Artiaga-Giron v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: 25-5689
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GILMER ARTIAGA-GIRON, No. 25-5689

Petitioner, Agency No. A077-589-718 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 22, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, FORREST, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Gilmer Artiaga-Giron, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks review of a

decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial by an

immigration judge (“IJ”) of his motion to reopen proceedings and rescind his in

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). absentia order of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we

deny the petition for review.

Where, as here, “the BIA expresse[s] agreement with the reasoning of the IJ,

[we] review[ ] both the IJ[’s] and the BIA’s decisions.” Hernandez v. Garland, 38

F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998

(9th Cir. 2013)). We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of

discretion, and we review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.

Kaur v. Garland, 2 F.4th 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2021).

1. The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Artiaga-Giron’s motion

to reopen based on a lack of notice of his removal hearing. As the agency

recognized, the record shows that Artiaga-Giron was personally served with notice

of the date, time, and location of his removal hearing. Artiaga-Giron argues that

personal service was insufficient because he was released from custody the day

after he was personally served, so he “would not have been able to attend his

hearing as it was on a detained docket.” But Artiaga-Giron does not explain why

his release prevented him from attending his hearing, especially given that Artiaga-

Giron was specifically cautioned that “[f]ailure to appear for this hearing other

than because of exceptional circumstances beyond your control” could result in the

agency entering an in absentia removal order against him. Cf. Arredondo v. Lynch,

824 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that petitioner bears the burden of

2 25-5689 establishing exceptional circumstances caused his failure to appear).

2. Nor did the agency abuse its discretion in denying Artiaga-Giron’s motion

to reopen due to changed country conditions in Honduras. To obtain reopening

premised on changed country conditions, the petitioner must show that the new

evidence of changed conditions “would establish prima facie eligibility for the

relief sought,” among other things. Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1209

(9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Artiaga-Giron offered evidence that his uncle

had been murdered in 2017, and he argued that cartel violence in Honduras had

worsened. As the agency recognized, however, that evidence does not show prima

facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or for relief under the

Convention Against Torture, because it does not establish that Artiaga-Giron fears

future persecution on account of a protected ground or that it is more likely than

not that he would be tortured with the Honduran government’s acquiescence.

Petition DENIED.

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