Artiemisha Rhodes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 26, 2019
• Docket: 19A-CR-1508
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 26 2019, 9:15 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Christopher Kunz Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Artiemisha Rhodes, December 26, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1508 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff Linda E. Brown, Judge The Honorable Peggy Hart, Magistrate Trial Court Cause Nos. 49G09-1904-CM-13658 49G09-1904-CM-14819

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Artiemisha Rhodes appeals her criminal-trespass convictions, arguing that the

evidence is insufficient to prove that she did not have a contractual interest in

her mother’s house. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In January 2019, thirty-seven-year-old Rhodes was released from jail. After her

release, she stayed “on and off” at her mother Alma Turner’s house, keeping a

“few belongings there.” Tr. p. 25. On April 8, Turner asked Rhodes to leave

her house. Although it’s unclear why Turner asked Rhodes to leave, it is

apparent that there were “a lot of issues . . . about their relationship and

[Turner] didn’t want [Rhodes] in her house or around her property.” Id. at 16.

When Rhodes told her mother that she didn’t have to leave, Turner called the

police. The police responded and told Rhodes that she had to leave. Rhodes

left but returned a couple hours later. Turner again called the police. When

Rhodes told the police that she didn’t have to leave, she was arrested for

criminal trespass and taken to Eskenazi Hospital.

[3] Rhodes was released from the hospital on April 16 and returned to her mother’s

house to “find out . . . if [she] could stay [there].” Id. at 33. Turner told Rhodes

to leave because she couldn’t “deal with the situation anymore.” Id. at 24.

When Rhodes did not leave, the police were called to Turner’s house. Turner

again told Rhodes to leave and explained to the police that Rhodes did not live

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 2 of 5 there. The police told Rhodes to leave. Turner went inside her house, and the

police left. When Turner later looked out her window, she saw that Rhodes

had returned. Turner called the police, and Rhodes was arrested for criminal

trespass.

[4] Thereafter, the State charged Rhodes with two counts of criminal trespass, one

for April 8 and the other for April 16. At trial, Turner testified that Rhodes

didn’t have any interest in her house on either April 8 or 16, that Rhodes did

not pay rent, and that she did not want Rhodes there on either occasion. Id. at

21, 25. Rhodes testified that she “used to pay rent” at her mother’s house but

that she didn’t in April. Id. at 34. The trial court found Rhodes guilty on both

counts.

[5] Rhodes now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [6] Rhodes contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her criminal-

trespass convictions. In order to convict Rhodes of criminal trespass as charged

here, the State had to prove that she (1) did not have a contractual interest in

Turner’s real property and (2) knowingly or intentionally entered Turner’s real

property having been denied entry by Turner. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1);

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 14, 78. Rhodes only challenges whether the State

proved that she did not have a contractual interest in Turner’s real property.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 3 of 5 [7] As defined by our Supreme Court, a “contractual interest in the property” as

required by Section 35-43-2-2 means “a right, title, or legal share of real

property arising out of a binding agreement between two or more parties.”

Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 n.2 (Ind. 2012). The State need not disprove

every conceivable contractual interest, but it must disprove contractual interests

that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which

the trespass allegedly occurred. Id. at 143.

[8] Here, the State proved that Rhodes did not have a contractual interest in her

mother’s house. At trial, Turner confirmed multiple times that Rhodes didn’t

have “any interest” in her house, didn’t own any part of it, and didn’t pay rent.

Tr. p. 21. In addition, Turner testified that although Rhodes had stayed at her

house “on and off” since she was released from jail in January, she was no

longer welcome there. Nevertheless, Rhodes claims that she had “an unwritten

living agreement” with her mother that allowed her to stay there. Appellant’s

Br. p. 8. Although the record shows that Turner had allowed Rhodes to stay at

her house “on and off” after she was released from jail, there was no binding

agreement between them. Cf. Apollos v. State, 59 N.E.3d 266, 268 (Ind. Ct. App.

2016) (“In this case, both Apollos and Francois understood that an agreement

existed, pursuant to which Apollos would live at Francois’s residence in

exchange for rent and/or childcare services for Francois’s daughter. The

precise terms may not have been agreed upon, but both parties understood that

an agreement existed.”). Instead, it appears that Turner allowed Rhodes to stay

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 4 of 5 at her house by her good graces and not pursuant to any binding agreement

between them.

[9] Finally, Rhodes argues that this case “strongly resembles” Semenick v. State, 977

N.E.2d 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Appellant’s Br. p. 13. In that case,

the defendant got into an argument with another worshipper at a Sunday

morning church service. An off-duty police officer working security asked the

defendant to leave. The defendant refused and was arrested for criminal

trespass. On appeal, we reversed the defendant’s conviction, explaining as

follows:

[T]here is uncontroverted testimony that [the defendant] was a church member, and an absence of evidence that [the officer] had authority to demand, without more, that a worshipper leave the sanctuary during Sunday services. Effectively, he intervened between parishioners who presumably had equal interests in the premises, and chose who would stay and who would go.

Semenick, 977 N.E.2d at 10. That is simply not the case here. Turner and

Rhodes did not have “equal interests” in the house; rather, it is undisputed that

Turner owned the house. We therefore affirm Rhodes’s convictions for

criminal trespass.

[10] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 5 of 5