Arthur v. Nyquist

904 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16510, 1995 WL 646372
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedOctober 18, 1995
Docket1:72-cv-00325
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 904 F. Supp. 112 (Arthur v. Nyquist) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arthur v. Nyquist, 904 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16510, 1995 WL 646372 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).

Opinion

CURTIN, District Judge.

This court has been struggling with the issues in the Buffalo School Case since 1974. After a trial, the court found the defendant Board of Education (“the Board”), the City of Buffalo (“the City”), and the State of New York liable in a decision filed on April 30, *113 1976. Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F.Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y.1976). The decision was affirmed in part by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1976). The court’s finding of liability on the part of the Board and the City was affirmed, and that on the part of the State of New York was reversed.

In a decision to be filed in several weeks, the court will set forth in detail the history of the progress of the remedy phase of this case. But at the present time, the court will ton to the issues which require immediate resolution.

There are several applications pending. Many papers have been filed in support of each application, but the issues presented may be summarized as follows.

1. There are various motions by the City and other parties for a declaration of unitary status, or partial unitary status, under the principles laid down in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992), and Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991).

2. The Board has submitted an Order to Show Cause why it should not be authorized to proceed to operate its schools in the 1995-96 school year at a funding level that it claims will not permit compliance with this court’s desegregation orders to the extent of compliance in 1994-95.

3. The plaintiffs have filed a cross motion for an order directing the City to provide, in the 1995-96 school year, certain funds necessary to maintain programs that the plaintiffs consider crucial to the continued success of the desegregation program.

In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court reemphasized that “[t]he duty and responsibility of a school district once segregated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system.” 503 U.S. at 485, 112 S.Ct. at 1442. In supervising a desegregation case, a district court’s authority is limited: “A remedy is justifiable only insofar as it advances the ultimate objective of alleviating the initial constitutional violation.” Id. at 489, 112 S.Ct. at 1444. “[I]n the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations.” Id. at 490, 112 S.Ct. at 1445. During the final phases of a desegregation case, “[t]he District Court should address itself to whether the Board ha[s] complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.” 503 U.S. at 492, 112 S.Ct. at 1446 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50, 111 S.Ct. at 637-38). “Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental system.” Id. 503 U.S. at 490, 112 S.Ct. at 1445. As the Supreme Court stated:

the court’s end purpose must be to remedy the violation and, in addition, to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution____ (“[T]he federal courts in devising a remedy must take in account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution.”) ... In Dowell, we emphasized that federal judicial supervision of local school systems was intended as a “temporary measure.” ... Although this temporary measure has lasted decades, the ultimate objective has not changed — to return school districts to the control of local authorities____ [A] court [must] provide an orderly means for withdrawing from control when it is shown that the school district has attained the requisite degree of compliance. A transition phase in which control is relinquished in a gradual way is an appropriate means to this end.
In considering the[ ] factors [which must inform the discretion of the court in ordering partial or complete withdrawal of its supervision of a desegregation case], a court should give particular attention to the school system’s record of compliance. A school system is better positioned to *114 demonstrate its good-faith commitment to a constitutional course of action when its policies form a consistent pattern of lawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations. And, with the passage of time, the degree to which racial imbalances continue to represent vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish, and the practicability and efficacy of various remedies can be evaluated with more precision.

503 U.S. at 489-92, 112 S.Ct. at 1444-46.

In this case, the City urges that unitary status has been achieved in the areas of faculty and staff hiring, student assignment, and transportation, and that as a result it should be dismissed as a defendant. The Board agrees that unitary status has been achieved in most areas, but maintains that there should be no such finding in the absence of a good-faith commitment from the City that it will meet its obligation to fund the School District to the extent necessary for the District to meet its obligations to the children attending the Buffalo schools, including the obligation to maintain a high-quality desegregated education program. The plaintiffs oppose a finding of unitary status at this time, believing that such a finding would be premature.

In accordance with the guidance of Freeman and other Supreme Court cases, I have carefully considered the detailed record supplied in this case, and the good faith and responsibility of the Board, the City, and the other participants. I have concluded that unitary status has now been attained, and that supervision of the School District shall be returned to the Board under terms which will be outlined in this order. Because of the need to provide immediate financial assistance to the Board, I will issue a summary order now, to be followed by a more detailed explanation for the declaration of unitary status as soon as is practicable.

At this point, I should briefly review the history of this litigation after the original liability order was filed on April 30, 1976. Within a few weeks, on May 18, 1976, the Board filed what was known as the “Phase I” plan. The plan provided that ten schools should be closed and their population merged with other schools in the district. This had the immediate effect of enhancing racial balance and also improving educational efforts, because the schools which were closed were either too small or in poor condition.

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959 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D. Missouri, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
904 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16510, 1995 WL 646372, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthur-v-nyquist-nywd-1995.