges to the step-five findings: (1) substantial 3 evidence does not support finding he had a marginal education; (2) the 4 ALJ did not identify a “significant” number of jobs he could perform;

5 and (3) substantial evidence does not support finding he has the 6 language skills necessary to perform the step-five jobs. Each challenge 7 fails.

8 1. “Marginal” education level 9 Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the 10 ALJ’s finding that he has a marginal education because he attended

11 school only through ninth grade in Mexico.26 Instead, Plaintiff argues, 12 he should be considered illiterate relative to the English language. The 13

14 26 Without citation to the record, Plaintiff states in his opening brief 15 that he attended school through seventh grade in Mexico, ECF No. 10 16 at 10, but he testified at the hearing that he attended through ninth 17 grade, AR 121, which no evidence contradicts. The Court’s reasoning is 18 the same whether Plaintiff has a seventh-grade or ninth-grade 19 education in Mexico. 20 1 Commissioner responds that Plaintiff’s ninth-grade education in

2 Mexico meets the regulatory definition of “marginal education.” 3 When determining whether the claimant can perform other jobs, 4 the ALJ must consider the claimant’s education level.27 “Education is

5 primarily used to mean formal schooling or other training which 6 contributes to [the claimant’s] ability to meet vocational requirements, 7 for example, reasoning ability, communication skills, and arithmetical

8 ability.”28 The regulations establish categories of education levels.29 As 9 relevant here, the “illiteracy” category “means the inability to read or 10 write. We consider someone illiterate if the person cannot read or write

11 a simple message such as instructions or inventory lists even though 12 the person can sign his or her name. Generally, an illiterate person has 13 had little or no formal schooling.”30 The Administration considers the

14 illiteracy category appropriate “only if the individual is unable to read 15

16 27 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1564. 17 28 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(a). 18 29 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b). 19 30 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(1). 20 1 or write a simple message in any language.”31 The “marginal

2 education” category “means ability in reasoning, arithmetic, and 3 language skills which are needed to do simple, unskilled types of jobs. 4 We generally consider that formal schooling at a 6th grade level or less

5 is a marginal education.”32 The Administration considers education 6 level “a reliable indicator of the individual’s ability to read and write a 7 simple message . . . regardless of whether the schooling occurred in the

8 United States or in another country.”33 9 Prior to April 27, 2020, the regulations provided that “education 10 also includes how well you are able to communicate in English since

11 this ability is often acquired or improved by education,” so the ALJ 12 “consider[ed] a person’s ability to communicate in English when [the 13

14 15

16 31 Social Security Ruling, SSR 20-01p: How We Determine an 17 Individual's Education Category, 85 FR 13692-02 (Mar. 9, 2020). 18 32 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(2). 19 33 SSR 20-01p, supra n.31. 20 1 ALJ] evaluate[d] what work, if any, [the claimant could] do.”34 Effective

2 April 27, 2020, the regulations no longer require the ALJ to do so.35 3 Here, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff had a marginal 4 education because he attended school until the ninth grade in Mexico,

5 which is slightly more schooling than the Commissioner generally 6 considers a marginal education.36 Plaintiff has cited no law or 7 regulation that invalidates the Administration’s policy of considering

8 education outside the United States.37 Further, because ALJs no longer 9 consider a claimant’s English-language communication abilities when 10

11 12 13

14 34 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b), (b)(5) (2020) (effective until April 27, 2020). 15 35 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564 (amendments effective April 27, 2020); 16 Removing Inability To Communicate in English as an Education 17 Category, 85 FR 10586-01 (Feb. 25, 2020). 18 36 AR 121; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(2). 19 37 See SSR 20-01p, supra n.31. 20 1 determining education level, the “illiteracy” education category would

2 not be supported based on Plaintiff’s ninth-grade education.38 3 2. “Significant” number of jobs existing nationwide 4 Next, Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not identify a “significant”

5 number of jobs existing nationwide because 10,000, the number of 6 existing small-parts assembler jobs and the number of existing 7 production assembler jobs, is not “significant” as a matter of law.

8 The Commissioner responds that the ALJ found 45,000 total jobs 9 nationwide that Plaintiff could perform: 10,000 small-parts assembler 10 jobs, 10,000 production assembler jobs, and 25,000 routing clerk jobs.

11 The Commissioner contends that 45,000 is a “significant” number as a 12 matter of law. The Commissioner asserts that no law supports 13 Plaintiff’s argument that each individual job must exist in significant

14 numbers, but even accepting the argument, the ALJ still found 25,000 15 routing clerk jobs, which is by itself a significant number. 16

18 38 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(1); 85 FR 10586-01; SSR 20-01p, supra 19 n.31. 20 1 At step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant

2 can perform work in the national economy which exists in “significant 3 numbers in the national economy (either in the region where [the 4 claimant] live[s] or in several regions in the country).”39 The Ninth

5 Circuit has “never set out a bright-line rule for what constitutes a 6 ‘significant number’ of jobs.”40 Even so, the Ninth Circuit has held that 7 “the ALJ’s finding that 25,000 national jobs is sufficient presents a

8 close call,” but nevertheless “represents a significant number of jobs in 9 several regions of the country.”41 10 Here, the ALJ identified approximately 45,000 total jobs existing

11 nationwide that Plaintiff could perform.42 Under Ninth Circuit 12 caselaw, this number qualifies as “significant.”43 Even accepting 13 Plaintiff’s argument that the 10,000 small-parts assembler jobs and

15 39 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1). 16 40 Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 528 (9th Cir. 2014). 17 41 Id. at 529. 18 42 See AR 59. 19 43 See Gutierrez, 740 F.3d at 529. 20 1 10,000 production assembler jobs are individually not significant, the

2 ALJ also found 25,000 national routing clerk jobs, a significant 3 number.44 Therefore, Plaintiff’s challenge to the significance of the 4 ALJ’s job numbers fails.

5 3. Language skills required for step-five jobs 6 Finally, Plaintiff argues he is illiterate relative to the English 7 language, and the record contains no support for finding that he has

8 the language skills needed to perform the jobs identified by the ALJ at 9 step five according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 10 definitions of those jobs. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ

11 adequately considered Plaintiff’s language skills by assessing his 12 marginal education without considering his ability to communicate in 13 English.

14 The definitions of “Assembler, Small Products I” and “Assembler, 15 Production” in the DOT require “Level 1” language skills, meaning the 16 ability to “[r]ecognize meaning of 2,500 (two- or three-syllable) words.

17 Read at rate of 95-120 words per minute. Compare similarities and 18

19 44 AR 59; Gutierrez, 740 F.3d at 529. 20 1 differences between words and between series of numbers.”45 The

2 definition of “Routing Clerk” requires “Level 2” language skills, 3 meaning “[p]assive vocabulary of 5,000-6,000 words. Read at rate of 4 190-215 words per minute. Read adventure stories and comic books,

5 looking up unfamiliar words in dictionary for meaning, spelling, and 6 pronunciation. Read instructions for assembling model cars and 7 airplanes.”46 Neither level 1 nor level 2 language skills refer to the

8 English language, whereas level 3 language skills require the ability to 9 speak (but not to read or write) in English.47 10

11 45 706.684-022 Assembler, Small Products I, DICOT 706.684-022; 12 706.687-010 Assembler, Production, DICOT 706.687-010. 13 46 222.687-022 Routing Clerk, DICOT 222.687-022. Plaintiff 14 erroneously argues that the DOT requires Level 1 language skills for a 15 routing clerk. See ECF No. 10 at 10–11; but see ECF No. 10 at 15 16 (exhibit accurately showing “L2” language skills). 17 47 DOT, Appendix C - Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 18 688702. 19

20 1 Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that

2 Plaintiff possessed up to level 2 language skills for purposes of 3 performing the step-five jobs. Plaintiff’s ninth-grade education in 4 Mexico alone is substantial evidence, considering language levels 1 and

5 2 do not require English language skills.48 But the record also contains 6 substantial evidence of levels 1 and 2 English language skills, as 7 Plaintiff completed handwritten function and work history reports with

8 narrative responses in English (with no indication that someone else 9 completed the forms on his behalf),49 spoke English and did not request 10 Spanish language interpreters at some medical appointments,50 and

11 agreed to hear the beginning of the hearing without an interpreter.51 12 13

14 48 See supra nn.45–47. 15 49 AR 376–83, 390–91. 16 50 See, e.g., AR 38, 479, 494, 497, 512, 602, 632, 638. 17 51 AR 107–14. But see AR 107–08, 115 (requiring a Spanish language 18 interpreter to testify at the hearing), 367–69 (disability report 19 indicating Plaintiff cannot speak, read, or understand English), 1243 20 1 IV. Conclusion

2 Plaintiff fails to establish that the ALJ consequentially erred, and

3 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s nondisability determination

4 ||for the period after April 30, 2022.

5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

6 1. The ALJ’s partially favorable decision is AFFIRMED.

7 2. The Clerk’s Office shall TERM the parties’ briefs, ECF

Nos. 10 and 12, enter JUDGMENT in favor of the

9 Commissioner, and CLOSK the case.

10 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to file this

11 ||order and provide copies to all counsel.

12 DATED this 14th day of July 2026.

i awd | Lew. 14 EDWARD F.SHEA | Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 (requiring a Spanish language interpreter for a psychological 19 evaluation). 20 DISPOSITIVE ORDER - 21