Arthur S. Lord v. Commissioner

10 T.C.M. 521, 1951 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMay 31, 1951
DocketDocket No. 27532.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 10 T.C.M. 521 (Arthur S. Lord v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arthur S. Lord v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. 521, 1951 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212 (tax 1951).

Opinion

Arthur S. Lord v. Commissioner.
Arthur S. Lord v. Commissioner
Docket No. 27532.
United States Tax Court
1951 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212; 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 521; T.C.M. (RIA) 51156;
May 31, 1951
James W. Cooper, Esq., for the petitioner. Robert Margolis, Esq., for the respondent.

RAUM

Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion

The respondent determined a deficiency in the income and victory tax of petitioner for the calendar year 1943 in the amount of $772.84. 1 The sole issue is whether rental payments made by petitioner in the amount of $1,485 in 1942 and $1,980*213 in 1943 are deductible as non-business expenses under the provisions of Section 23 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Section 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942.

Findings of Fact

Petitioner is an attorney and a resident of Weston, Connecticut. He filed his Federal income tax return and an amended Federal income tax return for the taxable year 1942 on March 15, 1943, and March 15, 1945, respectively. His return for the taxable year 1943 was filed on March 15, 1945. These returns were filed with the collector of internal revenue for the district of Maryland.

In April, 1940, the petitioner leased the premises located at 162 Prospect Street, New Haven, Connecticut, from Yale University for residential purposes. The lease was for a period of ten years, but was terminable at the end of five years upon proper notice and upon payment of a penalty of $500. The University insisted upon a long-term lease as a condition precedent to spending a substantial sum renovating and modernizing the house for the petitioner.

The petitioner, who had been*214 practicing law in New York, moved to New Haven on September 1, 1940, with his family to engage in postgraduate work in economics at Yale University. He had in mind that this might eventually lead to employment as a teacher at the University. He and his wife found that living in the leased premises was far more expensive than they had anticipated, and that living in New Haven was not as pleasant as they had hoped it would be. Moreover, petitioner was neglecting his studies at Yale in favor of some legal work in New York City, and the departure of some members of the graduate school faculty to other cities to engage in war work had an adverse effect upon the courses he was taking.

In January, 1942, the petitioner accepted a position in Washington, D.C., with the Export-Import Bank, and rented an apartment in that city for a one-year term. During the same month he listed the New Haven house with the Yale University Rental Bureau for rent at $165 a month, which was the amount he was paying under the lease. He told the Bureau that he was leaving the property for good, had no intention of returning to it, and was anxious to find a tenant as soon as possible. Later in the spring of 1942*215 the house was listed with other real estate agencies in New Haven. "For Rent" signs were placed on the property.

Under the lease the University's approval of any sublease was required. When the petitioner listed the property for rent with the University, it cooperated in every way in attempting to sublease on behalf of the petitioner.

Petitioner and his family moved to Washington on March 20, 1942. Before leaving New Haven he turned the keys to the house over to the University and one of the rental agencies, and notified the others that they could acquire access to the property through the University. He moved most of the furnishings of the New Haven house to Washington, put some in storage in New Haven, and left a few items in the house which he thought might make it more readily rentable. These items included venetian blinds and stair carpeting.

The petitioner expected to rent the New Haven property quickly. It proved to be difficult to rent, however, because of wartime conditions. Although the real estate agencies had several prospects, the petitioner was not successful in obtaining a tenant during the years 1942 and 1943, despite the fact that he gradually lowered the rental*216 asked from $165 to $100 a month. He finally, with the approval of the University, rented the property in 1944 for $125 per month.

The petitioner permanently abandoned the use of the New Haven house as a residence on March 20, 1942.

In his amended return for the year 1942 and his return for the year 1943 petitioner claimed as deductions the respective amounts of $1,485 and $1,980, which represented the amount of rentals paid by him on the New Haven property from and after March 30, 1942. The claimed deductions were disallowed by the respondent.

Opinion

RAUM, Judge: The petitioner contends that the rental paid by him on the Connecticut property during the years 1942 and 1943 and disallowed by the respondent is deductible under the provisions of Section 23 (a) (2), Internal Revenue Code, which permits an individual to deduct "all ordinary and necessary expenses paid * * * for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income".

These provisions were added to the Internal Revenue Code by Section 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 798, 819). Prior thereto taxpayers*217 not engaged in business were not allowed deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses for the production of income and were thus in effect taxed on gross income. The amendment was adopted to correct this inequity. See H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 46, 75; S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 87-88. Pertinent provisions of Regulations 111, Section 29.23 (a)-15 (as amended by T.D. 5331, 1944 C.B. p. 98) are set forth in the margin. 2

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Related

Martin H. Fishman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
837 F.2d 309 (Seventh Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
10 T.C.M. 521, 1951 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthur-s-lord-v-commissioner-tax-1951.