NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CHARLES ARTILLIO JR. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TERESA ARTILLIO : No. 158 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 2015-60295
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2020 Appellant Charles Artillio, Jr., appeals from the order creating a constructive trust for undisclosed marital assets in favor of Appellee Teresa Artillio. On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court lacked authority to create a constructive trust and erred by finding that the record supported the creation of a constructive trust. We affirm.
We adopt the facts set forth in the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct.
Op., 3/4/20, at 1-6, 13-26. We add that the parties’ divorce complaint requested incorporation of the parties’ property settlement agreement (PSA) into the divorce decree. See Compl. in Divorce, 2/25/15; see also Trial Ct.
Op. at 1-2. The certified record also reflects the filing of an inventory of marital property.1 See Compl. in Divorce; see also R.R. at 91a.
Subsequently, Appellee filed a petition for special relief, which essentially asserted that Appellant intentionally concealed marital assets. Appellee’s Pet. for Special Relief for Constructive Tr. & Accounting, 2/25/19, at 10-11. Appellee asserted that as a result of Appellant’s material misrepresentations, Appellant induced her to sign the PSA. Id. at 7. Appellee alleged that the trial court has “full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this part and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require . . . .” Id. at 11 (unpaginated) (quoting 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f)).
On that basis, Appellee’s petition requested the following relief:
a. [Appellant] shall, within ten (10) days of the date of the court’s order, file with the court a verified inventory and appraisement of all financial accounts held by [Appellant] or any financial account that [Appellant] has any interest for the past five years to present, substantially in the form provided by [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 1920.75.
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1 Specifically, the inventory was stapled in the middle of the parties’ divorce complaint, in between a document titled “report of social security number” and the PSA. See Compl. in Divorce. The trial court similarly noted that an inventory was filed and it was “on top of the marital property agreement.” R.R. at 292a-93a. We may cite to the reproduced record for the parties’ convenience.
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b. All of the entities which [Appellant] failed to disclose to [Appellee] shall be placed in a constructive trust and discovery shall be ordered to be completed within ninety days to determine the true value of the marital estate and to compel [Appellant] to tender to [Appellee] her equitable marital share of the full marital estate and to award all reasonable counsel fees and other costs in connection with the petition; and granting [Appellee] such other further relief as the court deems equitable and just[,] including interim counsel fees.
Id. at 12 (unpaginated).
On December 12, 2019, the trial court granted relief, and we quote the order in relevant part as follows:
Pursuant to Section 3505(d)[2] of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, 23 Purdon’s Consolidated Statutes Annotated, a constructive trust is established for all undisclosed assets/businesses including, but not limited to the following: . . .
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[The trial court designated an attorney as trustee of the constructive trust and stated the trustee would be paid].
[Appellant] shall provide to Trustee and opposing counsel within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, an accounting of the above businesses which shall include, at minimum the following:
date established; names and addresses of all partners/shareholders; percentage of [Appellant’s] interest in said property; if no longer in existence, then date it was dissolved; copies of all tax returns for all businesses from 2012 until the present; name of [all of the] officers; and any other information requested by the Trustee.
None of the above assets/businesses shall be disposed of, alienated or further encumbered without written notice given to
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2 As we noted earlier, Appellee’s petition requested relief under Section 3323(f), and not under Section 3505(d).
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the Trustee and all parties at least ten (10) days in advance of any action involving the assets/businesses.
This matter is referred to the Master’s Office for further oversight in accordance with state and local procedure. There is an outstanding request by [Appellee] for attorney’s fees. [Appellee]
is required to file any pleadings necessary, under state or local rule, to have the matter handled by the Master’s Office. The Master’s Office shall deal with the division of assets and attorney’s fees.
Order, 12/12/19, at 1-2 (emphasis added). Appellant timely appealed on January 6, 2020, and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
On January 28, 2020, this Court issued a rule to show cause why Appellant’s appeal should not be quashed because the trial court’s December 12, 2019 order, which referred “the matter to the Master’s Office for division of the listed assets and for disposition of [A]ppellee’s petition for attorney’s fees,” was not a final order. Order, 1/28/20. On February 6, 2020, Appellant filed an answer asserting that because the trial court ordered the creation of a constructive trust under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d), the order was appealable as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4).3 Appellant’s Answer to
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3 We note, however, that in his appellate brief, Appellant argues that the order was invalid because Appellee failed to request relief under Section 3505(d). See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 35.
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Rule to Show Cause, 2/6/20, at 2-3. On February 7, 2020, the Court discharged its rule and referred the issue to this panel.4 Order, 2/7/20.
Whether Appellant Could Properly Take an Interlocutory Appeal Before quoting Appellant’s issues, we address our appellate jurisdiction, which we may raise sua sponte. See Grun v. Grun, 496 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 1985).
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(a)(4) states:
(a) General rule.—An appeal may be taken as of right and without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:
(4) Injunctions.—An order that grants or denies, modifies or refuses to modify, continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves or refuses to dissolve an injunction unless the order was entered:
(i) Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), 3505(a); or
(ii) After a trial but before entry of the final order. Such order is immediately appealable, however, if the order enjoins conduct previously permitted or mandated or permits or
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4 On February 12, 2020, Appellee filed an application to quash on the basis that Appellant was appealing an interlocutory order not appealable as of right. Appellee’s Appl. to Quash Appellant’s Interlocutory Appeal, 2/12/20. Appellee argued that the trial court’s December 12, 2019 order was “an interlocutory order which [was] not appealable under the applicable statutes and rules.” Id. at 2. Appellee reasoned that the order “contemplate[d] additional action by the parties, the appointed Trustee and the supervision of” the master, subject to the trial court’s approval. Id. at 6. Appellant did not file a response. On March 10, 2020, this Court denied Appellee’s motion to quash without prejudice to re-raise the issue in her appellate brief or a new application. Order, 3/10/20. Appellee did not re-raise the issue. In any event, as we explain below, we have appellate jurisdiction.
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mandates conduct not previously mandated or permitted, and is effective before entry of the final order.
Pa.R.A.P. 341(a)(4).
As quoted above, Rule 311(a)(4) lists two statutory exceptions: § 3323(f) and § 3505(a). Section 3323(f) of the Domestic Relations Code states:
(f) Equity power and jurisdiction of the court.—In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this part and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f).
We quote Section 3505(a) and 3505(d), of which the instant trial court cited the latter:
(a) Preliminary relief.—Where it appears to the court that a party is about to leave the jurisdiction of the court or is about to remove property of that party from the jurisdiction of the court or is about to dispose of, alienate or encumber property in order to defeat equitable distribution, alimony pendente lite, alimony, child and spousal support or a similar award, an injunction may issue to prevent the removal or disposition and the property may be attached as prescribed by general rules. The court may also issue a writ of ne exeat to preclude the removal.
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(d) Constructive trust for undisclosed assets.—If a party fails to disclose information required by general rule of the Supreme Court and in consequence thereof an asset or assets with a fair market value of $1,000 or more is omitted from the final distribution of property, the party aggrieved by the
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nondisclosure may at any time petition the court granting the award to declare the creation of a constructive trust as to all undisclosed assets for the benefit of the parties and their minor or dependent children, if any. The party in whose name the assets are held shall be declared the constructive trustee unless the court designates a different trustee, and the trust may include any terms and conditions the court may determine. The court shall grant the petition upon a finding of a failure to disclose the assets as required by general rule of the Supreme Court.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(a), (d).
Instantly, the trial court’s order created a constructive trust and enjoined Appellant from alienating any assets that were to be transferred into the trust, which is a form of injunctive relief. See Order, 12/12/19; see generally Santoro v. Morse, 781 A.2d 1220, 1223 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2001) (noting interlocutory appeal as of right may be taken from order granting preliminary injunction and creating constructive trust). Rule 311(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal as of right from an order granting an injunction unless the injunction was created under either Sections 3323(f) or 3505(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). Here, the trial court’s order explicitly created a constructive trust, which is relief within the scope of Section 3505(d). Order, 12/12/19. We therefore do not need to examine whether the trial court could also have created a constructive trust under Section 3323(f) or 3505(a) for the purpose of determining our appellate jurisdiction. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4); 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), 3505(a). Accordingly, Appellant could properly take an interlocutory appeal as of right from the order at issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4).
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We therefore address the merits, and Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Was it an error of law and an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Appellant’s “motion for demurrer” requesting the dismissal of the petition for special relief (“PFSR”) filed by [Appellee], as Appellee was not legally entitled to the relief sought via the PFSR, that being the creation of a constructive trust pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 3505(d)?
2. Was it an error of law and abuse of discretion to grant the relief sought by Appellee in the PFSR, that being the creation of a constructive trust pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 3505(d), due to:
a) the absence of evidence that Appellant violated any general rule of the Supreme Court by failing to disclose information to Appellee; and b) the failure of either party to file a count sounding in equitable distribution pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§]
3502 in the underlying divorce action?
3. Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that assets outlined repeatedly and in detail within jointly filed federal and state income tax returns that Appellee signed and verified under penalty of perjury as being accurate before such time as the parties’ divorce[] were “undisclosed” to Appellee?
Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.
Whether There Was Abuse of Discretion in the Creation of the Constructive Trust
In support of his first issue, Appellant contends that Appellee’s petition for special relief did not specifically cite 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d) in support of a creation of a constructive trust. Id. at 31. Appellant reasons that because Appellee did not explicitly cite Section 3505(d), the trial court should not have granted it. Id. Regardless, Appellant argues, Appellee failed to fulfill the requirements for requesting relief under Sections 3105(a) or 3323(f) because no party has alleged the PSA was breached. Id. at 31-32.
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The standard of review follows:
We review a trial court’s decision to grant [or deny] special relief in divorce actions under an abuse of discretion standard . . . .
However, our deference [to the trial court] is not uncritical. An order may represent an abuse of discretion if it misapplies the law. It is therefore our responsibility to be sure that in entering its order the court correctly applied the law. An order may also represent an abuse of discretion if it reaches a manifestly unreasonable result. This will be the case if the order is not supported by competent evidence. It is therefore also our responsibility to examine the evidence received by the court to be sure that the court’s findings are supported by the evidence.
Although we will accept and indeed regard ourselves as bound by the court’s appraisal of a witness’ credibility, we are not obliged to accept a finding that is not supported by the evidence.
When reviewing questions of law, our scope of review is plenary.
Conway v. Conway, 209 A.3d 367, 371 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted and formatting altered).
Because Appellant also filed a motion for demurrer with respect to Appellee’s petition for special relief, we state the applicable standard of review as well:
A demurrer tests only whether, as a matter of law, the pleaded allegations may entitle the pleader to relief. To answer that question, the pleader’s factual allegations are accepted as true;
because there are no other “facts” before the court, the trial court has no basis to assume otherwise. And because neither party has had any opportunity to present evidence showing what the facts actually are, the law precludes dismissal unless it is “clear and free from doubt” that no relief may be obtained under the pleader’s allegations.
C.G. v. J.H., 172 A.3d 43, 54-55 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).
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Generally, the trial court must have some legal authority for issuing a particular order. See In re Q.R., 199 A.3d 458, 470 (Pa. Super. 2018) (reasoning that a trial court order that lacks statutory authority is void ab initio). For example, in Annechino v. Joire, 946 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. 2008), this Court resolved an appeal from the trial court’s order granting the appellee’s petition to enforce a PSA. Annechino, 946 A.2d at 122. On appeal, the appellant argued that because the “agreement was not incorporated and the pleadings did not include a count for equitable distribution, the [trial] court [did] not have the authority to enforce the [PSA] and [the appellant’s] only remedy [was] a separate civil action in equity.” Id. (emphasis added). The Annechino Court disagreed with the appellant, reasoned that Section 3105(a)5 permits enforcement of a PSA “(a) regardless or whether equitable distribution was pled, and (b) regardless of whether an agreement has been merged or incorporated into the divorce
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5 Section 3105(a) states:
(a) Enforcement.—A party to an agreement regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the court under this part, whether or not the agreement has been merged or incorporated into the decree, may utilize a remedy or sanction set forth in this part to enforce the agreement to the same extent as though the agreement had been an order of the court except as provided to the contrary in the agreement.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(a).
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decree.” Annechino, 946 A.2d at 122; see Peck v. Peck, 707 A.2d 1163, 1164 (Pa. Super. 1998).6 The Annechino Court additionally noted that Section 3323(f)
“expressly authorizes the court to enter orders requiring either party to act or refrain from acting as equity and justice require.” Annechino, 946 A.2d at 124 (citation and footnote omitted). The Annechino Court reasoned that because the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the parties, “[S]ection 3323(f) is a catch-all provision, granting not only broad enforcement powers, but ‘full equity and jurisdiction’ to issue orders necessary to protect the interests of the parties and effectuate economic justice and insure the fair and just settlement of the parties’ property rights.” Id. (citation and
footnote omitted). Notwithstanding Section 3323(f), the Annechino Court
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6 In Peck, the Court addressed an appeal from an order denying a petition to modify alimony. Peck, 707 A.2d at 1163. In resolving the appeal, the Peck Court noted as follows:
Section 3105 of the Divorce Code now permits enforcement of both merged and unmerged property settlement agreements under the Code. However, the amendment neither adds to nor subtracts from the substantive rights of the parties under their property settlement agreement; rather, it merely provides an additional procedural vehicle for the enforcement of their respective rights under their property settlement agreement.
Thus, a party who utilizes the enforcement power under Section 3105 still preserves his or her right to file a civil or equitable action on the property settlement agreement itself.
Peck, 707 A.2d at 1164 (emphases in original, citations omitted, and formatting altered).
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concluded that Section 3105(a) authorized the trial court to enforce the PSA. See id.
Here, Appellant’s petition cited Section 3323(f) but failed to cite Section 3505(d), the exact Section under which the trial court granted relief. See Order, 12/12/19, at 1; Appellee’s Pet. for Special Relief for Constructive Tr. & Accounting, 2/25/19, at 11. Appellant, similar to the appellant in Annechino, alleged the instant trial court lacked any legal authority to enforce the PSA. Cf. Annechino, 946 A.2d at 122. Like the Annechino Court, however, we agree that Section 3323(f)’s “broad enforcement powers” permitted the trial court to issue relief under Section 3505(d), notwithstanding Appellee’s failure to specifically cite to Section 3505(d). See id.
But even if Appellee had not cited Section 3323(f) in her petition, under Annechino, the trial court had an alternative basis under Section 3105(a) to enforce the PSA. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(a); Annechino, 946 A.2d at 122. As for Appellant’s contention that neither party asserted that the PSA was violated, as we noted above, Appellee contended that Appellant fraudulently induced her to sign the PSA by concealing marital assets. Appellee’s Pet. for Special Relief for Constructive Tr. & Accounting at 7. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Conway, 209 A.3d at 371; C.G., 172 A.3d at 54-55.
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Appellant’s Second Issue
Having resolved Appellant’s first issue, we summarize Appellant’s two interrelated arguments in support of his second issue. Appellant’s first argument is that Appellee failed to meet her burden of proof of establishing a violation of any Rule of our Supreme Court for creating a constructive trust under Section 3505(d).7 Appellant’s Brief at 33, 34-35 (asserting, “it is an absolute legal impossibility for a court . . . to place into constructive trust assets that were undisclosed to one of the parties in a divorce action unless that failure to disclose the same by the other party was also in direct violation of a specific Pa.R.C.P.”). In Appellant’s view, neither Appellee nor the trial court can establish that he violated any Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure by failing “to disclose assets to Appellee during the course of their divorce action.” Id. at 37.
Appellant’s second argument in support of his second issue is that because neither party requested equitable distribution, he could not have violated Rule 1920.33 as the trial court held. Id. at 40 (contending, “[e]quitable distribution is not at issue in the instant matter, as it was never
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7 We quoted Section 3505(d) earlier, which states in relevant part, “[i]f a party fails to disclose information required by general rule of the Supreme Court,” the trial court may create a constructive trust. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d).
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ple[d].”). Appellant asserts that he never filed an inventory such that Rule 1920.33 would be triggered. Id. at 41.8 In any event, Appellant posits that even if an inventory was filed, it was invalid. Id. at 41-42. Specifically, Appellant argues that the inventory did not comply with all of the requirements set forth in Rule 1920.75, and it was improperly dated two days after the PSA’s effective date and one day after the parties executed the PSA. Id. at 42. Finally, even if the inventory was valid, Appellant asserts that Appellee no longer has any right to equitable distribution because any such right was extinguished when the trial court entered the divorce decree. Id. at 42-43 (arguing, “the parties’ respective rights to equitable distribution and discovery were forever terminated at the entry of the divorce decree in their action in July of 2016, and the [t]rial [c]ourt cannot revive them in the matters brought before it by Appellee.”).
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8 We quote Appellant’s argument in relevant part as follows:
First, neither party ever filed an inventory, and the docket of the [trial court] is devoid of any reference to the filing of or the acceptance by the prothonotary of an inventory from either party. Any assertion by Appellee that among the boilerplate documents Appellant purchased online and filed in a pro se capacity was a document that is similar to a formal inventory is simply untrue.
Appellant’s Brief at 41.
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We previously stated the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See Conway, 209 A.3d at 371. Rule 1920.33 states:
(a) If a pleading or petition raises a claim for equitable division of marital property under Section 3502 of the Divorce Code, the parties shall file and serve on the other party an inventory, which shall include the information in subdivisions (1) through (3) and shall be substantially in the form set forth in Pa.R.C.P.
No. 1920.75. . . .
The inventory shall set forth as of the date of separation:
(1) a specific description of the marital assets which either or both parties have a legal or equitable interest, . . . and the marital liabilities, which either party incurred individually or jointly with another person . . .
(2) a specific description of the assets or liabilities claimed to be non-marital and the basis for such claim; and
(3) the estimated value of the marital and non-marital assets and the amount due for each marital and non-marital liability.
Pa.R.C.P. 1920.33(a). We need not quote Rule 1920.75, but observe that the Rule does not require strict compliance. See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.75 (noting the “inventory required by Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.33(a) shall be substantially in the following form” (emphasis added)).
We previously summarized this Court’s decision in Annechino, in which the appellant contended the trial court lacked authority to enforce the PSA because no party pled equitable distribution. See Annechino, 946 A.2d at 122. As we stated previously, the Annechino Court held that the trial court had authority to enforce a PSA even if the pleadings did not raise a claim for equitable distribution. See id.
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In Bennett v. Bennett, 168 A.3d 238 (Pa. Super. 2017), the former spouses executed a PSA that was incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree. Bennett, 168 A.3d at 241. Subsequently, the appellee filed a petition to impose a constructive trust, which alleged that the appellant failed to disclose a marital asset. Id. In response, the appellant filed a demurrer, claiming that a Section 3505(d) constructive trust required “the filing of an inventory during the equitable distribution process, and, in the absence of that form, the statutory provision is inapplicable.” Id. at 242 (emphasis added). The trial court overruled the demurrer, held an evidentiary hearing, and granted the appellee’s petition. Id. at 242-43. The appellant appealed.
In resolving the appeal, the Bennett Court reasoned as follows:
By its terms, § 350[5](d) does not require a party to demonstrate that the failure to disclose an asset was deliberate or intentional. This is because the provision is triggered by a breach of a parties’ affirmative obligation to “disclose information required by general rule of the Supreme Court,” e.g., an inventory under Rule 1920.33, which did not occur in this case.
However, mindful that parties to property settlement agreements are entitled to enforcement measures set forth in the Divorce Code, see [23 Pa.C.S.] § 3105(a), we find that the provision’s silence as to disclosure clauses did not preclude [the appellee] from invoking this remedial provision. Cf. Creeks v.
Creeks, 422 Pa. Super. 432, 619 A.2d 754 (1993) (where husband failed to include asset in inventory pursuant to agreement’s disclosure clause, the breach triggers action for constructive trust).
Id. at 244 (emphasis added). In sum, the absence of an inventory did not bar enforcement of the PSA under Section 3105. See id.
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Instantly, the trial court could enforce the PSA regardless of “whether equitable distribution was pled.” See Annechino, 946 A.2d at 122. Further, the trial court’s authority to enforce the PSA did not end after it entered the divorce decree. See, e.g., id. at 124; accord 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d) (permitting a party to petition the court “at any time” for a constructive trust).
Moreover, Appellant did file an inventory as part of the complaint for divorce. See Compl. in Divorce. As we stated above, it was stapled in between the PSA and a document verifying the parties’ social security numbers. See id. Because the inventory did not completely list the parties’ marital assets, it violated Rule 1920.33, which would justify the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust. See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.33; 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d).
But even if the inventory was invalid, as Appellant claims, the Bennett Court held that the trial court has authority to enforce a PSA even in the absence of an inventory. See Bennett, 168 A.3d at 244. The authority to enforce includes the creation of a constructive trust. See id. (enforcing PSA notwithstanding absence of inventory). Assuming the instant inventory was invalid, the trial court retained the authority to enforce the PSA. See id. Finally, we note that despite Appellant’s procedural challenges to the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust, the trial court has “full equity power and jurisdiction” to issue any orders it deems necessary “as equity
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and justice require.”9 See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f). For these reasons, Appellant did not establish the trial court’s abuse of discretion. See Conway, 209 A.3d at 371.
Summary of Background for Appellant’s Final Issue Before summarizing Appellant’s argument for his final issue, we state the following as background. The PSA, with respect to the disposition of the parties’ marital property, included the following clause:
OTHER PROPERTY. The parties represent and acknowledge that there is no other property, real or personal, which is owned jointly or in which both have an interest, and hereafter neither party will make any claim to any item which is in the possession of the other. Each party shall own, have and enjoy independently of any claim or right of the other, all items of property, real or personal, of every kind now or hereafter owned or held by him or her with full power to dispose of same as fully and effectively in all respects and for all purposes as if he or she were unmarried.
R.R. at 631a (emphasis added).
The PSA also included the following clause, which was omitted from the copy of the PSA that was filed with the trial court prior to entry of the divorce decree:
RELIANCE ON MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS
[Appellant] and [Appellee] acknowledge that in entering into this Agreement, each has been induced to and is directly and
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9 It follows that Appellant’s hypertechnical challenges, even if meritorious, would not establish an abuse of discretion by the trial court, given the trial court’s broad mandate.
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materially relying in good faith on the truth and completeness of the representations and warranties expressly made by the other party to this Agreement. The parties have also either agreed to not exchange any financial statements and records, or upon agreement, have exchanged sworn Financial Disclosure Affidavits (Statements of Net Worth) and other financial data including, but not limited to, joint Federal and State Income Tax Returns, W-2 Wage and Tax statements, data regarding the benefits from employment, pension information, bank statements, checking account statements, and credit card bills, as well as other miscellaneous business and personal financial data.
R.R. at 635a. None of the assets at issue in this lawsuit were listed in the inventory or the PSA.
Failure to Disclose Marital Assets In his final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion because there was insufficient evidence that he failed to disclose marital assets. Appellant’s Brief at 44. Initially, Appellant reiterates that Section 3505(d) requires evidence that he violated a Rule of Civil Procedure, and Appellee failed to establish any such violation. Id. at 47. Regardless, Appellant maintains that he disclosed all assets to Appellee in their joint tax returns. Id. at 48.
As we noted above, we review the trial court’s order for an abuse of discretion, including a claim that the “order is not supported by competent evidence.” Conway, 209 A.3d at 371. In Rosiecki v. Rosiecki, 231 A.3d 928 (Pa. Super. 2020), this Court set forth the applicable law in interpreting marital settlement agreements:
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A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by the law of contracts unless the agreement provides otherwise. The terms of a marital settlement agreement cannot be modified by a court in the absence of a specific provision in the agreement providing for judicial modification.
When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function. On appeal from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, we must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the appellate court may review the entire record in making its decision.
However, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.
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In construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous terms, this Court need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding. In other words, the intent of the parties is generally the writing itself. In ascertaining the intent of the parties to a contract when unclear from the writing itself, the court considers the parties’ outward and objective manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and subjective intentions. Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements.
Rosiecki, 231 A.3d at 932-33 (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Peck, 707 A.2d at 1165.
In Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529 (Pa. 2003), our Supreme Court addressed “whether a postnuptial agreement [was] a valid and enforceable
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contract” under the particular facts of that case. Stoner, 819 A.2d at 529. In resolving the issue, the Stoner Court noted the following:
parties to these agreements do not quite deal at arm’s length, but rather at the time the contract is entered into stand in a relation of mutual confidence and trust that calls for disclosure of their financial resources. In light of this unique relationship, we reaffirm the principle . . . that full disclosure of the parties’
financial resources is a mandatory requirement. This requisite acknowledges that the parties stand in a closer relationship beyond that of professional acquaintances negotiating a commercial contract. . . . [T]he right balance is struck by requiring full disclosure of financial assets, in conjunction with the protection of traditional contract remedies for fraud, misrepresentation or duress.
Id. at 533 (citation omitted and formatting altered).
In Bennett, the Court similarly explained:
If an agreement provides that full disclosure has been made, a presumption of full disclosure arises. Likewise, . . . [i]f a spouse attempts to rebut this presumption through an assertion of fraud or misrepresentation then this presumption can be rebutted if it is proven by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, [a]bsent fraud, misrepresentation or duress, spouses should be held to the terms of their agreements. This Court subsequently explained, an agreement is valid even if it does not contain financial disclosure itself and can be upheld if it merely recites that such disclosure has been made. Indeed, a full and fair disclosure in the property settlement agreement merely requires sufficient disclosure to allow the intended party to make an informed decision.
Bennett, 168 A.3d at 245-46 (citations omitted and formatting altered).
Conclusion
Here, after careful review of the record, the parties’ arguments, and the trial court’s reasoning, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 24-26. We do not disturb the trial court’s credibility
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determinations and its fact-finding, as they are supported by the record. See Conway, 209 A.3d at 371. We reiterate that the trial court has “full equity and jurisdiction to issue orders necessary to protect the interests of the parties and effectuate economic justice and insure the fair and just settlement of the parties’ property rights.” See Annechino, 946 A.2d at 124 (formatting altered). The trial court properly exercised its discretion to grant equitable relief in light of any disclosure or non-disclosure. See id. For these reasons, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2020
Circulated 11/30/2020 11:11 AM